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My focus is the everyday distinction between lies and other deceptive speech acts—acts of 
misleading—which involve saying something truthful with the intention of causing one’s listener 
to have false beliefs. 
The distinction resists straightforward pre-theoretical formulation, but it is closely tied to 
the concept of saying: if what someone said, strictly speaking, is true, then she did not lie—
though she may have misled. Ever since Paul Grice distinguished what a speaker says from what 
she otherwise communicates (e.g., via implicatures), theorists have attempted to provide a 
rigorous circumscription of ‘what is said’.  I test these theories according to how well they 
handle our intuitions about the lying/misleading distinction, and find that no extant account can 
adequately underwrite that distinction—in the process discovering that the boundary in question 
is even more difficult to draw than initially expected. 
Positions in the debate over ‘what is said’ can be characterized as more or less minimal, 
according to how much pragmatic—as opposed to semantic—content is taken to be a part of 
what a speaker says. There are different accounts, though, of how to characterize the division of 
labor between Semantics and Pragmatics, so I turn my attention to those, applying the lessons of 
my previous investigations. I focus mainly on a prominent recent proposal from Herman 
Cappelen and Ernest Lepore (“Semantic Minimalism”), according to which semantic content is 
particularly austere. I argue that their account is deeply flawed. I then briefly examine some 
alternative views from the literature, expressing guarded skepticism about those.  
LYING, MISLEADING, AND LANGUAGE 
Matthew Knachel, PhD 
University of Pittsburgh, 2014
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Finally, I turn to non-linguistic philosophical questions that arise in connection with my 
focal concern: How should lying be defined? What is the moral (and legal) significance of the 
lying/misleading distinction? I argue that the literature on the definition of lying would be 
enriched by more carefully considering competing accounts of assertion, and that a Robert 
Brandom-style normative account seems the best option. I conclude that it’s difficult to make the 
case for a moral difference between lying and misleading, but that a legal distinction can be 
made with the help of my earlier conclusions. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
In 2005 I watched Harry Frankfurt appear on The Daily Show with Jon Stewart to discuss his 
(surprisingly best-selling) “book” On Bullshit.1 He and Stewart had an amusing back-and-forth, 
in the course of which Stewart asked whether political “spin” is a species of bullshit and 
Frankfurt confirmed (somewhat tentatively) that he thought it was. I found this answer puzzling, 
since the crucial characteristic of the bullshitter, for Frankfurt, is his lack of concern for the truth: 
unlike the liar, or the honest man, he has no regard for truth-values—“He does not care whether 
the things he says describe reality correctly. He just picks them out, or makes them up, to suit his 
purpose.”2 The politician, on the other hand, is profoundly concerned with truth, in the following 
sense: he doesn’t want to get caught saying something false, opening himself up to accusations 
of being a liar. He must therefore take extraordinary care in crafting his statements, especially, as 
is often the case, when he aims to cause his listeners to have false beliefs. This activity—
speaking truly but manipulatively, often in such a way as to engender false beliefs—requires 
tremendous skill. Frankfurt himself acknowledges this, noting that in the realms of politics, 
public relations, and advertising “there are exquisitely sophisticated craftsmen who—with the 
help of advanced and demanding techniques of market research, of public opinion polling, of 
                                                 
1
 Frankfurt 2005. Scare quotes on ‘book’ because its content is just a short essay from decades before, made suitable 
for binding by manipulating page-size and margins. Here is the URL for the televised segment: 
http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/mon-march-14-2005/harry-g--frankfurt  
2
 Ibid. p. 56 
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psychological testing, and so forth—dedicate themselves tirelessly to getting every word and 
image they produce exactly right.”3,4 This is an apt description; he’s just wrong, I think, to 
characterize these people as bullshitters, since part of what makes their job so difficult is that 
they have to respect the truth (advertising and public relations firms are just as wary as the 
politician of being accused of lying). 
The distinction to which these craftspeople must be highly sensitive is a familiar one: it’s 
the difference between lying and (merely) misleading.
5
 It is quite possible to cause listeners to 
have false beliefs by saying things that are, strictly speaking, true. For example, grocery stores 
often advertise that, say, cans of soup are on sale by affixing a little placard to the shelf reading 
something like, “10 for $10.” This sign reports, truthfully, that for $10, one can purchase ten 
cans of soup. What the sign doesn’t mention, but which is also true, is that one can purchase a 
single can of soup for $1, or two for $2, and so on. The deal is: soup’s on sale for a buck a can. 
The reason they advertise the deal the way they do—rather than a more straightforward “$1 
each”—is that they hope that some customers will make an inference to the false belief that in 
order to get the special price, they must buy ten cans; the store’s hoping that some people will 
buy more soup than they otherwise would have. Hence, the poor little old lady laboring to push 
                                                 
3
 Ibid. p. 23 
4
 One of the greatest contemporary craftsmen of this sort, Frank Luntz, has outlined his techniques in detail. See 
Luntz 2007.  
5
 To be more precise, I should say ‘attempting to mislead’, since ‘mislead’ is a success-term, and so would describe 
the perlocutionary act of (successfully) causing false beliefs; lies, on the other hand, may fail in their deceptive goals 
(if such goals they have; the case of the “bald-faced” lie may be an exception), and so to lie is a mere illocutionary 
act. That said, I intend to bypass such fussiness, and use ‘mislead’ as shorthand for the illocutionary variant 
preceded by ‘attempt to’. (The distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary speech acts comes from Austin 
1962.) 
 A further note on ‘mislead’: misleading, unlike lying (at least normally; again, “bald-faced” lies may be an 
exception) is something one could do unintentionally—by accidentally mis-speaking, for example,  in a way that 
causes one’s hearer to have a false belief. In exploring the distinction between lying and misleading, I intend to 
focus on intentional acts only, so I will use ‘mislead’ in this more restricted sense. It might be suggested that 
deceiving is always intentional, so ‘deceive’ might be a better choice than ‘mislead’; but I take it that lying and 
misleading (in my sense) are different species of deception, so I will stick with ‘mislead’, suitably qualified. (Thanks 
to Kieran Setiya raising questions about these distinctions.) 
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the cart laden with multiples-of-ten sized stacks of soup cans, boxed potatoes, and frozen 
dinners—most of which she doesn’t need. 
The focus of the present work is the boundary between such misleading speech acts on 
the one hand, and outright lies on the other. Contemplation of this boundary—where it lies, how 
to draw it, whether it’s sharp or fuzzy, what its moral and legal significance should be, and so 
on—quickly involves one in the contemplation of a variety of philosophical questions. Viewing 
the issues from this vantage, I maintain, can give us fresh insights into vexed questions. The 
purpose of this introduction is to give the reader an overview of the philosophical literatures 
concerning some of the issues that arise when we focus on the lying/misleading distinction. 
1.1 WHAT IS SAID 
In order to distinguish between lying and (merely) misleading, we rely on some apparently 
commonsensical considerations. One is the distinction between what one says (strictly speaking), 
and what one merely implies. We might isolate the former by looking at what was actually 
uttered. In the case of the misleading sign at the grocery store, we have ‘10 for $10’.6 To decide 
whether this is true or false, we might inquire after another commonsense notion—what the 
utterance literally means; this will give us its truth-conditions. Clearly, the claim in question is 
true just in case $10 will get you ten cans of soup, and so what was said is strictly speaking or 
literally true.
7
 Any inference to the further claim that one must buy ten cans (or some multiple of 
                                                 
6
 Unnecessarily pedantic remark: it wasn’t uttered, but written. Yes. Speech acts needn’t be spoken; written 
communication can be analyzed the same way as spoken. 
7
 There is an ambiguity here. Is ‘strictly speaking’ modifying ‘what is said’, or ‘true’? I’ve apparently used it both 
ways. Does it make a difference? It could: as we’ll see below, there may be stricter or looser standards according to 
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ten cans) in order to get a special deal goes beyond the literal meaning of what was said; such 
claims are merely implied. And whether or not they are implied is arguable: the grocery store 
might defend itself from accusations of deceptiveness, arguing that no such implication was 
intended; they use the larger numbers to highlight just how good a deal people are getting, to 
make it more vivid (you could stock up on a whole month’s worth of soup for a relative 
pittance!). This feature of what is implied in communication—that it’s debatable—isn’t an aspect 
of what is said; that’s an objective fact. 
So suggests common sense, at least arguably. As a pre-theoretical first pass at the 
phenomenon, this account has some initial intuitive plausibility. But as soon as we begin to 
examine things a bit more closely, we quickly find ourselves in deeper linguistic and 
philosophical waters. One problem with our account as stated has to do with our proposed 
identification of what is said by the sign with the sentence on it: ‘10 for $10’ is not a 
grammatical sentence. And so (adding just one layer of terminological/philosophical 
sophistication) it cannot express a proposition, and there can be no question of truth-value. Of 
course, people communicate their thoughts using mere phrases and non-sentences all the time; 
we might say that such expressions are elliptical for complete sentences. But what exactly we 
mean by ‘elliptical’, and how we account for the phenomenon, is a vexed topic in linguistics and 
philosophy.
8
 If what is said in an act of speech must be a sentence, then the sign in our example 
does not provide one; which sentence should be singled out as the thing that it says—or even 
whether there is only one such thing—is an open question. In trying to answer it, we might start 
                                                                                                                                                             
which we identify what is said, as when we report the utterances of others with varying degrees of fidelity to the 
syntax and semantics of the original; also, there can be stricter or looser standards according to which we evaluate 
the truth of claims, as when we allow degrees of truth for claims involving vague predicates, for example. I want to 
set aside degrees of truth, however. There is a sense in which demands for strict truth and strict utterance-content are 
the same, since the latter can simply be understood as truth-conditions; strict truth-conditions give you strict truth (or 
falsity). The ambiguity, therefore, makes no difference. 
8
 See, for example, Stainton 2004 and 2005. 
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by noting that one could accurately report what the sign says as something like ‘For $10, one can 
purchase ten cans of soup.’ The practice of reporting the sayings of others is quite common; such 
indirect reports needn’t quote the original exactly in order to be considered acceptable. But 
would any such acceptable report capture what was said by the original? For example, one might 
report what the sign said by giving its true upshot: ‘Soup costs a dollar per can.’ That may seem 
OK, but it’s also true that seven cans of soup cost $7. And yet it seems wrong to characterize 
what the sign says with a sentence like ‘For $7 one can purchase seven cans of soup.’ Nor are 
such problems unique to cases such as ours, in which the original act was committed using less 
than a full, declarative sentence. Elisabeth Camp has a nice example, in which the original 
utterance, made by a certain George to an acquaintance named Alex, is “I’ve run into Jim 
coming out of the Bluebird Diner the last three Monday nights.”9 Alex, we’re told, knows that 
the Democratic Party holds its weekly meetings on Mondays at that diner. He therefore reports 
George’s original utterance as follows: “George says Jim’s been going to the Democratic party 
meetings at the Bluebird the last few Mondays.”10 This report seems innocuous enough, until we 
imagine a chain of similarly altered reports eventually coming back to Jim, who’s confronted by 
a right-winger about his left-leaning views. Jim, who prefers to keep his opinions to himself, is 
angry at George, who made the original report of Jim’s comings and goings on Mondays, for 
saying things about his politics. But, if we suppose that George had no knowledge of Democratic 
meetings at the Bluebird, he can rightly object that he never said anything about Jim’s politics. 
So, though the practice of reporting what was said by others often involves the production of 
sentences that differ from those originally uttered (if, indeed, the original utterance even 
involved a sentence), we cannot necessarily rely on such reports to give us a correct 
                                                 
9
 Camp 2007, p. 206 
10
 Ibid. 
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characterization of what was said originally. It is evidently not so easy to say what is said by any 
utterance. 
 Returning to our original focus, however, may help clear things up. We’re interested in 
the boundary between lies and acts of misleading. As we noted, one might defend oneself against 
the accusation of a lie by appealing to the truth of what one said, strictly speaking. What we’re 
after, then, is a more constrained notion, one which rules out the kinds of wanton speech-
reporting that got us into trouble above. Still, we need some criterion by which we might 
precisely delimit the content of what is said. Paul Grice was the first theorist to provide a 
systematic account of this and related phenomena.
11
 He distinguished, in acts of communication, 
between what is said, on the one hand, and what is “implicated”, on the other.12 Implicata (i.e., 
things implicated) go beyond the content of what is said in an utterance; they are aspects of what 
is communicated by an utterance that are meant by the speaker without being said. We’ll explore 
Grice’s ideas in more detail in Chapter 2, but for now I want to highlight what he says about 
‘what is said.’ He’s a bit vague on the subject, but states that what he has in mind is something 
“closely related to the conventional meaning of the words (the sentence)… uttered.”13 Further, he 
says that its content is determined by “the particular meanings of the elements of [the sentence 
uttered], their order, and their syntactical character.”14 Kent Bach dubs this the “Syntactic 
Correlation constraint.”15 What we have here is a kind of codification of the thoughts behind our 
commonsensical first pass above. What is said by an utterance is closely tied to, if not identified 
with, the actual sentence uttered and its conventional (or literal) meaning. This kind of constraint 
                                                 
11
 See Grice 1989. 
12
 ‘Implicate’ was a neologism for Grice: “I wish to introduce, as terms of art, the verb implicate and the related 
nouns implicature (cf. implying) and implicatum (cf. what is implied).” Ibid., p. 24.  
13
 Ibid., p. 25 
14
 Ibid., p. 87 
15
 Bach 2001, p. 15 
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rules out all but the most faithful indirect reports of someone’s speech act, thereby avoiding the 
troubles above. However, it gives rise to its own set of difficulties. 
First, as we’ve already seen, we may not have, in our original utterance, a complete 
declarative sentence—and so syntactic constraint leaves us without truth-conditions. But even if 
we set those difficult cases aside, the identification of what is said even by a fully sentential 
utterance isn’t as straightforward as it may seem. Even utterances of full sentences may leave us 
unable to determine truth-value—not because of any epistemological shortcomings we may have 
as hearers, but because the sentence, while grammatically complete, seems to fall short of 
expressing a full proposition. So, for example, if someone says “Rose isn’t tall enough,” the 
sentence alone doesn’t provide us with enough information to make an evaluation.16 We need to 
know what it is she’s not tall enough for. Not tall enough to ride the rollercoaster, to reach the 
top shelf, to play for the Lakers? What? In order to evaluate such utterances, we need input from 
the context in which it is uttered. If we’re at the county fair, in line for the Tilt-A-Whirl, we 
might judge the statement false; if we’re evaluating her prospects for the upcoming NBA draft, 
we might judge it true. This kind of (apparent) contextual dependence of truth-conditions is a 
pervasive linguistic phenomenon, and it can manifest in a variety of ways. Some sentences, like 
‘Rose isn’t tall enough’, are grammatically complete, but their dependence on context to deliver 
truth-evaluable propositions is relatively obvious. Other sentences may also display such 
contextual dependence, but less-obviously. Suppose Allen has exactly three children. Now 
consider an utterance of ‘Allen has two children.’ False, right? Maybe. In most contexts, the 
utterance would mis-characterize the facts. But suppose the context is this: one of Allen’s friends 
has just learned about a special tax-credit available to parents with two or more children; he’s 
                                                 
16
 Rose is my older daughter, who’s tall for her age, but not that tall. We’ll see her in a lot of examples. Probably her 
little sister, Alice, too. 
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thinking about whom he should inform about this money-saving opportunity, and utters the 
sentence in question. Now the utterance is true; in this context, at least two, rather than exactly 
two, is the operative sense of ‘two’ in the sentence. Examples like this can be multiplied. The 
apparent ubiquity of such contextual dependence has led some to conclude that Grice’s strategy 
for using syntactically constrained literal meanings of uttered sentences to identify what is said is 
hopeless: in a suitable context, almost any sentence can be used to say a wide variety of things.
17
 
In his 1985, Charles Travis takes several apparently straightforward sentences and shows that, 
despite first appearances, their truth-values are not so simple to determine when we imagine 
various contexts. Considering ‘The kettle is black’, he says, “Suppose the kettle is normal 
aluminum, but soot covered; normal aluminum but painted; cast iron, but glowing from heat; cast 
iron but enameled white on the inside; on the outside; cast iron with a lot of brown grease stains 
on the outside; etc.”18 John Searle subjects ‘The cat is on the mat’ to similar treatment.19 Faced 
with these considerations, one might begin to despair of using literal meanings of uttered 
sentences as a means of identifying what is said. Paul Ziff puts the concern pungently: “The 
factors that serve to determine what is said… appear to constitute a hopelessly unmanageable 
motley. … One may have a firm grasp of the phonology, morphology, syntax and semantics of a 
language, thus a thorough knowledge of the language, and yet not understand what is said in that 
language.”20  
This kind of nihilism about literal meaning, one might worry, could provide the liar with 
a Freddy Riedenschneider-style defense: who’s to say whether what I said was, strictly speaking, 
                                                 
17
 See Searle 1978, Travis 1985 and 1997, Ziff 1972. 
18
 Travis 1985, p. 197 
19
 Searle, op. cit. 
20
 Ziff, op. cit. p. 38 
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true; “[T]here is no ‘what [is said]’—not in any sense that we can grasp, with our puny minds.”21 
But of course, just as Riedenschneider’s absurd defense rested on a 
misunderstanding/misrepresentation of (Werner) Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle, such a 
skeptical conclusion about ‘what is said’ based on Searle’s and Travis’s examples would rest on 
a similar mistake. For their point is not that there is no such thing as what is said by an utterance; 
rather, their aim is to undermine a particular conception of that notion, viz., a syntactically 
constrained, literal—one might say minimal—conception. 
Now we can start to see a bit more clearly the contours of the philosophical landscape I 
aim to explore. We will examine various closely related debates within this space, using the 
distinction between lying and misleading as our point of entry. The notion of what is said 
(strictly speaking) by an utterance, as we’ve seen, is crucial to drawing that distinction, and so 
one of our main foci will be a debate over how to delimit that crucial notion. There is a range of 
views in the literature. At one end, we have relatively minimal characterizations of ‘what is said’, 
according to which it is very closely related to the literal meaning of the sentence uttered. This 
view must be somewhat moderated in light of the sorts of phenomena we’ve briefly mentioned—
where the context of the utterance obtrudes to affect its content—but, as we’ll see, it’s still 
possible to elucidate a coherent position on which there is minimal difference between sentence-
meaning and what is said by an utterance of that sentence. The further we move from this basic 
minimalist position on the spectrum of views about ‘what is said’, the more we allow contextual 
                                                 
21
 Coen and Coen 2001. In the film, Riedenschneider, a high-cost defense attorney in a murder trial, attempts to 
create doubt about his client’s guilt in the minds of jurors by claiming that there’s no such thing as ‘what happened’, 
since “[t]hey got this guy, in Germany. Fritz Something-or-other. Or is it? Maybe it's Werner. Anyway, he's got this 
theory: you wanna test something, you know, scientifically - how the planets go round the sun, what sunspots are 
made of, why the water comes out of the tap - well, you gotta look at it. But sometimes you look at it, your looking 
changes it. Ya can't know the reality of what happened, or what would've happened if you hadn't-a stuck in your 
own goddamn schnozz. So there is no ‘what happened’. Not in any sense that we can grasp, with our puny minds. 
Because our minds... our minds get in the way. Looking at something changes it. They call it the ‘Uncertainty 
Principle’. Sure, it sounds screwy, but even Einstein says the guy's on to something.” 
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factors to contribute—and these factors can be quite unruly: they may involve, for example, 
nonce interpretations of newly minted metaphorical usages, that, while clear enough in context, 
cannot be determined by the application of linguistic rules and consultation of established word-
meanings. If we go far enough along this path, we end up with Searle and Travis, where every 
utterance must be evaluated within its own context, where its content is completely up for grabs; 
but there are more moderate, intermediate positions, which allow to a greater or lesser degree for 
the intrusion of contextual factors into the determination of what is said. Our central question 
will be this: where along this spectrum can we find a conception of ‘what is said’ suitable to 
underwrite a clear distinction between lying and misleading? 
1.2 THE SEMANTICS/PRAGMATICS DIVIDE 
One way we might characterize the debate over ‘what is said’ is this: the more conservative 
minimalist positions see semantic factors as playing the primary role in its determination, while 
the more liberal views allow pragmatic considerations to play a central role. There is a closely 
related debate in the literature over how to demarcate the domains of Semantics and 
Pragmatics—indeed, over how to understand what we mean by those terms. The distinction 
between Semantics and Pragmatics as separate domains of linguistic inquiry goes back a ways. 
Rudolf Carnap influentially abstracted the domain of the former—“expressions and their 
designata”—from that of the latter—“investigation[s] [in which] explicit reference is made to 
the… user of a language.”22 The basic idea is that Semantics covers conventional meanings of 
                                                 
22
 Carnap 1942, p. 9. This was part of a tripartite distinction, with Syntax the third discipline, abstracted from 
Semantics, dealing with “only the relations between the expressions….” 
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expressions abstracted from actual usage, while Pragmatics deals with questions about what 
speakers mean by using various expressions (with their given conventional meanings). This 
formulation is too simple, however, in that it ignores the fact that the truth-conditional 
contribution of many expressions—thought to be a purely semantic topic—depends upon their 
use. So-called indexical expressions can refer to various things, depending on context; words like 
‘I’, ‘here’, ‘now’, ‘this’, and so on display this sort of flexibility. This would seem to cede to 
Pragmatics some role in what was thought to be the domain of Semantics—the assignment of 
truth-conditional content. David Kaplan rescues some systematic role for Semantics, though, 
with his distinction between character and content. According to this account, the conventional 
meaning of indexical expressions is not a full-fledged content (a referent, e.g.), but a function—
called a “character”—from contexts to contents. The word ‘I’, for example, has for its character a 
function that maps the context of its use to its user, the speaker.
23
 
With this insight in hand, it is possible to draw a boundary between Semantics and 
Pragmatics that departs only minimally from Carnap’s original formulation. The domain of 
Semantics is the literal, truth-conditional contents of sentences as determined by the rules of 
language. Accommodation can be made for indexicality in this picture: the literal content of 
indexical expressions is determined in context by their conventional meanings, which are just 
functions from contexts to contents. This is a highly constrained contribution from context; it 
contrasts with the unconstrained appeals to contextual factors typical of Pragmatics, which 
concerns itself with the determination of what speakers mean when they make utterances. 
Speaker-meaning typically outstrips literal meaning (as when, for example, implicatures are 
involved), so in making such determinations, one must consider a speaker’s intentions, the 
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identification of which might involve bringing to bear various bits of background knowledge 
about features of the context of discourse that go well beyond those used to nail down the values 
of indexicals (e.g., speaker, time, location). Those indices are part of what Kent Bach calls 
“narrow context”, as opposed to the “wide context” consulted in determining speaker-meaning. 
The former provides semantic values; the latter allows us to ascertain speakers’ intentions.24 In 
this picture, Semantics provides an input for Pragmatics: literal meanings of expressions uttered 
are part of the information one must consider in determining speaker-meaning; they are an 
interpretational starting point, which aspects of wide context may or may not modify or augment 
in various ways as one zeroes in on the proper understanding of an utterance. Semantic and 
pragmatic processes are complementary aspects of utterance interpretation. 
Something like this is what Francois Recanati calls the “Standard Picture” of the 
Semantics/Pragmatics divide.
25
 It has been challenged. Many theorists point out that, even on 
this understanding of the division of labor between Semantics and Pragmatics, many supposedly 
semantic phenomena seem to involve pragmatic processes. One issue here is the question 
whether Semantics can always provide truth-conditional content. On the Standard Picture, it is 
supposed to; Semantics delivers literal meanings, and what are the meanings of (declarative) 
sentences but the truth-conditions of the propositions they express? So says a venerable tradition 
in the philosophy of language. But there are many sentences, it seems, whose semantic content 
falls short of truth-evaluable propositions. Take, for example, a sentence we’ve already seen: 
‘Rose isn’t tall enough’. As we pointed out above, it’s not clear how we’re supposed to evaluate 
an utterance of this sentence for truth or falsity unless we know what it is she’s not tall enough 
for. And this information can only be provided by context. Now, the contextual information 
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needed to make a determination in this case is not an aspect of “narrow context” as characterized 
above; it doesn’t seem to involve assigning values to indexical expressions. But if that’s the case, 
then what’s needed to provide truth-conditions for this utterance is the consultation of “wide 
context”—i.e., Pragmatics. Stephen Levinson calls this phenomenon “pragmatic intrusion”, to 
capture the idea that in these cases Pragmatics seems to be crossing the boundary and intruding 
into supposedly semantic territory—the determination of truth-conditions.26 This sort of breach is 
qualitatively different from the (what Levinson calls “pre-semantic”27) contribution of 
Pragmatics to the determination of semantic values for indexicals: it is not—at least not 
obviously—driven by the syntax of utterances. Indexicals are a syntactical element of sentences 
whose meanings, as it were, compel us to consult context; Jason Stanley and Jeffrey King 
characterize this kind of pragmatic intrusion as a “weak pragmatic effect.”28  “Strong pragmatic 
effects,” on the other hand, “[are] one[s] in which context affects what is communicated, but not 
by affecting the referential contents of any lexical item in a sentence.”29 Now, one could argue, 
in the case of our example of ‘Rose isn’t tall enough’, that there is a lexical element in that 
sentence that demands contribution from context—viz., the word ‘enough’—so that in this case 
we may say that any propositional completion of the original (‘She isn’t tall enough to play for 
the Lakers’) is properly a semantic content on the Standard Picture. This is debatable. But there 
are myriad examples of the (supposed) phenomenon of semantic underdetermination—when the 
deliverances of Semantics are not propositional, and hence not truth-evaluable—and for many of 
them it’s not clear at all how one can massage things so that the effect of context can be 
characterized as “weak.” I’ll modify an example from Stephen Neale: I may use the sentence 
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‘The chair broke within a week’ to express the proposition that the chair I purchased from Smith 
broke within a week of my purchasing it.
30
 Now, while it might be claimed that a specification of 
reference-time to fix the period of ‘within a week’ is semantically required, it’s much less 
plausible to claim that the semantics of ‘chair’ demands a specification of the person from whom 
it was purchased. The intrusion of strong pragmatic effects is much harder to deny is such cases. 
Another problem for the Standard Picture is presented by cases in which there is no 
underdetermination—Semantics delivers a full proposition—but the purely semantic truth-
conditions are, intuitively, the wrong truth-conditions. Suppose I utter the sentence ‘Alice 
finished her green beans and got a treat’ in a typical family-dinner context.31 This sentence is a 
conjunction: its literal semantic meaning gives us truth-conditions according to which temporal 
order doesn’t matter; so the sentence would be vindicated by a scenario in which Alice first 
sneaked a chocolate chip cookie and then ate her green beans. But that’s not right. The original 
utterance tacitly included temporal order, as was clear from the context in which it was uttered: 
Alice finished her vegetables and then got a treat. This temporal reading of ‘and’ is typical. 
Consider ‘Rose put on her boots and went outside’ or ‘Alice took a bath, read a book, and went 
to bed’. What’s striking about these cases is that, while the temporal reading arguably goes 
beyond the strict semantic content of the sentences, it arises automatically, by default. It doesn’t 
seem to require the specification of some special context of utterance; on the contrary, one would 
have to invent a special context to cancel it and revert to the minimal conjunctive reading. These 
sorts of utterances arguably carry what Grice called ‘Generalized Conversational Implicatures’: 
“Sometimes one can say that the use of a certain form of words in an utterance would normally 
(in the absence of special circumstances) carry such-and-such an implicature or type of 
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implicature.”32 A more generic term might be ‘default meanings’.33 These are “salient 
meaning[s] intended by the speaker, or presumed by the addressee to have been intended, and 
recovered (a) without the help of inference from the speaker's intentions or (b) without conscious 
inferential process altogether.”34 The question is how to categorize these, and this is the 
challenge to the Standard Picture. They’re truth-conditional, and so there’s a temptation to 
classify them as semantic phenomena; on the other hand, they’re separable from (arguably) more 
basic sets of truth-conditions—and though they may be settled on non-inferentially by hearers as 
the salient meanings of utterances, they nevertheless rely on (often prodigious amounts of) 
background information (the typical order in which children eat different foods, or have their 
bedtimes structured), making it tempting to classify them as pragmatic.  
Faced with this apparent blurring of the line between Semantics and Pragmatics, theorists 
have developed a wide variety of responses. One can try to maintain the Standard Picture, or 
abandon it—or seek some middle ground. Among those who try to maintain an unmoderated 
view, with a strict separation between Semantics and Pragmatics, are King and Stanley.
35
 For 
them, truth-conditional content is entirely a semantic matter, allowing only for pragmatic effects 
of the “weak” variety. The strategy is to subsume all apparently strong pragmatic effects under a 
suitably expanded account of indexicality; the logical form of sentences is said to contain myriad 
empty slots demanding to be filled by context, and these slots needn’t correspond to lexical items 
in the syntax.
36
 This approach acknowledges the challenges posed by examples of apparent 
semantic underdetermination and contextually dependent default meanings and seeks to meet 
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them head on, by accommodating those cases within a purely semantic framework. Another 
option is to bite the bullet: admit that only Pragmatics can give us the more expansive truth-
conditions intuitively applicable to such examples, but maintain that, appearances 
notwithstanding, Semantics does provide unique, fully propositional and truth-conditional 
content in such cases—indeed, in all cases of grammatically complete declarative sentences. This 
approach has come to be called Semantic Minimalism. Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore, for 
example, maintain that ‘Rose isn’t tall enough’, on its own, expresses a full, truth-evaluable 
proposition—never mind what she isn’t tall enough for.37 Emma Borg has a somewhat different 
version of Minimalism, which is more radical than that of Cappelen and Lepore, driven by the 
conviction that semantic contents must be “formally tractable.”38 For her, any allowance for 
speaker-intentions, as features of context, determining semantic contents is illegitimate; they are 
too unruly to meet the formal tractability condition, and must be ruled out. This means that 
overtly indexical expressions like pronouns, included by Cappelen and Lepore, and most other 
theorists, among the well-behaved context-invoking lexical items, but which sometimes require 
reference to the intentions of the speaker to resolve (what does the speaker have in mind when he 
uses ‘that’?), cannot be so casually dismissed as semantically unproblematic. Hers is an austere 
Minimalism; her minimal “reflexive propositions” look not at all like semantic contents as 
normally conceived.
39
 One can also maintain a strict division of labor between Semantics and 
Pragmatics, but acknowledge the facts of semantic underdetermination. Bach, for example, 
allows that Semantics sometimes generates something less than a truth-evaluable proposition; in 
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such cases, we have only a “propositional radical.”40 A process of “completion” is required in 
such cases to generate a full proposition—as when we complete ‘Rose isn’t tall enough’ with ‘to 
play for the Lakers’.41 In cases where Semantics does yield a complete proposition, but it differs 
from the one naturally recovered, Bach says that a process of “expansion” or “conceptual 
strengthening” takes place.42 In ‘Alice finished her green beans and {then} got a treat’, the 
material in braces is the result of expansion in this sense. For Bach, the expanded/completed 
contents are implicit in the utterance of the original sentences, and so he refers to them as 
“conversational implicitures” (as opposed to Grice’s conversational implicatures; note the 
slightly different spelling).
43
 
For Recanati, the positions canvassed so far all fall under the rubric of ‘Literalism’, since 
they all agree that “we may legitimately ascribe truth-conditional content (the property of… 
expressing a thought or a proposition) to natural-language sentences.”44 They only disagree the 
extent to which contextual factors contribute to sentence-meanings. Recanati contrasts this 
Literalism with “Contextualism,” the view that “it is only speech acts, utterances in context, that 
have content in a basic, underived sense.”45 The debate between these camps can be seen a 
descendant of the mid-20
th
-century debates between “Ideal Language Philosophers” (in the 
Frege, Russell, Carnap, Tarski tradition) and “Ordinary Language Philosophers” (later 
Wittgenstein, Austin, Strawson).
46
 Like their forebears, Contextualists regard linguistic meaning 
as a malleable, use-based phenomenon: the meaning of an utterance depends on the situation in 
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which it’s uttered, on the background assumptions of interlocutors; conventional meanings of 
words and language rules play a role, but their prescriptions are only established and maintained 
by previous and ongoing usage. The effects of context on the truth-conditions of utterances can’t 
be limited to those mandated by conventional meanings (what Recanati calls “bottom-up” 
pragmatic processes, like the determination of reference for indexicals); optional (“top-down”) 
processes play an indispensable role in determining the propositions we communicate.
47
 So, 
unlike Bach, Recanati is not willing to relegate sentence-expansion to a merely complementary 
linguistic role, a secondary pragmatic modification to a primary, semantic meaning; the 
expanded proposition that Alice ate her green beans and then got a treat is the primary meaning 
of the utterance, and Pragmatics provides it. The literal, merely conjunctive meaning, since it 
plays no role in the interpretive process, is entirely dispensable.
48
 
Contextualism comes in more or less radical flavors. One can maintain that the pragmatic 
processes involved in, say, expansion—while they’re indispensable in ordinary contexts of 
utterance to generate the proposition meant—are nevertheless optional. There could be a context 
in which the minimal, literal meaning was picked out (in which, for example, one only meant 
that two conjoined events occurred, in whatever order). That the pragmatic contribution is 
optional is indicated by the fact that it is what Grice called “cancellable.”49 One can, without 
contradiction, retract or cancel the optional proposition, as in “Alice ate her green beans and had 
dessert—but not in that order.” At the more radical end, we get views like Searle’s and Travis’s; 
these question the very existence of literal meanings, traditionally conceived, for word- or 
sentence-types. Consider how we learn language. Words are initially associated with situations, 
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and we refine our understanding of them by applying or mis-applying them in new situations, 
being corrected as necessary along the way. But no amount of training of this sort can ever offer 
us complete guidance: there may always be novel situations in which we’re unsure how to 
proceed—not because of some epistemic failing on our part, but because there’s no such thing as 
a fully determinate “meaning” that could provide answers in every possible situation. This is the 
point of fanciful examples involving cats and mats floating in orbit, kettles made of aluminum 
but stained black, and so on. This situation makes utterance interpretation, the determination of 
speakers’ meanings, an essentially, unavoidably pragmatic, contextual affair. For Contextualists, 
then, Semantics is at best a bit player, at worst completely irrelevant.  
Unless, that is, we take arguably the most radical step of all, throwing open the gates to 
welcome the pragmatic barbarian hordes, as it were, and re-conceiving Semantics and semantic 
processing, not as a syntactically constrained, minimally contextual affair, as is traditional, but 
rather a multi-faceted, richly contextual process, with the contribution from syntax and lexicon 
but one factor among many in determining semantic content. Katarzyna Jaszczolt’s Default 
Semantics takes this approach. She happily accepts the label of ‘Radical Contextualist’50, and 
aims to provide an account of utterance-meaning as the sum (she uses the symbol Σ) of 
information from several processing resources, all of which are conceived as on a par with one 
another: not only syntax/lexicon, but also traditionally pragmatic sources such as background 
knowledge about the world, society, and culture; the discourse situation; properties of the human 
cognitive system. The result of this summation (called the “merger representation”) is the 
semantic content of an utterance, the speaker’s “primary” (as opposed to “secondary”) 
                                                 
50
 “Default Semantics… sits comfortably in the contextualist camp and in its radical flank, but also goes 
significantly beyond some of its assumptions.” Jaszczolt 2010(b), p. 2. [My references are based on pagination of a 
copy of the paper available on Jaszczolt’s website: http://people.ds.cam.ac.uk/kmj21/] 
   
 20 
meaning—that which it was her intention primarily to convey, and which may or may not be 
explicit in the utterance, may contain implicatures and other indirect speech acts.
51
 The 
summation is supposed to be compositional and truth-conditional, and so Jaszczolt feels 
comfortable referring to it as semantic content. But one concern with this approach is that to 
subsume so much of what formerly counted as pragmatic under the semantic umbrella is to 
obliterate the distinction between Semantics and Pragmatics entirely—or at least to render what 
many consider a substantive debate a mere question of terminological preferences. Another 
concern is whether Jaszczolt’s alternative distinction between primary and secondary meaning is 
compatible with other commonly accepted distinctions, such as those between what is said and 
what is implicated, explicit and implicit content, etc. And of course we will have questions about 
whether the framework can save the phenomena relating to the lying/misleading distinction. 
Returning to our main focus—the distinction between lying and misleading—we’re now 
in a position to give a more terminologically sophisticated statement of the commonsense 
approach with which we began. One merely misleads, and does not lie, if what one says, strictly 
speaking, is true. We can isolate this strict content of what is said by appealing to the distinction 
between Semantics and Pragmatics: Semantics gives us what is said, strictly speaking, while 
Pragmatics provides any content communicated that goes beyond this (implicata, e.g.). But now 
we can see just how naïve this approach is. Not only is it unclear whether purely semantic factors 
can account for our intuitive notion of ‘what is said’, it’s unclear precisely what counts as purely 
semantic, as opposed to pragmatic, content. We have a wide variety of views on these questions, 
and they will give us a wide variety of different accounts of the distinction between lying and 
misleading. Our project, then, is to canvass these positions, draw out their implications for our 
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distinctive focus, and ask whether those implications comport with our intuitions about how to 
differentiate between lies and other deceptive acts. To the extent that they don’t, this is a strike 
against the view in question. It needn’t be a fatal blow, however: a mismatch between the 
implications of a sufficiently plausible position in the philosophy of language, on the one hand, 
and our intuitions about lying and misleading, on the other, may provide evidence that it’s the 
latter, rather than the former, that needs to be re-thought. 
The initial animating concern for this project was a recognition that a commonly used 
distinction—between lying and misleading—depends upon concepts the precise analysis of 
which has been the subject of long-standing philosophical disputes. The hope was that in an 
examination of the literature, I might find an account well-suited to provide a theoretically robust 
underpinning for the commonsense distinction. This hope, as we shall see below, has gone 
mostly unrealized. However, there is value in conducting such a search. First, it never a bad thing 
to subject one’s intuitions about everyday matters to critical scrutiny under the light of the more 
sophisticated terminology provided by the relevant theoretical debates; it may be that our 
intuitions are sufficiently imprecise that only vague, ambiguous conclusions can follow from 
them; if that is the case, then such an examination can help us clarify our thoughts on important 
subjects. Second, bringing to bear one’s intuitions about everyday phenomena can shed new light 
on theoretical debates. Only very rarely in the literatures I have heretofore discussed has the 
distinction between lying and misleading been mentioned, much less a central focus.
52
 Making it 
the focus will at the very least help throw into sharper relief the differences between the various 
relevant positions in the philosophy of language and linguistics, giving us fresh insight into 
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what’s at stake in those disputes; it will also help us identify any serious weaknesses in theorists’ 
positions. 
1.3 THE DEFINITION OF LYING, ASSERTION, AND THE LAW 
It does not go without saying that my focal distinction, between lying and misleading, should 
even be made. There is a large philosophical literature on lying, of course, and many writers 
define it in such a way that there is no difference between lying and misleading. Many others 
make the preservation of that distinction an explicit desideratum. Either way, it’s clear that 
there’s a relationship between the positions one takes on the issues already canvassed and one’s 
views about the appropriate way to define lying: for instance, an expansive conception of 
Semantics, such as that favored by Jaszczolt, is compatible with a broader definition of lying, 
since the subsumption of traditionally pragmatic phenomena like implicatures under the category 
of primary meaning apparently makes classic cases of mere misleading into lies; it would be odd 
to deny that in cases where a speakers’ primary meaning is false she is lying. An examination of 
the literature on the definition of lying would seem to be in order, particularly with an eye toward 
ways in which it might be informed by the explorations of the issues already canvassed (and vice 
versa). 
There is very little agreement among philosophers about how precisely to define lying, 
but a consensus forms at least around one necessary condition: lying involves saying 
something.
53
 A famous example from Kant illustrates the restriction: he imagines someone 
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packing his bags in front of someone else, in order to get the observer to believe that he (the 
packer) is going on a trip.
54
 While this is an act of deception, it is not a lie; lies involve 
statements, and the packer never speaks.  
But beyond the general agreement that lies are statements of some kind, there is 
widespread disagreement about the conditions that must obtain for a particular statement to 
qualify as a lie. Some maintain that lies are false statements
55; in this, they’re in agreement with 
the Oxford English Dictionary, which defines a lie as “a false statement made with the intent to 
deceive.” Others deny that lies must be false statements: some to accommodate the intuition that 
telling someone something one believes to be false, but which is, in fact true, is still lying
56
; 
some whose definitions include among lies even true statements that merely imply (or implicate) 
falsehoods.
57
 Recently, some philosophers have attempted to articulate definitions that do away 
with the OED’s second condition—the intent to deceive.58 They point to so-called bald-faced 
lies—falsehoods averred despite the speaker’s knowledge that he has no chance of deceiving 
anyone—and adjust their conditions on lying to accommodate them. Discussion of these and 
other questions in their vicinity (Is it enough that the liar believes his statement probably is false? 
Or that he lacks belief in its truth? Must the liar have an audience? Is it possible to lie to 
eavesdroppers? Must the liar intend to deceive the addressee about the proposition he expresses? 
Must he also intend to deceive the addressee about his own belief in that proposition? And so 
on.) has generated a large literature trying to codify our intuitions about lying in the form of 
necessary and sufficient conditions. It has even been suggested by some that the search for 
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necessary and sufficient conditions is fruitless, because the meaning of ‘lie’ is a “cognitive 
prototype” to which different acts can correspond in varying degrees.59  
A perhaps more interesting set of issues—from the point of view of the present work—
emerges if we focus on the requirement about which there is most widespread agreement, viz., 
that lying necessarily involves saying something. If we set aside concerns about whether what is 
said must be false, believed false, and so on, we can ask a more fundamental question, one with 
which we’re already familiar: what counts as what is said for any given utterance? What contents 
are we evaluating for falsity (or believed-falsity, or whatever), and how are they determined by 
the actual words uttered? And further, to what sense of ‘saying’ must an act conform in order to 
count as a lie? An adequate account of lying must answer these questions, but too often in the 
literature they are given inadequate attention or ignored entirely. For example, in his otherwise 
comprehensive overview of the various positions in the literature on defining lying, 2008(b), 
James Mahon opts to present each alternative definition using the neutral and unexplained ‘make 
a statement’. Among those who have recognized that something more than this is required, the 
consensus seems to be that lying is a species of assertion.
60
 The accounts of assertions offered by 
these authors vary in their ambitions to specificity. There is, of course, a whole literature on the 
speech act of assertion.
61
 Only recently has an attempt been made to bring it to bear on the 
question of how to define lies—by Andreas Stokke in his 2013(a), which seeks to define lying 
using the account of assertion first elucidated by Robert Stalnaker. More work remains to be 
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done. It is an open question whether other prominent accounts of assertion are suitable for the 
task. 
Parallel to controversies among philosophers about how best to understand and define the 
notion of lying are controversies among legal scholars about how best to understand and define 
cognate legal notions, especially perjury. One could succinctly define perjury as lying under 
oath, and so some of the considerations that we can bring to bear on the issues so far discussed 
ought to be relevant in the legal context. The relevant U.S. statute defines perjury as occurring 
when a witness “states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true.”62 
This condition is quite similar to those encountered in the literature on defining lies, and makes 
room for the kind of distinction that’s been our focus all along—between lying or perjuring 
oneself on the one hand, and merely misleading (in a non-perjurious way) on the other. The most 
prominent ruling on perjury in the United States is the Supreme Court’s 1973 decision in 
Bronston v. United States. In Bronston’s original trial, the following exchange occurred: “Q. Do 
you have any bank accounts in Swiss Banks, Mr. Bronston? A. No, sir. Q. Have you ever? A. 
The company had an account there for about six months, in Zurich.”63 Bronston’s final answer 
was true; what he didn’t say was that he had also had a personal account in Zurich. Bronston was 
convicted of perjury based on that testimony, but the Supreme Court overturned that ruling, 
maintaining that the literal truth of Bronston’s answer precludes a perjury conviction. There has 
been vigorous debate among legal scholars about the ruling in Bronston, with some maintaining 
that the Court got it right, and others arguing that the Court’s decision is only the most prominent 
example of the pernicious influence of “Literalism” in legal thought.64 Of course, perjury is not 
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the only deceptive act covered in the law—we have libel, slander, fraud, and a host of other 
crimes—and there is much variation in the language with which these various acts are 
proscribed: some statutes (like that for perjury) seem to call for a narrower reading, so that 
what’s forbidden is more like lying; others cast a wider net, making it illegal in certain contexts 
to engage in what we’ve been calling mere misleading. It is naturally to be hoped that our 
detailed theoretical investigations into the linguistic and philosophical underpinnings of the 
notions of lying and misleading, and the distinction between the two, might allow us to make 
helpful contributions to debates among legal scholars about the merits and demerits of alternative 
approaches both to drafting and interpreting laws that prohibit deceptive acts. 
 
1.4 OUTLINE 
We will take up the issues just briefly introduced in order. Chapter 2 will focus on questions 
about how to determine ‘what is said’. We will approach the issue from the perspective of a 
concern to account for the distinction between lying and misleading, and ask what a concept of 
‘saying’ would have to look like to underwrite that distinction. We will search through the 
literature on ‘what is said’ for a suitable theoretical account. We will find none, but the search 
will prove instructive. 
 The focus of Chapter 3 will be the question of how properly to draw the distinction 
between Semantics and Pragmatics. We will attempt to bring to bear the lessons of Chapter 2 on 
the relevant issues. We will focus at length on one particular proposal in the literature—
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Cappelen and Lepore’s version of semantic minimalism—and then briefly discuss alternative 
approaches due to Borg, Stanley and Jaszczolt. 
 Finally, in Chapter 4, we will take up miscellaneous issues that arise when we consider 
how best to define lying. Besides various objections and counterexamples, and the corresponding 
alterations to the definition that they suggest, we will examine in detail how various accounts of 
assertion fit with these definitional efforts; whether there is any moral significance to the 
lying/misleading distinction, and how different answers to that question affect our definition of 
lying; and the legal issues, involving perjury and other proscribed deceptive actions, that are the 
natural adjunct of a concern with the distinction between lying and merely misleading. 
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2.0  IN SEARCH OF ‘WHAT IS SAID’ 
The purpose of this chapter is to make a contribution to an on-going debate in linguistics and 
philosophy of language over the concept of ‘what is said’. Roughly, the debate is between those 
who favor a more austere conception, on the one hand, and those who favor a more robust one, 
on the other. This debate often involves reflection on our intuitions about specific cases, and my 
contribution will feature much of this. There is a logically prior debate, though, about what kinds 
of intuitions are appropriate to rely on in circumscribing the targeted concept; section 1 addresses 
this question. My focus on the lying/misleading distinction suggests a middle way between—or a 
synthesis of—two positions. After discussing these methodological preliminaries, we will 
proceed to apply our methods to specific cases. The purpose of this activity is to conduct a 
search: we’re looking through the theoretical literature on the subject for an account of ‘what is 
said’ that’s suitable to underwrite the distinction between lying and misleading. The theorists 
whose views we’re discussing, with a few exceptions, did not intend their work to be put to this 
use, so a caveat is in order: failure of an account to comport with our intuitions about lying and 
misleading should not be construed as a direct criticism of that view; it may be that there a 
multiple conceptions of ‘what is said’, and those that fail our tests may help explain other 
intuitions and linguistic phenomena, or have other theoretical uses. One of our results will be that 
this is indeed the case, and the work we do will help throw into sharper relief the differences 
between competing accounts. 
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Our search through the literature for a theoretical account of ‘what is said’ suitable to 
explain the difference between lying and misleading will be a failure; no extant view will do. But 
our failure, and the reasons for it, will allow us to gain some fresh insight. We will start our 
search from the beginning, as it were, with the pioneering work of Grice; in section 2, we will 
see that Grice’s austere ‘what is said’ is too narrow a notion to provide a basis on which to draw 
the distinction between lying and misleading. The cases we examine will suggest a natural way 
of extending Grice’s notion—including so-called Generalized Conversational Implicatures 
(GCIs) as part of what is said—and in section 3 we will test this approach, relying on the 
elaborate theory of GCIs advocated by Stephen Levinson. This more expansive ‘what is said’ 
will also fail to capture our intuitions about deceptive acts, but in the course of analyzing a 
variety of cases, one of our most important lessons will become clear: the distinction between 
lying and misleading is an extremely murky one, with intuitions exhibiting a variability that 
makes it difficult to see how any theoretical account of ‘saying’ could possibly capture it. Not 
yet completely deterred, though, in section 4 we will continue our search for such an account by 
looking briefly at a major player in the debate about ‘what is said’: Relevance Theory. After 
concluding that, despite some promising aspects, it will not serve our purposes either, we will 
conclude in section 5 pulling back a bit to look at the big picture, extracting whatever lessons we 
can about the debate between advocates and opponents of austerity about ‘what is said’. Our 
exemplars of the former school will be neo-Griceans like Kent Bach and Larry Horn; Francois 
Recanati will represent the latter view. The main lesson will be that the two sides of the debate 
are talking about two different notions of ‘what is said’—the more austere one merely 
locutionary, the more robust one illocutionary—each of which has a basis in our linguistic 
practice and a role to play in our linguistic lives, but which we must be careful not to conflate. 
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The notion of ‘what is said’ that we need to underwrite the distinction between lying and 
misleading, while not fully circumscribed by any extant theory, is evidently an illocutionary 
notion—but a merely locutionary ‘what is said’ sometimes plays a role in explaining our 
intuitions in this area. This suggests a puzzle: how to explain the complex and variable 
relationship between these two conceptions of ‘saying’. We have no solution to offer—only the 
observation, derived from our examination of a wide variety of cases, that no simple solution 
will do. We conclude with a thorough critique of an attempt, by Horn, to offer such a simple 
solution. 
 
2.1 METHODOLOGY 
 
There are disputes in the literature about specific cases, and types of cases, over whether or not 
some propositional content is part of ‘what is said’. Our approach to adjudicating these types of 
disputes will draw on intuitions that we have about circumstances in which the issue of whether 
someone has lied, or merely misled, is salient. We will invent scenarios in which it is, and apply 
the following test: 
 Let u be an utterance, let t be a true proposition (arguably) expressed by u, and let f be 
a false proposition (arguably) expressed by u. 
 Consider a defense against the accusation that u was a lie, on the grounds that it’s t, 
not f, that was said. If we would reject such a defense, then f, not t captures ‘what is 
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said’65; on the other hand, if we would accept such a defense, then t, not f captures 
‘what is said’.66 
So, for example, imagine the following scenario: you’re paying a mid-day visit to a 
neighbor who’s an enthusiastic but terrible cook; he offers you a bowl of what he’s calling 
“gumbo,” but which to the best of your olfactory and visual reckoning resembles nothing more 
closely than burnt pieces of vulcanized rubber floating in dirty dishwater. You respond to the 
offer politely, but deceptively, thus: “No, thanks. I’ve had lunch.” In fact, you haven’t eaten 
anything that day, but you’re not about to break your fast with this so-called gumbo; you’ll grab 
a sandwich or something as soon as you get home. Now suppose that it comes to pass that, a bit 
later, back at your house, the bell rings and it’s that same neighbor, now at your door; he’s come 
bearing a Tupperware container full of his “gumbo,” thinking that maybe you’d like to have 
some for dinner, when you’re not so full from lunch. But as you answer the bell, you open the 
door with one hand while holding in the other a hero sandwich the size of a football. You’re still 
chewing your most recent bite, and there’s Italian dressing dribbling down your chin. Your 
neighbor, his feelings hurt, exclaims, “I thought you said you already had lunch! You lied to 
me.” Setting down your grinder and wiping your chin, you defend yourself with this speech: 
“No, I didn’t lie. What I said to you was, strictly speaking, true. The sentence that I uttered—
‘I’ve had lunch’—expresses a proposition with the following truth-conditions: it is true if and 
only if there is at least one occasion in the past on which I’ve eaten that particular meal. Now, 
                                                 
65
 Or at least: f is part of what is said. We may reject such a defense on the grounds that the speaker says more than 
one thing, at least one of which is false 
66
 The test makes a quite minimal, and I think plausible, presumption: that a necessary condition for lying is saying 
something false. There’s a vast literature on how to define lying, and some deny even this minimal claim. More on 
such definitions in Chapter 4. 
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since my life before today has not been entirely lunch-less—in fact, I’ve eaten lunch many, many 
times—what I said was true. Hence, I did not lie.”  
 We can apply our test to this scenario. The utterance u is “I’ve eaten lunch”; the true 
proposition t that it (arguably) expresses is that your life hasn’t been entirely lunch-less before 
the time of utterance; the false proposition f that it (arguably) expresses is that you ate lunch 
before the time of utterance but on the same day as the utterance. Your defense against the 
accusation of lying, on the grounds that it was t, not f, that you expressed, would be rejected. It’s 
laughable—and not merely because it’s couched in ridiculous-sounding technical terminology 
(that just makes its absurdity more vivid). Since we would reject such a defense, f captures ‘what 
is said’: you told your neighbor that you’d already had lunch that day. You lied.67 
2.1.1 Alternative methods 
As we’ve noted already, this way of proceeding is novel: with few exceptions, no-one has 
approached these issues from a perspective focused on the lying/misleading distinction. Whether 
or not this approach is also fruitful, of course, can best be demonstrated by applying our test to 
concrete cases. It is nevertheless possible to say some things on its behalf before we proceed to 
those cases.  
In the literature about ‘what is said’, there has been debate specifically over the question 
of which kinds of intuitions we ought to rely upon to help us nail down this notion. On one side, 
                                                 
67
 This claim can be disputed from a different direction: one could argue that, since your motivations in deceiving 
were pure—you wanted to spare your neighbor’s feelings, refusing his offering without implying that he’s a bad 
cook—that this is not a genuine lie. Some authors define lying in such a way that the act is intrinsically wrong (see 
Grotius 2005), which makes these kinds of “white lies” impossible. If lies are necessarily told with malicious intent, 
then any act which lacks that intent is not a genuine lie. I’ll set this concern aside for the moment and assume that 
white lies are real lies; the proper definition of lying is a topic for Chapter 4. 
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there are those who claim that we should favor intuitions about the truth or falsity (or 
appropriateness, or accuracy) of indirect reports of speech acts, reports of the form “So-and-so 
said that blah.” To the extent that such reports go through, ‘blah’ is (at least part of) what is 
said.
68
 Cappelen and Lepore: “We take our practice of indirect reporting at face value and 
assume that the speakers have said what we have the reporters saying that they have said.”69 
Bach formalizes the approach, calling it the “IQ Test”: “An element of a sentence contributes to 
what is said in an utterance of that sentence if and only if there can be an accurate and complete 
indirect quotation of the utterance (in the same language) which includes that element, or a 
corresponding element, in the ‘that’-clause that specifies what is said.”70 Recanati, on the other 
hand, insists that there is a better way to isolate ‘what is said’, relying not on intuitions about the 
viability of indirect reports of speech, but rather on intuitions about the truth-conditions of 
utterances. “One has simply to provide subjects with scenarios describing situations, or, even 
better, with—possibly animated—pictures of situations, and to ask them to evaluate the target 
utterance as true or false with respect to the situations in question.”71 Normal interpreters 
understand what is said by an utterance—its meaning, the proposition it expresses—just in case 
they know how the world would have to be to make it true; utterance understanding is grasp of 
truth-conditions. It is important for Recanati that what is said by an utterance be consciously 
available to interlocutors; if it plays no conscious role in utterance interpretation, or if it is not 
part of what a speaker intends to convey in an utterance, then it cannot be ‘what is said’. Conflict 
arises between his approach and Bach’s because some propositions that pass the IQ test are not 
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 Cappelen & Lepore and Bach, who advocate this method, also allow that more than one thing can be said by a 
single utterance—hence the parenthetical hedge. 
69
 Cappelen and Lepore 2005, p. 50 
70
 Bach 1999, p. 8 [My references are based on pagination of a copy of the paper available on Bach’s website: 
http://userwww.sfsu.edu/kbach/]  
71
 Recanati 2004(b), p. 15 
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consciously available. For example, I might say “Alice and Rose are sisters.” By now you, dear 
reader, know that those are my two girls, and so you interpret me as saying something the truth-
conditions for which include the requirement that they have the same parents. For Bach, this is 
too expansive an understanding of what is said; there is no element in the syntax of the sentence 
to indicate this. Rather, a more minimal, literal proposition corresponds to what is said by my 
utterance, viz. that each of the girls has at least one sibling. They may have different parents and 
live in different counties; they may never have met, for all I’ve said.  
Now, on the face of it, my approach, with its focus on lies (and hence the truth and falsity 
of what is said), has more affinity with Recanati’s than with Bach’s. And indeed, for the case just 
mentioned, if we invented a scenario in which the context made it clear that I was 
communicating that the girls were related, but in fact they weren’t, my test would render the 
same verdict about what was said as Recanati’s.72 And while I’ll often agree with his 
assessments, our results will not always line up exactly. This is because my test relies on both 
intuitions about intuitive truth-values and on intuitions about the appropriateness of indirect 
reports of utterances. It combines both competing approaches. The truth-conditional element of 
my test is clear: I’m relying on intuitions about when statements are lies, and hence false, or not, 
and hence true. But since my scenarios involve an imagined defense against an accusation of lies, 
a defense that takes the form of an indirect report on one’s own speech (“No, what I said, strictly 
speaking, was…”), I incorporate Bach’s approach as well. And so, for example, we will have 
some cases in which the minimal sense of ‘what is said’ that he defends does indeed play a role 
in our linguistic lives. My approach will help us to say how his and Recanati’s understandings of 
that key notion differ.  
                                                 
72
 Exercise for the reader. 
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At this point I’ll just issue a promissory note: the dual nature of my test will enlighten. 
We will see that a strict reliance on one type of intuition or other leads to counterintuitive results, 
but that their combination will help clarify things. Perversely, the nature of this clarification will 
be a realization of just how fuzzy the boundaries are between lies and non-lies, Semantics and 
Pragmatics, what is said and what isn’t. Focus entirely on truth-conditions or indirect quotation 
gives the illusion of clear-cut answers; my approach reveals the reality that things are a damn 
mess. 
2.1.2 Concerns  
Despite its promise, we should take note of some concerns that one could have about my 
methodology. First, one might object that the reliance on intuitions to solve philosophical 
problems is an outmoded technique that ought to be displaced by a more rigorous, experimental 
approach. This is the position of so-called Experimental Philosophers. Joshua Knobe and Shaun 
Nichols characterize the enterprise thus: “[E]xperimental philosophers proceed by conducting 
experimental investigations of the psychological processes underlying people’s intuitions about 
central philosophical issues.”73 I will not be conducting any such studies; let’s just say I don’t 
have the budget for that sort of thing (I’m still making payments on my armchair). But this is not 
to suggest that such investigations would be out of place in a project of this kind. In fact, 
systematic studies of people’s intuitions about lying and about ‘what is said’ have been 
conducted.
74
 Some studies, for example Gibbs and Moise 1997 and Nicolle and Clark 1999, 
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 Knobe and Nichols 2007, p. 3 
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 For studies of intuitions about lying, see Coleman and Kay 1981 and Arico and Fallis (forthcoming). These 
studies will be more relevant to our discussion in Chapter 4.  
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present subjects with scenarios with utterances-in-context and ask them directly what they think 
has been said. The former claims to vindicate Recanati’s views, since subjects consistently 
reported the intuition that ‘what is said’ goes beyond minimally semantic propositions; the latter 
casts some doubt, failing to reproduce the same results. Either way, Recanati 2004 objects to the 
approach of both, on the grounds that they’re testing the wrong intuitions: as we’ve seen, he 
thinks the proper way to delimit ‘what is said’ is to focus on intuitions of ordinary speakers about 
the truth-conditions of utterances.
75
 Bach also objects to the approach, claiming that what such 
data “are indicative of is how people apply ‘what is said’,” not what is, in fact said in any given 
utterance.
76
 People’s intuitions about ‘what is said’, he points out, can be “sensitized” by 
exposing them to examples of cancellability: for example, Gibbs and Moise reported that people 
confronted with an utterance of ‘Martha gave John her key and he opened the door’ had the 
intuition that part of what was said was that John opened the door with the key in question; but 
their intuitions might change if they were confronted with ‘Martha gave John her key and he 
opened the door—not with her key, but with another one’ and asked whether it was 
contradictory; Bach predicts they wouldn’t.77 People’s untutored intuitions may change with 
some tutoring. Of course, this is a testable hypothesis. Gibbs and Moise don’t test it, and neither 
does Bach—but he does offer his own testable predictions, pointing the way for future research. 
The best I can do is the same. I’ll be using my own intuitions to arrive at my own conclusions, 
the generalization of which will also be testable. It would be instructive to conduct studies to see 
whether I am vindicated; we can speculate along the way about what such studies should look 
like, how their results might differ from others using different approaches. 
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 Bach 2002, p. 6 [My references are based on pagination of a copy of the paper available on Bach’s website: 
http://userwww.sfsu.edu/kbach/] 
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As interesting as such investigations might be, however, I don’t think we should conclude 
too hastily that they are the only, or even the best, source of data about the phenomena we’re 
investigating. The language itself is another source. For example, the prevalence in the language 
of the phrase ‘some, but not all’, is a linguistic datum with which we must reckon. Such a phrase, 
though it might be grammatical, would certainly not be so frequently used if it were redundant. 
When we use the word ‘some’ by itself, we frequently communicate the sense of ‘some, but not 
all’: I might utter ‘Some of my students are hard workers’ in a typical context and naturally and 
correctly be taken to mean that not all of them are, for example. The fact that the phrase ‘some, 
but not all’ is not redundant, however, indicates that ‘not all’ is separable from ‘some’. Any 
account of ‘what is said’ by such utterances must account for this fact: to what degree is this 
evidence for a minimal construal of such utterances? And the fact with which we’re dealing here 
goes beyond speakers’ intuitions; it concerns the prevalence of a certain usage. Another, related 
example: it is a fact that, among the four corners of the traditional Square of Opposition for 
Aristotelian logic
78
, only the bottom-right subcontrary (O) lacks its own typical lexical 
incarnation; for A we have ‘all’, for E we have ‘no(ne)’, and for I we have ‘some’—but nothing 
for O (we don’t contract ‘not all’ to get, e.g., ‘n’all’). This lack of lexicalization of the O-corner 
is true not only of English, but across languages. And it generalizes within languages: one can 
map other linguistic relationships onto an oppositional square, and it is always the bottom-right 
subcontrary that goes unlexicalized. So we have ‘and’ (A), ‘or’ (I), ‘nor’ (E), but no ‘nand’ (O); 
we have ‘always’ (A), ‘sometimes’ (I), ‘never’ (E), but no ‘nalways’ (O).79 Larry Horn takes this 
fact to be significant for debates about which we’re concerned. As we just noted, utterances 
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 A = Universal Affirmative, ‘All S are P’; E = Universal Negative, ‘No S are P’; I = Particular Affirmative, ‘Some 
S are P’; O = Universal Negative, ‘Some S are not P’ 
79
 See Horn 1989, §4.5 and Horn 2009 for more examples. 
   
 38 
featuring the left-hand (I) subcontrary, e.g. ‘Some philosophers are bald’, typically communicate 
the content from the right-hand side as well, giving us ‘Some {but not all} philosophers are 
bald’. Horn’s view is that the bracketed material is an implicature, not part of what is said, since 
a pragmatic account of this phenomenon is “more general and more explanatory than rival 
theories.”80 The details of his argument for this claim needn’t concern us. The point I want to 
make is simply that speakers’ intuitions aren’t the only sorts of data to which we can appeal in 
our investigations of the issues at hand.  
Another focus of concern about my methodology—especially in light of Bach’s 
observation about sensitizing intuitions—might be me. That is, one might worry that my 
intuitions, being the result of extensive tutoring in philosophy, linguistics, and logic, won’t be at 
all representative of normal speakers’ intuitions. This is a legitimate concern, but we shouldn’t 
make too much of it. Besides being conscious of my own potential theoretically informed biases 
and taking as much care as I can to avoid them (I have consulted as frequently as possible with 
the relatively untutored intuitions of friends and family as a safeguard), I can only offer the 
following: increased tutoring might in some cases provide me with more insight into the 
intuitions of ordinary speakers than I would otherwise have. The kind of tutoring I have in mind 
is logical—and I’m the tutor. Over the course of many years of teaching logic, I have become 
(painfully, at times) aware of a variety of common linguistic intuitions among untutored 
speakers. For example, I know there is a strong tendency to consider ‘not all’ to be part of the 
“meaning” of ‘some’. I’ve seen first-hand the preference for exclusive ‘or’. I have much data on 
the tendency toward conditional perfection (in which a mere conditional is interpreted as a 
biconditional); every attempt to explain the conditional reading of ‘unless’ provides fresh 
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evidence. And so on. This kind of tutoring has provided me with a greater sensitivity toward 
common intuitions, and should be considered an asset. 
One final concern we might have about my methodology stems from its focus on lying. I 
regard this focus as the source of one of its virtues: I think that contemplating scenarios in which 
there is something at stake—a moral judgment that we care about—can only sharpen our 
intuitions. But one might worry that the addition of moral considerations may muddy the waters. 
The intuitions we’re after (about ‘what is said’, literal meanings, etc.) are linguistic, not moral; 
but might we not make an apparently linguistic judgment for (unconsciously) moral reasons? 
The design of my test seems to open up this possibility. It asks us to imagine cases in which a 
defense is being made against the accusation of having lied, and to make a judgment about 
whether such a defense would be acceptable. But because of the morally salient features of the 
case under discussion, we might be less (or more) inclined to accept a defense. If, for example, 
the deceptive act has particularly dire consequences for its victim, we might be more inclined to 
call it a lie—since that judgment carries more negative normative weight—rather than a mere 
deception, no matter what the linguistic facts may be. I think this possibility of confusing moral 
and linguistic intuitions is a serious concern. I can offer three thoughts to address it.  
First, simply being aware of the possibility, and keeping it in mind when we’re 
contemplating scenarios, will be a safeguard against its occurrence. Second, if we suspect that 
moral considerations have obtruded into our linguistic deliberations about a particular case, we 
can conduct a second test, a kind of control. We keep the linguistic phenomena constant, but 
change the moral facts. For example, if we’re inclined to reject an imagined defense against 
lying in a particular case, and we suspect that it’s (only or mainly or partially) for moral reasons 
(the consequences of the speech act are abhorrent), we can alter the scenario so that the utterance 
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is the same, but the moral circumstances are less severe (we can always invent a case in which 
the lie, if it is one, is a “white” one, told with benevolent intentions). If our judgment changes, 
then we were right to suspect moral intrusion; if not, then our linguistic intuitions are vindicated. 
And third, to some degree at least, the possible admixture of moral and linguistic intuitions is not 
so much a bug as a feature. One of my central concerns in this work is to try to find, within the 
vast philosophical literature on the relevant topics, a theoretical basis on which to draw an 
everyday distinction—between lying and misleading. This distinction is part of everybody’s 
linguistic practices, and so everybody has intuitions about it. If those intuitions (about ‘what is 
said’) are affected by the salient moral features of the situations in which it’s at stake, then so be 
it. Insofar as we’re trying to find a suitable theoretical conception to underwrite the everyday 
distinction, we must take those intuitions at face value and ask whether they’re captured by the 
proposal at hand. 
 
2.2 STARTING AT THE BEGINNING: GRICE 
Our topic is the difference between lying and misleading. Both are deceptive acts, in that they 
share the same goal of causing the listener to have false beliefs. But they use different means. 
When you lie, you just say the false thing you want your audience to believe; when you mislead, 
you’re more subtle. You avoid saying the falsity, and if you’re really clever, you say nothing but 
truths. The falsehoods you convey are not part of what you say, but rather part of what you imply 
or otherwise indirectly communicate. Confronted with your deception, you can at least fall back 
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on a defense to the effect that you didn’t lie. This mitigates the damage somewhat, since lies are 
typically taken to be more serious moral and legal transgressions.   
When you mount a defense against lying, you rely on the notion of ‘what is said’; that is, 
you claim of the thing that you said that it is (strictly speaking, perhaps) true. The question is: 
how do we delimit the content of what we say, as opposed to what we merely imply? 
Philosophers have discussed this and related questions for some time, so it’s not unreasonable to 
hope that, somewhere in this discussion, we might find a theoretically sophisticated basis on 
which we can draw the boundary in question and thereby provide a principled and sharp 
distinction between lying and merely misleading. Since Grice was the first philosopher to 
attempt to map of the philosophical terrain in this area, we shall start our search with him. 
The seminal work for the philosophical investigation of the distinction between saying 
and implying is Grice’s 1967 William James lectures at Harvard (collected, revised, and 
reprinted in Grice 1989). It was here that he introduced the idea of “implicatures”, dividing the 
totality of what we communicate between these and what we say. Grice’s favored notion of 
saying will be the subject of this section. Our question is whether this notion can underwrite a 
principled distinction between lying and merely misleading. 
Grice is, by his own admission
81
, somewhat vague about how to understand ‘saying’ in 
his favored sense. But we can understand it well enough to evaluate its suitability for 
underwriting our distinction. One thing we know, we’ve had occasion to remark on already: what 
someone says in an utterance is supposed to be closely related to the syntax of what is uttered. 
There is some question in the literature about whether or not the content of what is said is to be 
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equated with truth-conditional content, or whether it is something distinct (and more austere).
82
 
However such questions are resolved, though, the Syntactic Correlation constraint makes Grice’s 
notion unsuitable for underwriting our distinction, as we’ll see. For our purposes, the most 
interesting aspect of Grice’s conception of ‘what is said’ is that it is, by definition, distinct from 
any contents otherwise communicated—i.e., implicated. We can apply our test to show that any 
such understanding of ‘what is said’ is too narrow to form a basis for distinguishing lies from 
non-lies.  
By requiring that the content of what is said by an utterance be closely related to the 
linguistic elements of that utterance, Grice constrains that notion to an unacceptable (for us) 
degree. As we’ve already seen, some utterances of fully grammatical sentences fail to provide 
truth conditions unless we allow elements of context—pragmatic factors—to contribute the 
missing pieces. Grice’s ‘what is said’ is almost entirely a semantic affair. Almost, because he 
does allow minimal contributions from Pragmatics: “[F]or a full identification of what the 
speaker had said [on a given occasion], one would need to know (a) the identity of [the speaker], 
(b) the time of utterance, and (c) the meaning, on the occasion of utterance, of [any ambiguous 
words or phrases].”83 So, for Grice, context can resolve ambiguities and provide the values for 
any indexical expressions.  This is some contextual input, but often not enough to give us 
something truth-evaluable (see above, e.g., ‘Rose isn’t tall enough’). This fact alone makes 
Grice’s notion of ‘what is said’ too limited for our purposes: the mark of an act of (mere) 
misleading is that what is said in that act is (strictly speaking) true; lies involve saying things that 
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 See Levinson 2000, p. 170 – 171 and Bach 1994, §5. One question is whether or not syntactically distinct, but 
truth-conditionally equivalent utterances count as sayings of the same thing. For example, if I utter ‘John loves 
Mary’, do I say the same thing as when I utter ‘Mary is loved by John’? Levinson and Bach both think not: Grice’s 
notion is at the level of semantic representation (logical form, structured propositions), and so it would distinguish 
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are false. If what is said by an utterance may not be truth-evaluable, we cannot decide between 
the two. 
One might suppose we could repair the damage here by allowing for some additional 
contextual factors to contribute in cases of semantic underdetermination and still get a 
recognizably Gricean, minimal conception of what is said—and that it would suit our purposes. 
But even if we could deal with the problem of underdetermination, we would still have other 
problems. For in many cases in which the minimally semantic ‘what is said’ is a truth-evaluable 
proposition, it’s the wrong one for our purposes. Instead, the version of ‘what is said’ that we 
need to distinguish lies from non-lies in such cases turns out to include content that is 
communicated, by Grice’s lights, by implicatures. 
One more note before we proceed: a scrupulous reader of Grice might object to our 
imputation to him of a kind of semantic minimalism about what is said—the view that what we 
say, as opposed to what we implicate, is determined by the meanings of the terms uttered with 
only a highly constrained contribution from context (which can disambiguate and determine 
reference for a short list of indexicals). There is, after all, little textual evidence to support this 
imputation: we have the quote I cited two paragraphs ago, and the quotes that Bach takes to 
establish the Syntactic Correlation constraint (what is said is “closely related to the conventional 
meaning of the words… uttered” and determined by “the particular meanings of the elements of 
[the sentence uttered], their order, and their syntactical character.”84). A determined Grice 
exegete could point to this paucity of evidence, and then interpret these passages as consistent 
with a denial of semantic minimalism about what is said. Further, our sympathetic Gricean could 
point out that there is an alternative view, not equivalent to semantic minimalism, for which we 
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have ample textual evidence to support the claim that it is genuinely Grice’s—viz., the thesis that 
the way to isolate what is said (as opposed to merely implicated) is to rely on various diagnostic 
tests for the presence of implicatures, such as cancellability and reinforcability (implicatures can 
be cancelled without contradiction and felicitously reinforced without redundancy).
85
 Since this 
view and minimalism are not equivalent, one might worry that even if I’m successful in 
demonstrating that the notion of ‘what is said’ revealed by the minimalist criteria is not suitable 
to underwrite the distinction between lying and misleading, I have not thereby shown that the 
(possibly different) notion of ‘what is said’ revealed by the diagnostics also fails in this respect. 
So there are two worries to which we need to respond: (1) Grice may not really be a 
semantic minimalist about what is said; and (2) by targeting that conception of what is said, we 
may miss a viable alternative—‘what is said’ as revealed by the usual Gricean diagnostics. I’ll 
take these two concerns in turn. First, in imputing to Grice a semantic minimalism about what is 
said, I am not doing anything out of the ordinary. In the literature to which I’m presently 
contributing, it is taken for granted that this is Grice’s view. So, for example, Recanati says, 
“Even though he construed saying as a variety of non-natural meaning, Grice espoused 
Minimalism. On his view, disambiguation and saturation [fixing indexicals and anaphora] suffice 
to give us the literal interpretation of the utterance--what is literally said.”86 This is typical; 
Grice’s minimalism is never questioned by the authors with whom I’m engaging. Now, maybe 
everybody's wrong, and some great Grice exegete can demonstrate that, but I'm not interested in 
Grice exegesis. If we're all wrong, then my target is not the real Grice, but some alternative 
Grice* who holds the minimalist views everybody attributes to him. Second, on the topic of the 
diagnostics (cancellability, reinforcability, etc.), we can set aside, I think, concerns about their 
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reliability for identifying implicatures (expressed by Grice himself and later by others
87
); the 
main concern is that, whatever its merits as a means of identifying implicatures and thereby 
isolating what is said, it may generate results to which my tests are blind. I don’t think this 
should be much of a concern. In what follows, I will focus my attention on a Grice (Grice*?) 
who identifies what is said as semantically minimal content, but with few exceptions, this 
approach, and one based on the diagnostics, will agree on what is said. Consider an example 
from earlier, in which I said to my neighbor, “I’ve had lunch.” According to a semantic 
minimalism about what is said, the proposition expressed here is that there exists a time, before 
the time of the utterance, at which I, the speaker, had lunch; it’s true just in case my life hasn’t 
been entirely lunch-less. Any content beyond that is implied or implicated. The Gricean 
diagnostics render the same verdict: I can non-redundantly reinforce the interpretation that I have 
had lunch today, simply by adding that word to the utterance (“I’ve eaten lunch today”); and I 
can cancel that aspect of meaning without contradiction, for example, thus: “I’ve eaten lunch—
not today, mind you, but I’ve lunched before.” In what follows, almost without exception, the 
same pattern will repeat: I will try to show that a minimalist conception of ‘what is said’ is 
unable to support our intuitions about the distinction between lying and misleading, by 
identifying content that goes beyond the minimal, but which our test nevertheless suggests ought 
to, at least arguably, be included as part of what is said; this content will also be cancellable, 
reinforcable, etc., so the same considerations will apply to both Gricean approaches to isolating 
what is said. 
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2.2.1 Implicature: the basics 
Before we get into this, though, we should briefly survey the different kinds of implicatures, their 
characteristic features, and the ways they are generated by speakers and interpreted by hearers. 
An implicature is any component of what a speaker communicates that goes beyond what she 
merely says. Grice draws a distinction between implicatures that are “conversational” and those 
that are not. The non-conversational implicatures arise from the meaning of the words used in an 
utterance, and so Grice calls them “conventional” implicatures. Grice’s original example is an 
utterance of ‘He is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave’. For Grice, the utterer says that the 
person in question is an Englishman and that he is brave, but he has not said that the one implies 
the other; that is implicated.
88
 The implicature arises because of the conventional meaning of the 
word ‘therefore’; hence, it’s a conventional implicature.  
On the other side of the distinction, we have conversational implicatures. These arise not 
because of the meanings of the words used, but because of certain principles governing 
conversation generally. These are unwritten rules or maxims to which competent speakers can be 
assumed to be adhering in the course of conversation. Since communication is a cooperative 
endeavor, Grice identifies as the principal maxim a Cooperative Principle: “Make your 
conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted 
purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.”89 Under this master rule 
fall various sub-maxims, falling into (Kant-inspired) categories: Quantity, Quality, Relation, and 
Manner. So, for example, under the heading ‘Quality’, we have a principle according to which 
one ought not to say anything false. The details of maxims needn’t detain us. The important point 
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is that the presumption that a speaker is observing these rules, along with the data provided by 
what she says, allows the hearer to infer implicata. For Grice, someone saying that p 
conversationally implicates that q if (1) the speaker can be presumed to be following the 
maxims; (2) q must be supposed in order to maintain this presumption; and (3) the speaker thinks 
the hearer realizes this (condition (2)). Grice’s first example has one interlocutor saying “I’m out 
of petrol,” and the other responding, “There’s a garage around the corner.” The respondent 
implicates that (he thinks) the garage is open and has petrol to sell; these propositions follow 
from the presumption that he’s following the maxim: “Be relevant.” Other implicatures can arise 
when maxims are violated, as when one implicates one’s lack of knowledge by being less than 
fully informative; also, when maxims are flouted, as when a letter-writer for a student implicates 
that he has a low opinion of the student’s abilities by praising irrelevant attributes (“so-and-so 
has excellent penmanship and is a snappy dresser”).90 
Grice makes one more distinction: he identifies two types of conversational implicatures, 
generalized and particularized. The former arise normally or automatically, in the absence of 
special circumstances, because of the form of words used. We’ve already seen some examples of 
Generalized Conversational Implicatures (GCIs): ‘some’ normally gives rise to an implicature of 
‘not all’; certain instances of ‘and’ normally give rise to a temporal implicature of ‘and then’. 
Grice’s first example is: “X is meeting a woman this evening,” which implicates that the woman 
is not X’s wife.91 There are many others. Particularized Conversational Implicatures (PCIs), on 
the other hand, don’t arise normally or automatically: they are communicated only because of the 
peculiar circumstances of the utterance that carries them. 
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2.2.2 Logical connectives 
We are searching for a notion of ‘what is said’ suitable for underwriting the distinction between 
lying and misleading. I have asserted that Grice’s notion won’t do, both because of cases of 
semantic underdetermination, and because in some cases the notion we require must include 
content that, for Grice, is only inferable from implicatures—and hence can’t be part of what is 
said, by definition. It’s time to back up this assertion. Grice’s principal focus in his William 
James lectures was on the logical operators: he wanted to defend the claim that there is no 
divergence in meaning between the truth-functional operators of classical logic (⊃, ∙, ∨, etc.) and 
their natural-language counterparts (‘if’/‘then’, ‘and’, ‘or’, etc.); any perceived differences can 
be given a pragmatic explanation in terms of implicatures. So, for example, the semantic 
contribution of ‘and’ to an English sentence is just the standard truth-functional definition: the 
conjunction is true iff both conjuncts are true. Additional elements of speaker-meaning that may 
be conveyed by an utterance of a conjunction (causal connection between conjuncts, temporal 
order) are implicata; what is said by the utterer is just the conjunction, and has the usual truth-
conditions. I want to run my test—presenting scenarios involving deceptive utterances that may 
or may not be lies—to see whether Grice’s minimal ‘what is said’ is right for us. 
Imagine the following scenario. Setting: Knachel household, dinnertime. Suppose that I, 
the paterfamilias, am a tyrant obsessed with healthy eating. I'll do anything to get my kids to eat 
right. The kids are being their typical, finicky selves. Suppose I say this to Alice: “If you don’t 
finish your green beans, you won’t get a cupcake for dessert.” I brandish a tray of tempting 
confections. Alice, enticed by the prospect of dessert, is cowed by the threat, and quickly 
devours her vegetables. As she chokes down the last bite, she asks, “Can I have a cupcake now?” 
But I never had any intention of giving her a cupcake (do you know how much sugar is in those 
   
 49 
things?); I just wanted to get her to eat her vegetables. “No,” I respond, “No dessert for 
anybody!” I make a show of dumping the cupcakes into the trash; they were just a prop. Now, 
young children are relatively unsophisticated in some ways, but they come equipped with an 
innate and finely tuned sense of fairness. Alice accuses me of lying to her. But I was ready for 
that accusation. I defend myself thus: “What I said was, strictly speaking, true. There were two 
components in my utterance: ‘Alice doesn't finish her green beans’ and ‘Alice doesn't get a 
cupcake for dessert’. As it turned out, the first is false and the second true. According to the way 
classical truth-functional logic defines its operators, these facts make my utterance true. For a 
sentence of the form ‘if p then q’, when p is false and q is true, the whole statement comes out 
true according to the definition of if/then; in this case, p = ‘Alice doesn't finish her green beans’ 
(false), and q = ‘Alice doesn't get a cupcake for dessert’ (true), so the whole thing is true.” 
 Now, setting aside concerns about giving such an explanation to a two-year-old, let’s 
evaluate my defense.
92
 It’s constructed along Gricean lines: for him, any deviation between what 
one communicates with a conditional sentence and what one says in uttering such a sentence is 
purely pragmatic; there is no divergence in meaning between ‘if’ and ‘⊃’, and so what is said in 
uttering a conditional sentence has the truth-conditions of the material conditional.
93
 True, 
there’s a strong tendency, for certain utterances of conditionals, to communicate something 
more. In this case, my conditional was understood to have the significance of a biconditional: ‘If 
you don’t finish your green beans, you won’t get a cupcake; but if you do, you will.’ This 
phenomenon is referred to as “conditional perfection” in the literature. For Grice, the additional 
conditional (‘If you finish your green beans, then you will get a cupcake’) is an implicatum; it is 
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not part of what is said. So, does my defense succeed? I’m somewhat inclined to say that it 
doesn’t, so that part of what I said was the falsehood, ‘If you finish your green beans, then you’ll 
get a cupcake’. But this may be a case about which intuitions would vary; conditionals are tricky, 
after all. Testable hypothesis: we could make people less disposed to call this a lie if we made a 
defense along these lines: “What I said was that if you didn’t eat the green beans, then you 
wouldn’t get a cupcake; I never said anything about what would happen if you did eat them. 
Since you did eat them, my claim about what would happen if you didn’t couldn’t be false; 
hence, I didn’t lie.” This explanation taps into the urge to say of conditionals, the antecedent of 
which is false, not that they’re true, but rather that they lack truth-value or something; they’re 
certainly not false. It’s easy to elicit this intuition in an introductory logic class. There are two 
points to make about this modification. First, it’s a departure from the test I’ve proposed that we 
use, in that the defense does not involve claiming that what I said was true, only that it wasn’t 
false. But the test can easily be modified to accommodate the abandonment of bivalence; if 
saying something false is a necessary condition for having lied (as we’re assuming it is), then a 
defense against lying can succeed merely by demonstrating that what was said wasn’t false 
(rather than the stronger claim that it was true). Second, though, even if such a defense succeeds, 
it does not vindicate Grice’s claim that what is said by the utterance of the conditional is nothing 
more than a proposition with the material conditional’s truth-conditions; acceptance of 
something like truth-value gaps is not consistent with that program. But this is a minor problem: 
nobody believes anymore that the proper semantics for if/then sentences is captured by the 
material conditional; it may be a departure from Grice’s actual position, but an account of what 
is said by such sentences that adopts a different semantics would retain the Gricean spirit, so 
long as it counts perfections of conditionals as implicata, rather than part of what is said. 
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 So what does an example like this show? We’re looking for a theoretical basis on which 
to make the commonsense distinction between lying and merely misleading—a distinction about 
which competent language users have intuitions. If a Gricean account of ‘what is said’ is at odds 
with those intuitions—even by a little bit—then we must have some degree of doubt about its 
suitability for our purposes. One might respond to this concern on Grice’s behalf by claiming 
that—especially in light of the data indicating that people’s intuitions are variable—what we 
have here is a case in which intuitions can be sensitized (to use Bach’s term) and reformed. 
Grice—or an account in the spirit of Grice—has it right, and folks can be brought around to this 
view with the proper logical tutoring. That one can be brought around is supported by the 
(anecdotal) data that the change in defense above can alter people’s intuitions. However (again, 
anecdotally), not everyone changes her mind about this case, but perhaps a Gricean could argue 
that one ought to come around. That’s a bigger argument, though; it requires at least that we 
consider more than one example—that we examine Grice’s notion from many more angles—
before we make an overall judgment about its viability. To this task we now proceed. 
 Straight ‘if/then’ conditionals are tricky; there’s a tendency to “perfect” them, but given 
all the other noise surrounding our intuitions about them, it’s hard isolate the signal and say with 
any conviction whether such elaborations of content belong to ‘what is said’. Alternative 
conditional locutions, on the other hand, are not so tricky. I know—again, from experience as a 
logic instructor—that the tendency to interpret sentences featuring ‘unless’ as biconditionals is 
very strong. So, consider the following scenario. You're an avid golfer and a jerk who hates 
spending time with his family. It's Friday, and your wife starts in with the nagging: “What are 
you doing this weekend? I was thinking it would be nice to take the kids to the museum.” You 
reply, “I’m sorry dear, but I’ve got a ten o’clock tee time at the club. I’m afraid I won’t be 
   
 52 
joining you at the museum unless it rains.” In fact, the forecast calls for rain all weekend, so your 
wife is mollified. But that was your plan. You didn't want to get into a whole big thing with her 
right now (you're trying to enjoy a pre-dinner scotch and watch Hannity), but you have no 
intention of going to the museum this weekend; you’ll golf if there’s no rain, and find something 
else to do if there is. The next morning, it's pouring down rain, and as your wife is busy cleaning 
up after breakfast, you're headed out: “I'm going to the tavern for Bloody Marys with the boys, 
and then we’re gonna hit the strip clubs. Don't wait up.” “You lied to me again, you creep!” she 
shouts, hurling a juice glass at your head. "No I didn't," you reply quickly, ducking and scurrying 
toward the door, “since the sentence I uttered can be rendered as the conditional, ‘If it doesn’t 
rain, then I won’t go to the museum.’ It goes beyond what I said to perfect that conditional, as 
you apparently have, and add ‘If it does rain, then I will go to the museum.’ That conditional is 
indeed false, but it’s not part of what I said. Anyway, have fun at the museum!” 
 Does your defense succeed? I know your wife isn’t buying it; I’m not either. Testable 
hypothesis: presented with this scenario, normal language users would be much less inclined to 
accept the defense against having lied than they were in the previous example. And what we 
have here is a version of the same phenomenon—conditional perfection—at least according to 
the standard treatment of ‘unless’ as a conditional. But as any logic teacher knows, one has a hell 
of a time convincing students that this is the correct treatment. It’s almost irresistible to 
supplement ‘I won’t go to the museum unless it rains’ with something like ‘in which case I will 
go to the museum’. Untutored language users have a strong urge to treat ‘p unless q’ as ‘p iff 
~q’, and sometimes all the tutoring in the world can’t shake that conviction. Take another simple 
example: an arch-criminal says, “I’ll detonate the bomb unless you pay me one million dollars”; 
the people who give into his demands will be justifiably aggrieved if he detonates the bomb 
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anyway. The use of ‘unless’ strengthens the tendency to perfect conditionals. The Gricean 
treatment of this example fails to capture the intuition that what is said, in this case, includes the 
added content.  
 We can construct examples that make the minimalist, truth-functional interpretation of 
the locutions corresponding to other logical operators also seem dubious. Consider ‘either/or’. 
For Grice, the meaning of this locution is captured by the inclusive sense codified in the truth 
table for the wedge (∨): ‘either p or q’ is true if and only if it’s not the case that both p and q are 
false. The tendency to interpret disjunctions as exclusive is explicable in terms of implicatures: 
the exclusion of the possibility of both disjuncts being true is (often) implicated by the utterance 
of the disjunctive sentence; what is said in the utterance is just the inclusive sense. But consider 
this example. You're buying a house, negotiating directly with the sellers. It's an older home, and 
it's got a few big problems: it needs a new roof and it needs serious foundation work. Both 
repairs cost big money. They agree to come down on the price a bit, and you say, “Alright. I’m 
going to make an offer at that price. But it will either contain a provision that you pay for the 
roof repairs, or a provision that you pay for the foundation repairs.” They think that sounds fine, 
so you tell them you'll have your lawyer write out an official offer and send it over the next day. 
They're giddy with excitement; as soon as you leave, they immediately proceed to pore over a 
book of fabric swatches, looking for the perfect toilet-seat cover for the master bedroom in their 
new McMansion in the exurbs. But this excitement was part of your plan; you wanted them to 
think that they'd only have to pay for one of the two major repair jobs, so they'd get excited and 
be more likely to cave when you presented your real offer. It arrives the next day, and to their 
horror you've asked that they pay for both the foundation and the roof. They accuse you of 
having lied. You reply that what you said was, strictly speaking, true, on Gricean grounds: what 
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is said by the utterance of a disjunction is the inclusive-or, which is true when both disjuncts are 
true. 
 Does the defense succeed? I think not. In some circumstances, the exclusive reading of 
‘or’ is unavoidable—is part of what is said. One might object that the example above was 
contrived in such a way to make the exclusive interpretation more salient. It was! But this is no 
objection. Sure, if you vary the circumstances, an inclusive reading might be more reasonable (I 
haven’t said something false if I declare my intention either to eat steak or lobster for dinner, 
then later decide, “What the hell—surf and turf!”), but this is evidence in favor of the view that 
what we say is sensitive to contextual information, contrary to Grice’s picture. We can construct 
examples of disjunctive statements for which, because of special features of the context, the 
exclusive reading is inevitable: “With my tax return, I’ll either buy a lawnmower or a moped” 
(my return, as a matter of (lamentable) financial fact, is not going to be big enough for both). 
Heck, sometimes the laws of nature preclude an inclusive reading: “The flipped coin will come 
up either heads or tails.” Do we really want to say, in such cases, that what I said allows for the 
possibility of both, that the exclusion of that possibility is merely implicated? 
 Another concern one might have about this example—and about any one of our 
examples—is that what’s driving our intuitions is not linguistic, but moral considerations. We’re 
inclined to call this a lie because of our moral disapprobation: the character in our story is 
negotiating in bad faith, and we want to condemn him in the strongest possible terms. We 
discussed this concern above in §2.1.2, and noted that one way to address it is to control for the 
moral factor: invent a different scenario with the same linguistic features, but in which moral 
disapprobation would be absent (or diminished). So one might attempt to do this as follows: 
suppose I tell Alice that she can have either a cupcake or a cookie, but then I end up giving her 
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both. The linguistic features are the same (the exclusive understanding of ‘or’ is more salient), 
but the intuition that I lied goes away. Doesn’t this show that it was in fact moral considerations 
driving our intuitions in the house-selling example, and that we’re not entitled to draw the 
linguistic conclusions that we did? It does not. What this example shows is that one needs to be 
quite careful in constructing scenarios to test our intuitions about the difference between lying 
and misleading. Appropriate examples must involve deception, since we’re trying to distinguish 
two species of deception. The speaker has to intend to cause the hearer to have a false belief (and 
to make the example convincing and vivid, has to have some motivation for doing so). I can't 
imagine a context in which I'd want to convince Alice that she can have a cookie or a cupcake, 
but not both--when in fact she can have both. So there's no surprise we don't have the intuition 
that I lied. These scenarios are hard to invent; they need to present us with a choice between the 
two types of deceptive act. Here’s an attempt to construct an alternative scenario for ‘or’ in 
which we control for the moral factor. Suppose your family is playing lawn darts—the old school 
kind, where the things are actually metal darts that you throw way up into the air, and are 
dangerous as hell—and the family dog runs into the field of play and gets skewered with a dart. 
The wound is mortal, and you know it, but you want to comfort your kid with a white lie: “Either 
we're going to remove the dart or put Rufus down.” Your kid gets the idea that there's hope: if 
you get that dart out of him, Rufus won't be put down--because ‘or’ is exclusive. But the real 
plan is to do both: remove the dart (to relieve the dog’s suffering, and to ensure you can continue 
the game with a full complement of darts (sorry - leave that last bit out; it'll cause the moral 
disapprobation we're trying to avoid)) AND put Rufus down, because there's no way he can 
make it. Despite the lack of evil intentions here, I’m still inclined to call this a lie.94 
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 Finally, let’s consider ‘and’. For Grice, what is said in utterances of sentences with this 
operator is only a conjunction, with the usual truth-conditions. As we’ve noted, however, such 
utterances are often interpreted as conveying additional information, such as a temporal ordering 
of the conjuncts, or a causal connection between the two. To see whether we ought to include 
this content in what is said by such utterances, we can apply the usual test. Consider this 
scenario. Someone is asking me for advice about where to eat. He’s considering a new Italian 
restaurant, Papa Giorgio’s. I tell him the following: “I ate at Papa Giorgio’s and got violently 
sick.” Here are the relevant autobiographical details: I did, in fact, eat at the restaurant in 
question last Wednesday; the only time in my life that I’ve ever been violently sick was on my 
twenty-first birthday, for the usual reasons; I have a longstanding grudge against Papa Giorgio, 
the owner of the restaurant, and I hope to do everything I can to ruin his chances for success and 
steer people away from his new business (the only reason I went to the restaurant last week was 
so I could give him the Evil Eye; I was hungry, though, so I had a nice veal picatta while I was 
there). Now, suppose Papa G. hears about what I’ve been telling people, and accuses me of 
lying. I defend myself along Gricean lines: what I said, strictly speaking, is a conjunction; it’s 
true just in case both of its conjuncts are true, and they are—I did go to the restaurant, and there 
was an occasion prior to my utterance on which I was violently sick. 
 Does my defense succeed in this case? I think it would clearly be rejected. What if I had 
printed the sentence in question in the newspaper, as part of a restaurant review, and Papa had 
sued me for libel? I think I’d be in serious trouble. The tendency to interpret utterances of 
sentences featuring ‘and’ as conveying temporal and/or causal information is called “conjunction 
buttressing” in the literature.95 My test indicates that, in at least some circumstances, this 
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interpretation is almost irresistible—strong evidence that the intuitive notion of ‘what is said’ for 
which we’re searching ought to make room for such content, and evidence, once again, that 
Grice’s more restrictive notion will not do for our purposes. 
2.2.3 Other limitations of the Gricean picture 
I’ve been focusing on the contribution of the logical operators to what is said in an utterance, 
because those were Grice’s primary focus; he developed his distinction between what is said and 
what is implicated largely to help him resolve disputes about their proper semantic treatment. I 
have argued that Grice’s understanding of ‘what is said’ is too narrow to underwrite the 
distinction between lying and misleading, because it produces unintuitive results for utterances 
involving those operators. But we needn’t limit our criticism of the Gricean picture to cases 
involving logical operators. If we apply our test, we will see that his minimalist conception of 
‘what is said’ produces unintuitive results in a wide range of other cases. 
 We’ve already noted the problems raised by the phenomenon of semantic 
underdetermination: sometimes the sentences we utter fail to express truth-evaluable 
propositions; if we constrain our notion of ‘what is said’ as Grice suggests, then we will have 
cases in which what one says in producing an utterance will (arguably) not be truth-evaluable.
96
 
We pointed to utterances like ‘Rose isn’t tall enough’, which seem to require pragmatic input in 
order to express a proposition and be truth-evaluable. The notion of ‘what is said’ that we require 
to underwrite a distinction between lying and misleading must be one according to which what 
we say has a truth-value, and so it seems in these cases Pragmatics contributes to (our favored 
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sense of) what is said. Bach refers to the process by which we flesh out such underdetermined 
utterances as completion.
97
 He notes that there is another, complementary process at work in 
some other cases, which he calls expansion. In these instances, we have an utterance of a 
sentence that is literally truth-evaluable, but whose truth-conditions differ from those 
communicated. Our examples involving the logical operators are arguably instances of this 
phenomenon, but there are many more. I will complete our discussion of Grice, then, by briefly 
examining some of these cases, using my test involving intuitions about lying. 
 We’ve already seen one. Recall the example of the neighbor who’s a bad cook. We 
declined his offer of gumbo with the utterance, “No thanks. I’ve had lunch.” A minimal, Gricean, 
account of what is said in this case would deliver truth-conditions according to which the 
utterance is vindicated just in case the speaker has had lunch at least once in his life. We saw that 
a defense against lying on such grounds would fail; what is said in such a case is an expanded 
proposition: ‘I’ve had lunch today.’ In his 1994, Bach has other examples of expansion, which 
we can subject to similar analyses. We’re asked to consider a mother consoling a child who’s cut 
his finger; she says, “You’re not going to die.” Now suppose that later in life, the child is 
diagnosed with a life-threatening disease, and he accuses his mother of having lied to him that 
day when he cut his finger. She could easily defend herself: “I didn’t say you were immortal; 
what I said was that you wouldn’t die from that cut.” That is, what she says to the child is an 
expanded proposition, whose truth-conditions differ from the minimal semantic interpretation.
98
 
Another example from Bach: an utterance of ‘France is hexagonal’. Suppose the context of the 
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utterance is this: I’m trying to help a child unfamiliar with European geography pick out France 
on a map. Now, if the child got out his protractor and—failing to measure the requisite six 120° 
angles—accused me of lying, I could easily defend myself by pointing out that I didn’t say it was 
exactly hexagonal, only that it was roughly so. 
 Or consider typical uses of quantifiers. If I tell Rose, “Everybody’s coming to your eighth 
birthday party,” and all the invitees, plus her grandparents, uncles, and mom and dad all show 
up, she’s in no position to accuse me of lying because it’s not the case that everybody in the 
world showed up. But on a minimalist understanding, what I said in my utterance has just that 
truth-condition. If Alice needs a beverage (to go with her green beans (or cupcake)), and I tell 
her, “There’s some milk in the fridge,” I’m a liar if it turns out that all there is in the refrigerator, 
milk-wise, is a tiny puddle of spilt milk that dripped down into the crisper. It’s no defense to fall 
back on a minimal semantics for the existential quantifier and make myself out to be a truth-
teller in virtue of the fact that the fridge was not, in fact, entirely devoid of milk. We routinely 
communicate using quantifiers to refer to domains without explicitly identifying them, and when 
we do so, we say things about those domains. 
 I think these cases are decisive. Unlike the examples involving the logical operators, for 
which I think—as I noted—that it would be reasonable to expect (depending on the case) varying 
degrees of disagreement about the intuitions involved, there seems to me no disputing the 
conclusions about these examples of expansion. The notion of ‘what is said’ that we use to 
distinguish lies from non-lies is one according to which Pragmatics makes contributions to 
content. Grice’s minimal notion does not allow this kind of robust contextual contribution, and 
so it cannot underwrite our distinction. Whether a minimal, purely semantic notion of ‘what is 
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said’ plays some other role in our linguistic practice and/or theorizing is, for now, an open 
question. We will return to it later. 
2.3 GENERALIZED CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURES 
Continuing our search for a conception of ‘what is said’ suitable for our purposes, we may 
follow up a lead suggested by the previous section. It seemed clear that completions and 
expansions, to use Bach’s terminology, were part of what is said in the sense we need. Maybe we 
should look to Bach for the stable, theoretically sophisticated notion of ‘what is said’. Recall, he 
refers to the contents generated by completion and expansion as ‘implicitures’. Perhaps if we just 
add these on to literal meanings, we have what we need. 
 There are two problems with this proposal. First, Bach himself would strenuously deny 
that implicitures are part of what is said. He conceives of them as a level of content between 
what is said and what is implicated; it is a distinct level of meaning. And he argues forcefully 
and at length against the kind of expanded notion of ‘what is said’ that I’ve been advocating.99 
But even if we set aside Bach’s own personal qualms with our appropriating his terminology, it’s 
not clear that the notion of impliciture is as precisely delimited as we might hope for it to be. As 
Levinson observes, Bach “fails to give us a clear boundary between impliciture and 
implicature.”100 Levinson doesn’t provide much of an argument to support this claim, but I think 
we can make some observations to substantiate it. Bach says the following: 
Although both impliciture and implicature go beyond what is explicit in the utterance, 
they do so in different ways. An implicatum is completely separate from what is said and 
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is inferred from it (more precisely, from the saying of it). What is said is one proposition 
and what is communicated in addition to that is a conceptually independent proposition, a 
proposition with perhaps no constituents in common with what is said. …In contrast, 
implicitures are built up from the explicit content of the utterance by conceptual 
strengthening…, which yields what would have been made fully explicit if the 
appropriate lexical material had been included in the utterance.
101
 
 
These are suggestive remarks, and they do a fine job of distinguishing the phenomena Bach has 
in mind from Grice’s typical examples of particularized conversational implicatures. In this 
exchange 
A: Smith doesn’t seem to have a girlfriend these days. 
B: He has been paying a lot of visits to New York lately.
102
 
 
the implicatum—that maybe Smith has a girlfriend in New York—is intuitively “separate from” 
and “conceptually independent” of what B says. But separateness and conceptual independence 
are rather vague notions; can they be relied upon to sustain a sharp distinction between 
implicatures and implicitures? Bach’s gloss of “conceptual strengthening” as making explicit 
content that would have been, but for the absence of “appropriate lexical material,” might be 
thought to help make things more precise. But consider another of Grice’s classic examples, the 
utterance of ‘There is a garage round the corner’ to the man out of petrol. We could state the 
implicatum simply by adding appropriate lexical material: ‘There is a{n open} garage {with 
petrol for sale} round the corner.’ That seems to be “built up from explicit content” of the 
original utterance. Is it an impliciture, then? The same problem arises, perhaps more acutely, if 
we try to distinguish implicitures from generalized conversational implicatures. Consider an 
example we’ve already dwelt on: utterances of sentences like ‘Some logicians are bald’ typically 
implicate propositions like ‘Some {but not all} logicians are bald’. Again, the extra content 
seems to be built up from the original by the addition of lexical material (in braces), and so it’s 
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hard decide whether to call this an impliciture or an implicature. Given the close connection 
between GCIs and lexicalization—they arise typically with certain forms of words—we would 
expect Bach’s suggested method of demarcation to leave us with this kind of indeterminacy quite 
regularly. Are the expanded contents in statements of the form ‘A or B {but not both}’ and ‘A 
and {then} B’, for example, implicitures, implicatures, or both? Unlike the category of 
conventional implicatures, which Bach thinks is empty
103, GCIs aren’t on the chopping block—
and there’s no indication that he wants to assimilate them into the impliciture category. 
 But if Bach’s notion of impliciture is somewhat wanting in terms of clear criteria for 
demarcation, the concept of Generalized Conversational Implicature is not. In Levinson 2000 
(Presumptive Meanings: The Theory of Generalized Conversational Implicatures), we have an 
exhaustive defense and taxonomy of GCIs. If we’re looking for a theoretically sophisticated 
account on which to base our preferred understanding of ‘what is said’, perhaps this is it. 
2.3.1 Categories of GCIs 
Grice, recall, distinguished implicatures in this category from their particularized cousins on the 
basis of their default character: they arise, associated with particular forms of words, normally, 
and are only cancelled in the presence of “special circumstances.”104 This feature of GCIs makes 
them difficult to distinguish from the conventional meanings of the words and phrases that 
typically give rise to them. They are therefore prime candidates for assimilation into an intuitive 
understanding of what is said by an utterance. We’ve already seen—in cases involving the 
logical connectives and in Bach’s examples of implicitures—that this sort of supposedly 
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implicatural content arguably sits more comfortably on the same side of the meaning-divide as 
what is said, at least in the sense of that notion that we are seeking to elucidate. 
 While Grice is characteristically sketchy in his attempts to circumscribe the domain of 
GCIs, Levinson is the opposite: painstaking and thorough. He bases his taxonomy on some of 
Grice’s suggestive remarks, extending and elaborating them to present a comprehensive system. 
He divides GCIs into three types, based on the conversational principles that give rise to them. 
He reduces the number of maxims to three (Grice listed more), and refers to them as heuristics; 
the thinking here is that these rules of thumb allow us to streamline the communication process, 
speeding up interpretation by providing an inferential—but automatic, often sub-conscious—
bridge between relatively impoverished linguistic inputs and richer, expanded interpretive 
outputs. GCIs help increase the efficiency of communication by licensing inferences to default, 
presumptive meanings for common expressions; this is why they’re only cancelled in abnormal 
circumstances. 
 Levinson calls his three heuristics the Q, I, and M Principles, based on/inspired by 
Grice’s first maxim of Quantity (“Make your contribution as informative as required”105), second 
maxim of Quantity (“Do not make your contribution more informative than is required”106), and 
maxims of Manner (“Be perspicuous”; “avoid obscurity of expression”; “avoid prolixity”107) 
respectively. Let’s run through Levinson’s principles in order: 
 The Q Principle. The pithiest statement of this heuristic is “What isn’t said, isn’t.”108 
More specifically, it’s a maxim according to which the speaker is supposed not to “provide a 
statement informationally weaker than [her] knowledge of the world allows”, to make the 
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strongest possible statement “consistent with the facts.”109 Hearers can then make inferences on 
the basis of the assumption that the speaker is abiding by this rule. This results in implicatures of 
the so-called “scalar” variety, for example, which are based on scales ranging from stronger to 
weaker expressions (e.g., <all, most, many, some>), with the use of a weaker expression 
implicating that the stronger one(s) could not have been used (some +> not all).
110
  
 The I Principle. The pithy version: “What is simply described is stereotypically 
exemplified.”111 More specifically, according to this maxim, the speaker ought to “produce the 
minimal linguistic information sufficient to achieve [her] communicational ends” and the hearer 
ought to “[a]mplify [or enrich] the informational content of the speaker’s utterance, by finding 
the most specific interpretation” consistent with the speaker’s presumed point.112 Under the 
rubric of this heuristic, Levinson gathers a motley assortment of phenomena, some of which 
we’ve already seen: conditional perfection (if +> only if), conjunction buttressing (and +> in that 
order), and many others. 
 The M Principle. “What’s said in an abnormal way, isn’t normal; or Marked message 
indicates marked situation.”113 The demands this heuristic imposes on speakers and hearers are, I 
think, pretty clear: speakers should choose unusual modes of expression if and only if the 
situation is unusual, and hearers should make inferences about the normality of the indicated 
situation accordingly. There are as many implicatures arising from this principle as there are 
marked expressions, so they’re somewhat difficult to categorize further, but examples include an 
utterance of “Sally was knitting. Occasionally, the woman looked out the window.” implicating 
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that ‘the woman’ refers to someone other than Sally; the choice of ‘tome’ rather than ‘book’ in 
“He was reading a tome” implicating that the volume in question is unusually large; the choice of 
‘caused … to die’ rather than ‘killed’ in “The Spaniards caused the Aztecs to die” implicating 
that the way in which the Spaniards killed them was unusual and indirect (disease?).
114
 
 So these are the categories of GCIs. What remains for us to see is whether we ought to 
include these species of conveyed meaning under the category ‘what is said’, as we’re 
understanding that notion. That is, we need to ask whether content supposedly implicated 
according to these heuristics should actually be included as part of the truth-conditional content 
of speakers’ utterances when the issue of whether they lied or merely misled is on the table. Let’s 
examine Levinson’s three categories one at a time. 
2.3.2 Q-Implicatures 
We’ve already seen some example of scalar implicatures, and made the case for one of them that 
at least in some circumstances it makes sense to include the supposed implicatum as part of what 
is said in an utterance. The understanding of sentences featuring ‘or’ as excluding the possibility 
of both disjuncts arises, on Levinson’s model, because of the existence of a scale <and, or> and 
an inference from the use of the weaker locution to the negation of the stronger, in accordance 
with the Q heuristic: what isn’t said, isn’t; therefore, not both. As the example of the dishonest 
real estate negotiator (§1.3.1.2) showed, sometimes this interpretational move is so strongly 
suggested by the context that it makes sense, for our purposes, to include the exclusion of the 
possibility of both disjuncts as part of what the speaker said. This is at least partially because the 
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very nature of deceptive situations is such that it matters to the hearer whether or not the 
possibility of both is open, and so the interpretive move to exclusive-or is strongly motivated. 
This is promising. Perhaps we can conclude that, in general, Q-implicatures are prime candidates 
for inclusion in the notion of ‘what is said’ that we seek. We’ll have to examine more of them to 
see. 
 Let’s consider the other scalar implicature that we’ve already mentioned—that from 
utterances featuring ‘some’ to propositions whose truth-conditions include the negation of 
universal affirmation—not all. The locutions ‘some’ and ‘all’ fall on a scale, and the former is 
weaker, so an utterance using it implicates the negation of the latter, by the Q principle. 
Following our usual procedure, we need to imagine a scenario in which the speaker is being 
deceptive, so that the inference to the GCI makes a difference, matters to the hearer. Suppose I 
bake up a batch of my Grandma’s famous cinnamon rolls, my favorite dessert. I and the girls 
scarf down a couple straight out of the oven, and then save the rest of the batch for tomorrow. 
That next day, I come home from work and find that the rolls have all been eaten! I set about 
interrogating the family, and ask Rose about the missing treats. “I ate some of the cinnamon 
rolls,” she admits. But suppose the fact of the matter is that she ate all of them. After 
interrogating my wife and little Alice, neither of whom snuck so much as a bite, I confront Rose 
with her deception: “You lied.” She defends herself in the usual way: “No dad, I didn’t lie. What 
I said was, strictly speaking, true: in fact I did eat at least one of the rolls, so the truth-conditions 
of ‘I ate some of them’ are satisfied.”115 Does this defense succeed?  
 I’m not sure what to say about this case; my guess is that opinions will differ. I think we 
might expect some degree of variation in intuitions about different instances of the some +> not 
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all implicature, depending on features peculiar to the scenario. Consider another example. 
Suppose we’re living in a dystopian future USA in which Secret Police agents periodically troll 
for dissidents by calling random citizens in for questioning. I’m so called, and respond to 
questions about my neighbors with an utterance of “Some of my neighbors are law-abiding, 
patriotic citizens.” In fact, I know that all of them fit that description, but I’m nursing a grudge 
against the lot of them: I overheard them making disparaging remarks about the quality of my 
noodle salad at last summer’s block party. Subsequent to my testimony, everybody’s rounded up 
in the middle of the night and subjected to all manner of harassment and “enhanced” 
interrogation techniques. When they hear about what I said, both my neighbors and the Secret 
Police accuse me of lying, and I reply that since at least one of my neighbors was as described, 
what I said was strictly speaking true.  
 When I present people with this case, they’re less-inclined to reject my defense than they 
are to reject Rose’s above. Why? I suspect that one reason is that the facts about which I’m 
testifying in the latter case—the political views and activities of all my neighbors—are facts 
about which it’s quite possible for me to be ignorant. In Rose’s case, the fact in question—
whether or not she ate all the cinnamon rolls—is not a fact about which it’s possible for her to be 
ignorant. It’s relatively rare, in normal speech, to use the word ‘some’ and not implicate the 
particular negative, but some cases in which it is appropriate are those in which one is ignorant 
of all the facts. When I’m teaching introductory logic, and illustrating this minimal use of 
‘some’, I ask my students to imagine visiting home on spring break and telling their mom about 
the classes they’re taking; when she hears about logic, she asks (for some reason), “I’ve always 
wondered, what are logic teachers like?” I tell the students that they might respond, given what 
they know about me, “Some logic teachers are jerks.” And for all they know, I point out, all of 
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us are jerks; maybe it’s just something about logic that attracts unpleasant people. This leads to 
another observation: people’s intuitions in these cases probably vary partially as a function of the 
extent of their exposure to logic. 
 Let’s look at some other Q-implicatures. There are various scales of strong-to-weak 
expressions. Consider the deontic modals: being forbidden, permitted, or obligated to do thus-
and-so. Obligation is stronger than permission, so we have a GCI from the latter to the former. 
Let’s cook up a scenario: An old French acquaintance of yours from the Vietnam War sent his 
son to America for college; the son liked it here so much, he decided to stay; he’s just been 
naturalized—a newly minted citizen. Still, he doesn’t really know much about how things work 
here in the USA. His dad told him to seek you out as an advisor. Big mistake: because of their 
perfidy in the build-up to the Iraq War, you’ve developed a strong antipathy to all things French; 
plus, he didn’t know it, but you always hated this particular Frenchman’s guts. Anyway, the son 
comes to you for advice. Suppose he’s 22 years old. Hoping to lead the kid astray, you say to 
him, “Oh, you should know that (male) citizens between the ages of 18 and 25 are permitted to 
register with the Selective Service Agency, in case there’s a military draft.” The little punk 
considers himself a lover, not a fighter, and opts to forgo that little perk of citizenship. But later, 
when he’s at the DMV and they refuse to give him a license because he’s not registered (as is, of 
course, required by law)
116, he comes back to you, angry, and accuses you of lying. “I didn’t 
lie,” you reply, “since what I said was, strictly speaking, true: the law does not forbid your 
registering for the draft; it is permitted.” This strikes me as an extraordinarily lame response. I 
think it’s reasonable to include a lack of obligation as part of the content of your utterance. 
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Testable hypothesis: people would be more inclined to reject defenses against lying in permitted 
+> not obligated cases than in some +> not all cases. 
 Number-terms fall on a scale, of course. The tendency to understand utterances of a 
particular numeral as conveying that exactly-that-many are involved can arguably be treated as a 
GCI.
117
 Use of ‘three’ literally means at least three, but implicates at most three. I think this 
inference is so well-entrenched in usage that the supposed implicatum ought to be included as 
part of the content of what is said. Here’s a scenario using our usual test. In China, according to 
the “Family Planning Policy,” it’s illegal for certain couples to have more than one child. 
Suppose my wife and I were a Chinese couple subject to this restriction, and the Party’s Family 
Planning Compliance Inspector came to our door (I don’t know how this actually works in 
China; bear with me). I report to this official: “We have one child.” He checks a box on his 
clipboard and moves on to the next house. Later, though, he sees me taking my two girls out for 
ice cream. “You said you only had one kid, you liar,” he says. Instead of trying to pass off Alice 
as the neighbor’s girl or something, I respond, “What I said was true: we have at least one child.” 
This defense is simply not going to cut it. 
 Other phenomena that Levinson classifies as GCIs strike me as harder to judge; my 
intuitions are murky, and I would expect wide disagreement about them. Take the scale <hot, 
warm>. Suppose I own a hot tub (I don’t), and my wife, who’s about to have a soak, asks me 
how the water is. I say, “It’s warm.” Background: the heating mechanism for the thing has been 
on the fritz, so the water’s been unheated for some time. I had just been tinkering with it, and the 
results of my efforts have been an over-correction: now it’s pumping out energy like crazy, 
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heating the water to near-boiling temperatures. My wife’s been bugging me lately about fixing it, 
and I wanted to get back at her. And did I! To the tune of second-degree burns over 60% of her 
body; she’ll think twice before she nags me again. She accuses me of lying, but I maintain that I 
merely misled her; the water was, in fact, warm. Part of me wants to say that my defense 
succeeds—the falsity seems cancellable: “It’s warm; in fact, it’s boiling!”—but part of me wants 
to agree that I lied. If I surveyed people, they might be inclined to call me a liar, but I worry that 
would mostly reflect moral disapprobation (there’s no denying that my actions are despicable). If 
we switched the hot tub to a bowl of soup, and the injuries were just a little scalding on the roof 
of her mouth, I think the intuition would be to characterize my statement as a lie might diminish; 
it becomes, arguably, more of a misleading understatement. This is a hard case.  
An easier one: Levinson also mentions the scale <know, believe>. If I say that I believe 
that p, I implicate that I don’t know that p. I can find in my imagination no scenario in which it’s 
tempting to include that implicatum as part of what is said. If I tell someone I believe something, 
but in fact I know it, it just seems bizarre for them to accuse me of lying. 
 Implications arising from the use of different tenses can be analyzed as GCIs of the Q 
variety. There are cases for which I would include such supposed implicata as part of what is 
said. Let’s go back to our dystopian future USA, with the Secret Police and all that. Suppose that 
things have shifted so far to the right politically that being a member of the Democratic Party is 
as bad as being a Communist was in the ’50s. I’m brought in for questioning, and I’m sweating 
it, because I’m a Democrat (I attend secret meetings, distribute underground newsletters, the 
whole nine yards), and I have been for decades. But I know that the authorities go easier on you 
if you’ve mended your ways and abrogated your Democratic affiliations. So I tell my 
interrogators, “I used to be a Democrat.” If they catch me the next day handing out copies of my 
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pamphlet, “Jimmy Carter Wasn’t So Bad,” and accuse me of lying, can I successfully defend 
myself by claiming that what I said was, strictly speaking, true, since there was a time before my 
utterance at which I was a Democrat? I’m inclined to say that my defense fails, and that part of 
what I said was that I’m not a Democrat now. I’m somewhat less strongly inclined to reject the 
defense, though, if I alter the original utterance: “I was a Democrat twenty years ago.” And my 
conviction weakens further reflecting on the simple “I was a Democrat.” But it strengthens again 
somewhat, considering “I had been a Democrat.” So we have, for the same basic phenomenon—
Q-implicatures arising from the use of tense—a range of intuitions about the relationship 
between what is said and what is implicated. 
 What have we learned? Far from providing a firm theoretical grounding for a clear and 
sharp distinction between lying and (mere) misleading, Q-implicatures instead seem to reveal a 
range of cases falling on a spectrum between those two extremes. Perhaps there is no sharp 
distinction to be made between lying and misleading; or if there is, the basis of that distinction 
must involve something other than GCIs. It’s looking impossible to classify these default 
inferences uniformly; their behavior in lying/misleading scenarios is far too erratic. A quick 
examination of I- and M-implicatures will confirm this observation. 
2.3.3 I-Implicatures 
We’ve already seen two of the phenomena Levinson classifies as I-implicatures: conditional 
perfection and conjunction buttressing (“If you don’t finish your green beans, you won’t get a 
cupcake” and “I ate at Papa Giorgio’s and got violently sick”). Those two cases alone provide 
evidence of the varying degrees to which it seems appropriate to include implicata in ‘what is 
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said’: the intuition to call my conjunction a lie was much stronger. Other I-implicatures confirm 
this variability.  
 Recall, I-implicatures, as Levinson puts it, “go in just the reverse direction to that in 
which Q-implicatures tend. … [They] are inferences from the lack of further specification to the 
lack of need for it, whereas Q-implicatures are inferences from the lack of informational 
richness to the speaker’s inability to provide it.”118 The I heuristic instructs the speaker to say as 
little as necessary, relying on the hearer to fill in the gaps according to how things usually, 
stereotypically go. So one inference of this type Levinson calls “Inference to stereotype,” and his 
example is an utterance of “John said ‘Hello’ to the secretary and then he smiled” 
communicating that John said ‘Hello’ to the female secretary and John smiled.119 Secretaries are 
stereotypically female, and this information settles the reference of ‘he’. Now, even Grice allows 
that reference-fixing is part of the determination of what is said (though the fact that implicatural 
inference is involved in the process creates an awkward consequence for his account—according 
to which ‘what is said’ is supposed to be the input, not the output of implicature-processing—the 
Levinson calls “Grice’s Circle”), and so cases in which inference to stereotype is active at that 
level are unproblematic for our purposes, since there’s no tendency to begin with to separate the 
implicature from what is said. It’s much more difficult in other instances to see how one could 
genuinely lie by relying on such inferences, though. Kindergarten teachers are overwhelmingly 
female, but it’s hard to see how an utterance employing the expression ‘the kindergarten teacher’ 
could be rendered false by the teacher’s being male.  
 But for some other I-inferences, there are cases in which the inferred content ought to be 
included as part of what is said. Take “negative strengthening,” where an utterance of, e.g., “I 
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don’t like Alice” implicates that I positively dislike her.120, 121 Imagine I’m trying to ingratiate 
myself with some (potential) new friends; they’re all big sports fans, but I know next to nothing 
about sports. They’re going on about Lance Armstrong and what a heel he was. I’ve never even 
heard of the guy, but everybody really seems to hate him, so I chime in: “I don’t like Lance 
Armstrong.” I lied to fit in, one might say. “No,” I might respond, “I didn’t. What I said was, 
strictly speaking, true. Since I’ve never met him and don’t even know who he is, I don’t have 
feelings one way or the other about Lance Armstrong: I neither like him nor dislike him. It’s not 
the case that I like him, so what I said was true.” This strikes me as pretty weak. Maybe even 
weaker: suppose they’re all Lance Armstrong apologists; despite his admissions to Oprah, they 
still think he’s innocent. I opine, “I don’t think he did it, either,” not knowing who he is—or even 
what it is. Can I defend the truth of my statement based on this level of ignorance?  
 An even more striking case: the “mirror maxim,” according to which, e.g., “Harry and 
Sue bought a piano” implicates that they bought it together, rather than each of them buying 
one.
122
 Suppose you’re homosexual, but you’re lucky enough to live in one of the states where 
gay marriage is legal. You’re unlucky, though, in that your boss is a closed-minded jerk; if he 
ever found out about your sexual orientation, you’d lose your job. It’s time for the annual 
company Christmas party, a big fancy black-tie affair that everyone attends--usually with their 
significant other. You’re determined to throw your boss off, so (with your husband’s somewhat 
reluctant blessing
123
) you get your sympathetic next-door neighbor’s wife, Tina, to accompany 
you as a beard. At the party, you tell anyone who’ll listen (especially the boss), “Tina and I are 
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married.” You lied! It’s no defense to point out that, since you have a spouse and Tina has a 
spouse, what you said is, strictly speaking, true. 
2.3.4 M-Implicatures 
These sorts of inferences arise in the presence or absence of marked expressions—unusual ways 
of putting things. Roughly, unusual expressions indicate unusual circumstances; normal 
expressions indicate normal circumstances. Unlike their I-heuristic cousins, these implicatures do 
not often seem suitable for assimilation into what is said. Let’s consider two representative 
examples: one in which someone tries to conceal the unusual nature of a situation by using an 
ordinary mode of expression, and one in which someone tries to conceal the straightforwardness 
of a situation by using an inappropriately marked mode of expression.  
First, consider Dirty Harry. His Lieutenant’s finally had it: he’s going to start garnishing 
Callahan’s wages to pay for all the property he destroys. It’s hard enough to get by on a meager 
Inspector’s salary already, so Harry can’t allow his pay to be cut. But he’s not about to change 
his investigative modus operandi; it may be “unconventional”, but he gets results, dammit. So he 
decides to deceive his Lieutenant. As part of the narrative in his latest report, Inspector Callahan 
has written this sentence: “I opened the door.” What actually happened was: Dirty Harry took out 
his .44 Magnum and fired, putting a hole the size of a basketball where the lock and doorknob 
used to be, then kicked the door completely off its hinges. Did he lie in the report? I’m inclined 
to call this a classic case of misleading with the truth. He may have done it unconventionally, but 
he did open the door. If it is a lie, it’s at least not clearly a lie. But suppose we alter the scenario 
slightly: instead of writing “I opened the door,” let’s consider the sentence “I unlocked the door 
and opened it.” Now my intuitions aren’t so clear. This sentence seems worse, if not an outright 
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lie, at least closer to being one. Why? Is it that the idea of unlocking a door is more closely 
associated with a typical, normal procedure than the idea of opening one? Is it the conjunction of 
two dishonest characterizations rather than just one? I can’t say for sure. The only lesson I want 
to extract from this is that our intuitions about such cases seem mutable, variable—sensitive to 
small changes in the circumstances. This is an interesting datum. 
Next, let’s take up the opposite kind of case, in which the utterance is marked, but the 
situation normal. Consider the nameless outlaw narrator of Bob Marley’s “I Shot the Sherriff.” 
Suppose that he’s less ingenuous than he is in the song. He wants to appear forthcoming, but he 
wants his listener to believe, falsely, that he’s not guilty of murder. So instead of confessing as 
he does in the song, he says, “I and my gun were part of the causal chain that ended in the death 
of the Sherriff. But I and my gun were not part of the causal chain that ended in the death of the 
Deputy.” This is a marked way of putting it. It calls to mind elaborate scenarios, like Donald 
Davidson’s stampede of wild pigs.124 Now suppose (contrary to fact probably; maybe it’s his 
wife) the listener has every reason to believe that the man is being a cooperative, maxim 
following communicator. According to the M-principle, then, this marked way of confessing 
implicates that the situation was not a simple, ordinary shooting. But suppose it was: as a matter 
of fact, the guy just walked up behind the Sherriff in the local saloon, pulled out his pistol, and 
shot him in the back. (He really didn’t have anything to do with the Deputy, though.) Again, I’m 
disinclined to classify this statement as a lie. It’s hard to justify including the lack-of-normalcy as 
part of what is said. If there’s a degree to which things are lies or not—a continuum of 
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possibilities between the extremes of lies and acts of (mere) misleading—I’d put this one even 
closer to the ‘misleading’ side than the Dirty Harry case. 
2.3.5 Final reflections on GCIs 
So what have we learned? Generalized Conversational Implicatures, despite our initial tentative 
hopes, do not provide a unified set of phenomena—at least with respect to the distinction that is 
our focus, between lying and misleading. We have been in search of a theoretically rigorous 
basis on which to draw this commonsense distinction, which depends crucially on the notion of 
what is said (strictly speaking) by a speaker in making an utterance: if what he said, strictly 
speaking, is true, he didn’t lie. Some reflection led us to conclude that a notion of ‘what is said’ 
suitable for our purposes could not be minimal; it must accommodate the observation that 
features of the context of utterance play an important role in determining what we say—a role 
that goes beyond merely determining the references of indexical expressions. We noted that 
GCIs, as default pragmatic inferences that are closely tied to specific linguistic forms, and are 
therefore close kin with the conventional meanings of those forms, might be prime candidates for 
assimilation into the more expansive conception of ‘what is said’ that we were seeking. Perhaps, 
our thinking went, if we simply add the GCIs to the semantic contribution of expressions, we’d 
have a stable foundation for our target distinction—and a theoretically rigorous one, at that, since 
Levinson 2000 provides an elaborate taxonomy of GCIs with a thoroughly argued, evidence-
based rationale.  
 But, alas, our hopes were dashed. When we got down to concrete cases, and applied our 
test designed to elicit intuitions about ‘what is said’ based on the contemplation of scenarios near 
the border between lying and misleading, we discovered not unity, but variety. Some GCIs were 
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clearly strong candidates for inclusion as part of the content of what was said by speakers; others 
were clearly not suitable for such inclusion. And perhaps most disturbingly, some species of GCI 
exhibited flexibility, ambiguity, on this central question. We weren’t sure, in some cases, what 
our intuitions were about exactly what was said; it seemed there were in-between cases, acts not 
easily categorized as either lies or (mere) deceptions. 
 Faced with this failure to find a theoretical basis in GCIs for a sharp distinction between 
lying and misleading, we have two choices: abandon the search, or press on. There is some 
reason for thinking that the proper choice is the former. Our discovery of variegated intuitions 
about what is said in various circumstances could be taken as evidence that there is no precisely 
definable notion suitable for our purposes. Our commonsense distinction between lying and 
misleading may be inherently blurry and ambiguous, not clear and distinct. We may want to 
embrace the indeterminacy, and try to search for an explanation of why we might expect it. In 
fact I think this is the proper course. But before we proceed along it, I want to consider the 
alternative one last time. For perhaps the reason our intuitions were confused was not that it’s 
impossible to draw a sharp boundary between lying and misleading, but because we were trying 
to draw the boundary using the wrong tools. GCIs cut across the distinction, but perhaps some 
other linguistic theory can provide us with the tools to sensitize our intuitions in such a way that 
a sharp boundary can be drawn. In that spirit of open-minded inquiry, I want to examine 
Relevance Theory. 
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2.4 RELEVANCE THEORY 
Relevance Theory (RT) is an attempt to build on the basic Gricean model of communication, 
incorporating subsequent insights that the extent of pragmatic contributions to the interpretive 
process extend beyond the strict limits Grice originally set.
125
 Semantics provides a logical form 
(LF) for utterances, but this is in general not enough to give us the explicit content of the 
utterance, which is called its “explicature.” Since explicatures may have content that goes 
beyond Grice’s minimal ‘what is said’, we have in RT another potential candidate to provide a 
sound theoretical basis for the more expansive understanding of that notion that we seek—one 
that can underwrite the distinction between lying and misleading. We shall briefly consider 
whether Relevance Theory can give us what we want. 
 
2.4.1 The basics  
Relevance Theory is ambitious. It aims to provide a comprehensive account of communication 
that is based on plausible and empirically testable assumptions about cognitive processing 
mechanisms. The central assumption is the Cognitive Principle of Relevance: “Human cognition 
tends to be geared to the maximization of Relevance.”126 Relevance is a property that cognitive 
inputs—principally, for our concerns, utterances, but also perceptions, etc.—can have to a 
greater or lesser degree depending on their cognitive effects and on the effort required to process 
them. The relevance of utterances will vary directly with the degree to which they have “positive 
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cognitive effects” like “answering a question [one] has in mind, improving [one’s] knowledge on 
a certain topic, settling a doubt,” and so on; relevance will vary inversely with “the effort of 
perception, memory, and inferences required [to process them].”127 
 We saw that Levinson, in his theory of GCIs, streamlined Grice’s framework of 
conversational maxims, identifying only 3 principles (the Q-, I-, and M-heuristics) involved in 
the inference of implicata. Relevance Theory is even more austere, with only a single principle 
governing communication, the Communicative Principle of Relevance: “Every [utterance] 
communicates the presumption of its own optimal relevance.”128 From the presumption that 
speakers are making relevance-maximizing conversational contributions, hearers infer the 
contents of their utterances. The important difference between Grice and Levinson, on the one 
hand, and relevance theorists on the other, is that in RT, the maxim is not limited to aiding in the 
derivation of implicatures—contents that go beyond a speaker’s primary, literal meaning. The 
Principle of Relevance facilitates understanding at all levels, including the primary level, at 
which we find what speakers communicate explicitly—so-called “explicatures.” This content 
often goes beyond the more minimal Gricean ‘what is said’, and so can include what Grice and 
his followers would prefer to call implicatures (especially GCIs), or what Bach would call 
implicitures.  
 Sperber and Wilson spell out a multi-step comprehension procedure that hearers are 
supposed to follow as they recover speakers’ meanings: it’s organized into subtasks, including 
the decoding of the logical form of utterances (the contribution of semantics), the formation of 
competing hypotheses for the content of explicatures (which are “development[s] of a logical 
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ostensive communication”—a more general notion, the explication of which needn’t detain us. 
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form”)129, the evaluation of these in relation to the Principle of Relevance, the recovery of 
implicatures that go beyond explicit content, and so on. The tasks can be accomplished in 
parallel, not linearly, but the process is supposed to be deductive. They distinguish between weak 
and strong implicatures, with only the latter necessary to meet the demands of maximum 
relevance (among the former are various forms of loose talk and metaphor). And within explicit 
content, they distinguish “basic explicatures” from “higher-order explicatures,” all of which can 
be conveyed by a single utterance. So, for example, in an exchange between Peter and Mary, in 
which Peter asks Mary if she’ll pay him the money she owes by Tuesday, and Mary responds, “I 
will pay it back by then,” we have for a basic explicature the proposition ‘Mary will pay back the 
money by Tuesday’, and for higher-order explicatures the propositions ‘Mary is promising to pay 
back the money by Tuesday’ and ‘Mary believes that she will pay back the money by 
Tuesday’.130 
 
2.4.2 Appraisal 
On the face of it, there’s much for us to like about Relevance Theory. When we were attempting 
to mine the theory of GCIs for a suitable candidate for an expanded notion of ‘what is said’, we 
had to do violence to the intentions of the theorist: GCIs are implicatures on that account—
content that is, by definition, separate from what is said (in the strict sense).
131
 If we consider 
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someone utters “She either got married and had a child, or had a child and got married; but I don’t know which,” 
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adding explicatures to an expanded notion of ‘what is said’, we do much less violence to the 
intentions of the relevance theorists. They would be reluctant to say something along the lines of 
“what is said includes explicatures,” but only because ‘what is said’ is so tied up with the 
Gricean picture that they prefer just to talk of explicatures. Under the auspices of RT, though, 
we’re free to say of some of our liars above that the explicit contents of their utterances were 
falsehoods like ‘I ate at Papa Giorgio’s and, as a result, soon thereafter I became violently ill’, 
‘The offer will either contain a provision that you pay for the roof repairs, or a provision that you 
pay for the foundation repairs, but not both’, and ‘We have one, and only one, child’. RT 
provides no redoubt for the sneaky liar, trying to defend himself by adverting to some mythical, 
minimal semantic content; for relevance theorists, minimal semantic content is just LF, which is 
hardly ever propositional (it is underdeterminate, typically, and requires development or 
enrichment to achieve propositionality, truth-evaluability). 
 What relevance theorists don’t provide is an acknowledgment of the kinds of in-between 
cases that many of our examples above highlighted—cases in which there are conflicting, 
ambiguous or indeterminate intuitions about the truth-conditional content of utterances. As 
we’ve seen, there are cases in which contents that RT would classify as explicatures (the ‘not all’ 
understanding of ‘some’) do not clearly belong on one side or the other of the said/implied (or 
explicated/implicated) divide. But we have, in RT, the resources to provide an explanation for 
this phenomenon. As mentioned, the picture of language processing that relevance theorists favor 
is one according to which multiple interpretations for a given utterance are entertained by a sub-
personal inference-module, operating deductively with the Principle of Relevance as a guiding 
                                                                                                                                                             
then what they say must include the implicatural contribution (and then), lest it be the utterance of a tautology 
(followed by a confusing remark: “I don’t know which.”). But while he allows this sort of intrusion, he does not 
countenance a notion of ‘what is said’ according to which the GCI becomes part of the content in an utterance of 
plain old “She got married and had a child,” and of course it is just this sort of inclusion that we were testing. 
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maxim. The procedure one follows involves testing different hypotheses—candidates for the 
correct interpretation—in order of their “accessibility” (roughly, the cognitive-computational 
ease with which they’re accessed) until one finds a suitably relevant one. Now, in this process, 
there will be degrees of accessibility for the various hypotheses; less-accessible ones will never 
be considered during the interpretive process, but they could be considered afterwards—when, 
for example, questions about the literal truth or falsity of someone’s claims are being entertained. 
At this point, one may find, on reflection, that while, for example, the ‘not all’ reading of the 
particular affirmative utterance was the most relevant (and accessible), the ‘some and possibly 
all’ reading was relatively close, in terms of cost of cognitive computation, to the interpretation 
that was chosen. In such cases, when an alternative understanding is relatively close to the 
chosen interpretation accessibility-wise, we might experience the kind of conflicting intuitions 
that we experience in cases where we weren’t sure whether the speech act was a lie or a mere 
deception. There could be a spectrum here: from cases in which the strict meaning proffered by 
the deceiver to defend against an accusation of lying is much less accessible (if at all) than the 
falsity actually communicated, to cases in which it’s quite a close call which of the two 
interpretations—the minimal truth or the more expansive falsity—is more accessible. This would 
explain the data above. 
 This is all quite promising, and I think it may be on the right track. Nevertheless, I’m 
very reluctant to embrace Relevance Theory as a framework for drawing the distinction between 
lying and misleading. The features mentioned above are nice, but RT brings along much extra 
theoretical baggage that I’m reluctant to take on board. This is not the place for a comprehensive 
review of the merits and demerits of Relevance Theory, so rather than set out detailed arguments, 
I’ll just briefly note some of my concerns. First of all, RT is committed strongly to a particular 
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picture of the way the mind works in general, and how it processes language in particular. As 
Robyn Carston puts it, “The relevance-theoretic approach… aims at a causal mechanistic 
account… in terms of interacting sub-personal systems,” among which are a “decoding system 
(the language module)”, a “deductive device” which operates inferentially on interpretive 
hypotheses using “the logical elimination rules [as] its proprietary database”, and a series of 
representations for background knowledge conceived as “cross-referenced encyclopaedic entries 
attached to particular conceptual addresses….”132 I have personal reservations about both 
modular and computational theories of mind, so I’m reluctant to hitch my wagon to a theory that 
so fully embraces versions of each approach. But even if we set those concerns aside, and grant 
that there is in some sense a division of mental labor in linguistic processing, I’m not sure about 
the particular job-descriptions that relevance theorists provide. Utterance interpretation that’s as 
sensitive to contextual factors as the relevance theorists’ model suggests seems a paradigmatic 
example of an abductive, all-things-considered inference to the best explanation (of what the 
speaker is trying to convey). Sperber and Wilson’s efforts to avoid the frame problem by 
simultaneously characterizing this inferential process as non-demonstrative and deductive strikes 
me as a not-entirely plausible attempt to have their cake and eat it, too.
133
  
Second, key relevance-theoretic notions seem a bit too vaguely defined to be of much 
predictive or explanatory use. I was able, above, to give a sketchy account of why some cases 
might present us with conflicting intuitions about what was said, in terms of the relative 
accessibility of different interpretive hypotheses. That’s a well and good. The problem is, I can’t 
see how one might provide anything more robust, an explanation less-sketchy. Relevance is 
supposed to be a function of positive cognitive effects and processing effort, but there is no way 
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to quantify these notions, no specification of how to measure them.
134
 But without such 
specifications, I don’t see any way to fill in the details of an account of accessibility differences 
that would be at all satisfactory—that would predict, say, that certain locutions’ minimal 
readings will be more salient than others, and that our intuitions about deceptive utterances 
featuring them are likely to tend more toward the ‘misleading’ end of the spectrum. 
Also, the key notion of explicature seems not to have clearly defined boundaries. 
Explicatures are supposed to be developments of logical form, but it’s hard to see how this 
criterion creates a clear distinction between explicatures and implicatures. Take Grice’s first 
example of a particularized conversational implicature, the utterance of “There is a garage round 
the corner” in response to a stranded motorist’s “I am out of petrol.” As we saw above when we 
were discussing Bach’s quite similar notion of impliciture, one can conceive of the 
communicated content as an enrichment (Bach would say expansion, relevance theorists would 
say development) of the original utterance, as in ‘‘There is a{n open} garage {with petrol for 
sale} round the corner.’ As Recanati notes, Carston explicitly declares that this is an instance of 
implicature, but a plausible case can be made that according to RT, it should be considered an 
explicature.
135
 Understanding how to circumscribe the domain of explicature is further 
complicated by the theory’s inclusion of “higher-order” explicatures, as noted above. It is 
intuitively unappealing to include propositions like ‘Mary believes she will pay back the money’ 
as part of the explicit content of an utterance in which she promises to do so. Rather, it seems 
that such a proposition should count as entailed by the utterance. 
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Finally, Relevance Theory’s scientific ambitions—its status as an empirically verifiable 
(or falsifiable) theory—seem hard to justify. Sperber and Wilson point to a study that they say 
provides support for RT. It involves asking people at train stations for the time in various 
circumstances, some of which prompt the subjects to give precise answers (11:58, e.g.), while 
others prompt subjects to speak loosely (“It’s noon”). The fact that experimenters were able to 
elicit these different kinds of responses by altering scenarios shows that people respond to 
“subtle clues as to what might make [an utterance] relevant for the questioner,” and so the 
predictions of Relevance Theory are confirmed.
136
 My question is this: did we need a full-
fledged “cognitive psychological theory”137 to tell us that people adjust the precision of their 
utterances according to what they perceive to be the hearer’s needs and expectations? How does 
this result confirm RT in particular, as opposed to any other account that would make the same 
utterly banal prediction? This citation by Sperber and Wilson comes in an article published in 
2004, nearly thirty years after their initial formulation of RT. If pointing to this study is the best 
they can do to defend their theory’s claims to scientific rigor, after all this time, that strikes me as 
a serious problem.  
2.5 LESSONS FOR THE DEBATE OVER ‘WHAT IS SAID’ 
Time to take stock. We’ve been searching through the philosophical and linguistic literature for a 
suitable conception of ‘what is said’ to underwrite our commonsense distinction between lying 
and misleading. We haven’t found one. But our search has been instructive: in the course of 
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testing particular proposals, we had a chance to consider a wide variety of cases in which our 
focal distinction was at issue and to examine our intuitions about it. They turn out to be a bit of a 
mess. That is, our intuitions do no always give a clear answer to the question: Is this a lie, or an 
act of (mere) misleading? There are two possible explanations for this fact: either (a) our 
intuitions are not suitably sensitized by exposure to the proper theoretical basis for the 
distinction, and if they were, we would reform them in such a way that a clear boundary could be 
drawn between lying and misleading; or (b) the commonsense distinction cannot be made 
sharply, is inherently ambiguous, with a range of cases falling on a spectrum between the two 
extremes. While I’m still open to suggestions on option (a), I want to embrace (b) for now and 
see what consequences follow. 
 In particular, I want to explore the consequences for the longstanding debate over the 
proper understanding of the controversial notion ‘what is said’. As we’ve briefly discussed 
already, there are, in this debate, basically two opposing camps: those who want to construe the 
notion minimally, in the style of Grice, and those who regard the minimal conception as 
untenable, preferring instead a notion that more clearly lines up with normal speakers’ intuitions 
about truth-conditions. The most prominent exponent of the former view is Bach, though there 
are others; Recanati is perhaps the standard-bearer for the latter view. In the remainder of this 
chapter, I want to examine this debate in more detail and extract what insights I can from our 
explorations so far. 
2.5.1 Refining Grice’s minimal notion 
Grice’s original characterization of ‘what is said’ was a minimal one, constrained by syntax and 
allowing only minimal contribution to content from context (fixing indexicals and resolving 
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ambiguity). The original formulation gives rise to some intractable problems, though, so in order 
to maintain a minimal conception of ‘what is said’, theorists in the Neo-Gricean camp have made 
certain modifications. Bach, as usual, is the principal here.
138
 
 Grice wanted his distinction between saying and implicating to be exhaustive of speaker-
meaning: part of what we mean in an act of communication is what we explicitly say, and the 
rest is what we implicate. A consequence of this is that, for Grice, saying entails meaning; 
whenever we say something, we mean it. But this is obviously not true, if we understand saying 
in a particular (intuitive) way: when we’re being ironic or metaphorical, we say things that we 
don’t mean. When I say, sarcastically, “Well that’s just great,” after getting a flat tire, I mean the 
opposite of what I say; and when I say, “You’re a delicate flower” to my wife, I’m not making a 
botanical observation. Grice was aware of this problem, and so for such cases he distinguished 
between genuine saying and “making as if to say.”139 But, as Bach puts it, “[i]t is more natural to 
describe these as cases of saying one thing and meaning something else instead.”140 
 For Bach, the key to refining Grice’s notion of saying is to be mindful of the difference 
between locutionary and illocutionary acts. The distinction, going back to Austin 1962, marks 
the crucial difference between merely saying something and what one does by saying it—
promising, warning, informing, asserting, etc. A locutionary act produces a content; an 
illocutionary act assigns a force to that content. In order to get the content of the locutionary act, 
all one needs is the conventional meanings of the terms, plus disambiguation and resolution of 
indexical reference, if necessary. These are the minimal semantic ingredients that Grice 
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explicitly allows to determine what is said, and so it’s the locutionary sense of ‘saying’ that he 
needs. His mistake, according to Bach, was to use ‘say’ in an illocutionary sense: “[T]he verb 
say, as Grice uses it, does not mark a level distinct from that marked by such illocutionary verbs 
as state, tell, ask, etc., but rather functions as a generic illocutionary verb.”141 If we restrict 
‘saying’ to its locutionary sense, we can easily handle cases of irony and metaphor: one says one 
thing (locutionary act) and means (asserts, states, or whatever—illocutionary act) something else. 
This more restrictive sense of ‘saying’ also allows us easily to account for cases in which we say 
things unintentionally (through misuse of terms or slips of the tongue) and cases in which we say 
things but don’t mean anything at all (as in recitation, e.g.).142 
 An important feature of Bach’s minimalist conception of what is said is that it needn’t be 
fully propositional. In utterances like “Rose isn’t tall enough,” what is said falls short of being a 
truth-evaluable proposition; there is nevertheless no problem in referring to this incomplete 
entity (a “propositional radical,” for Bach) as the content of what is said, since there is no 
problem indirectly quoting it: The man said Rose isn’t tall enough. It passes the “IQ Test.” This 
potential lack of propositionality, of truth-evaluability, makes Bach’s minimalist notion 
unsuitable as a candidate for ‘what is said’ in the sense that underwrites the distinction between 
lying and misleading. This we’ve already seen. But now that we’ve reached a point in our 
investigation of despair about ever finding a theoretical account that can capture all of our 
intuitions about that distinction, we’re free to ask a different question. While Bach’s minimal 
‘what is said’ cannot in general distinguish lying from misleading, might it nevertheless play a 
role in specific instances in which the distinction is at issue? For example, when it is fully 
propositional, might it in those cases serve as the deceiver’s fallback—what he said, strictly 
                                                 
141
 Bach 1994, p. 13 
142
 Bach 2001, p. 18 
   
 89 
speaking? Again, the answer is no—or at least, not always. As we’ve seen time and again, the 
purely semantic contents of utterances like “I’ve had lunch” and “You’re not going to die” are no 
safe redoubt for the deceiver, no defense against having lied. 
 What this suggests is that the sense of ‘what is said’ that we’ve been in search of is not a 
bare-bones, merely locutionary one, but rather an illocutionary one. Lying and misleading are, 
after all, illocutionary acts.
143
 They are attempts to engender false beliefs by saying false (or true) 
things, in the sense of stating, telling, or asserting them. Our ordinary use of the word ‘say’ is 
ambiguous between the illocutionary and locutionary senses, but it’s the former we’ve been 
seeking. This suggests that Bach’s locutionary sense of ‘saying’ plays no role in drawing the 
distinction we’ve focused on. We shall see. 
 
2.5.2 Truth-Conditional Pragmatics 
The alternative to Bach’s austere, locutionary ‘what is said’, the content of which is entirely 
semantically determined, is provided by Recanati’s so-called truth-conditional pragmatics. His 
project can be seen as a kind of resuscitation of Grice’s original dichotomy between what is said 
and what is implicated, achieved by dropping the requirement that ‘what is said’ be syntactically 
constrained. In this picture, what is said by a speaker in making an utterance is determined by a 
variety of pragmatic processes. This conception of ‘what is said’ is propositional, truth-
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evaluable, and illocutionary—a fine candidate, on the face of it, for underwriting our distinction 
between lying and misleading. 
 Recanati identifies ‘what is said’ with the intuitive truth-conditional content of utterances. 
As we’ve noted repeatedly, this often goes beyond what semantics gives us. He identifies various 
processes (“primary pragmatic processes”) that enrich bare semantic content to give us truth-
evaluable propositions. Some are mandatory, “bottom-up” processes, like saturation, which 
takes us, for example, from an utterance of the sentence ‘She is smaller than John’s sister’ to a 
proposition specifying the referent of ‘she’ and the relevant relation between John and the sister 
mentioned.
144
 This process is mandatory in the sense that we need to saturate in order to get a 
truth-evaluable proposition. It’s this process that’s involved in completing familiar examples like 
“Rose isn’t tall enough.” Optional pragmatic processes aren’t necessary to get a proposition, but 
their output is the intuitive truth-conditions of the utterance in question. So, free enrichment 
takes us from an utterance of ‘Mary took out her key and opened the door’ to the proposition that 
she did so with the key mentioned; it’s responsible for the specifization of ‘rabbit’ in ‘He eats 
rabbit’ to rabbit meat; it gives us a particular contextually salient restricted class of books in ‘All 
the books are on the table’ (along with a specific table).145 
 This is all very good so far. The propositional results of pragmatic processes like 
Recanati’s correspond to what we’ve previously identified as ‘what is said’ by liars who 
unsuccessfully try to defend themselves by adverting to minimal interpretations of their 
utterances. Free enrichment gives us ‘I ate at Papa Giorgio’s last week and {shortly thereafter, as 
a result} got violently sick’ and ‘Tina and I are married {to each other}’. The problem is that 
relying on intuitive truth-conditions of utterances, ignoring alternative minimal interpretations, 
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gives us the misleading appearance of certainty about what’s a lie and what isn’t. Recanati’s 
pragmatic processes get us from ‘some’ to ‘not all’, ‘warm’ to ‘not hot’, ‘permitted’ to ‘not 
obligated’ in the cases we discussed. But as we saw, it’s not clear in those cases whether or not 
we should include the extra content as part of what was said; we had conflicting intuitions about 
whether the utterances were false, whether or not to call them lies.  
 It seems, then, that while the pragmatically enriched, intuitive truth-conditions of 
utterances play an important role in our linguistic lives, there remains some pull in the direction 
of minimal interpretations. And this was exactly the state of affairs that our focus on the 
lying/misleading boundary, and the associated test of intuitions, was meant to examine. A 
complete reliance of Recanati’s intuitive truth-conditions gives the false impression that 
pragmatic propositions are all that matters; but a complete reliance on Bach’s IQ test gives the 
equally misleading impression that minimally semantic contents play a more important role than 
they do. The truth is somewhere in between. Our deliberations will have been successful if they 
allow us to say something about the respective roles in our linguistic lives of both the minimal, 
merely locutionary ‘what is said’, and its enriched, illocutionary counterpart. 
2.5.3 The role of a minimal ‘what is said’ 
Recanati objects to the very idea of a minimal, locutionary notion of ‘what is said’, on the 
grounds of its lack of psychological reality—its lack of “availability”—for interpreters of 
utterances. According to his “Availability Principle,” ‘what is said’ must be analyzed in terms of 
normal language-users intuitions about what is said by utterances, and those are their intuitions 
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about truth-values.
146
 These are not determined by minimal semantic contents, and so those are 
not part of what is said. Moreover, minimal propositions are dispensable in the actual process of 
utterance interpretation.
147
 When we’re processing an utterance of ‘Al has three kids’ in a normal 
context, for example, we never consider the supposedly more basic at least three interpretation; 
we skip straight to exactly three. This is true of all sorts of default meanings. But if they’re not 
part of what is said, and they’re not part of the cognitive processing of utterances, then one 
wonders what the point is of talking about minimal propositions at all. 
 Bach argues that this reasoning rests on a confusion of psychological facts and semantic 
facts: “The process of utterance comprehension is obviously a very interesting topic for 
psychology, but it’s hard to see why facts about hearers’ cognitive processes should be relevant 
to what a speaker says.”148 That the minimal ‘what is said’ (often) plays no role in the cognitive 
process of interpretation doesn’t show that it’s a mere fantasy. He goes on: “All this shows is that 
hearers can infer what a speaker is conveying without first identifying what the speaker is saying. 
The semantic notion of what is said pertains to the character of the information available to the 
hearer in the process of identifying what the speaker is conveying, not to what goes on in this 
process….”149 He pointedly uses the term ‘available’ here, which is Recanati’s key notion. The 
sense in which minimal meanings are available to hearers is not that they are consciously present 
in the process of interpretation, but that they could be made so present, after the fact. The key 
datum here is cancellability. Even if we don’t entertain the proposition that Al has at least three 
kids when interpreting an utterance of ‘Al has three kids’, we can be made aware of that way of 
understanding the utterance with the addition of a cancelling phrase: “Al has three kids—and 
                                                 
146
 Ibid., p. 14 
147
 Ibid., §4.5 
148
 Bach 2002, p. 10 
149
 Ibid. 
   
 93 
maybe even more than that.” The implicit qualification of the original to exactly three is thereby 
cancelled, and the minimal content laid bare. The same option is available whenever there’s an 
implicature, explicature, impliciture, whatever: cancellation reveals a more minimal proposition. 
 So here we have a clearly defined role for a minimal, locutionary conception of what is 
said: it explains the phenomenon of cancellability. In addition, as we’ve already seen, it allows 
us in cases of irony and metaphor to distinguish between what a person says and the (vastly 
different) thing that she means; and it gives us a sense of ‘saying’ in which one can say 
something unintentionally (misspeaking, e.g.), or say something without meaning anything at all 
(performing, e.g.). It is therefore going too far, as Recanati does, to dismiss the notion entirely. It 
has at least these roles to play in our linguistic lives. The really interesting question is whether 
and to what extent it plays the additional role of providing minimal content to fall back on in 
cases where the distinction between lying and misleading is at stake. And as we’ve seen, the 
answer to this question is not at all straightforward. In some cases, the pull of locutionary, literal 
meaning is sufficient to mark the relevant difference; in others, it clearly isn’t—and in still 
others, it seems to exert varying degrees of pull against pragmatically enriched illocutionary 
meaning, so that the verdict is not clear.  
 Instances of irony and metaphor, which make perhaps the strongest case for a merely 
locutionary ‘what is said’, also provide striking examples of the separation between this minimal 
sense of ‘saying’ and the more robust, illocutionary one. There is no pull in the minimal direction 
when we contemplate the use of irony and metaphor to deceive. Think back to my neighbor, the 
horrible cook. I and my wife finally relent and agree to attend a dinner party at his house. When 
dinner’s over, and everybody’s disingenuously congratulating the chef, I do the same, but 
indirectly: “Oh, that was just a terrible meal. I can’t remember ever eating something so 
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revolting.” I make this speech with an ironic tone of voice; he knows how sarcastic I can be, and 
takes me to mean the opposite of what I said—to be giving him a strong compliment. In fact, 
what I said was literally true: it was a terrible meal, the most revolting I’d ever had. Now, if the 
host found out about my true feelings, and called me out for lying, it would be laughable if I 
attempted to defend myself by pointing to the literal truth of what I said. Cases of metaphor are 
even clearer. Suppose I’ve succeeded in putting Papa Giorgio’s out of business, but he never 
discovered that I was the one who undermined him. He still thinks I’m his friend, and he lists me 
as a reference on his résumé. When his interviewers call me, I tell them, “That Papa: he’s no 
workhorse.” In fact, he’s one of the hardest working guys you’ll ever meet, but my deception 
costs him many job opportunities. Suppose it’s revealed to Papa what I said about him, and he’s 
mad at me for lying to prospective employers. A defense appealing to the literal truth of my 
claims—he is not, after all, really a horse—would fail. In both these cases, there’s a clear 
separation between the contents of my locutionary and illocutionary acts—what I’ve merely said 
and what I’ve said, in the sense of stating, asserting, telling. I’ve clearly committed myself to 
falsities, and the true content of my locutions provides no cover. 
 So when does minimal content exert a pull? We might have expected it not to in cases in 
which there’s such a clear separation between what we say and what we mean, like irony and 
metaphor. Obviously, there are cases on the opposite end of spectrum, in which we speak 
literally: the content of our illocutionary acts just are the contents of our locutionary acts. These 
are not interesting from our point of view, though; the act of (merely) misleading can only occur 
when locutionary and illocutionary contents differ, when one is true and the other false. Our field 
of inquiry is between these extremes, where what we assert or state is related, but not identical 
to, what we say.  
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 One particularly murky phenomenon in this area is what Grice called conventional 
implicature. These extra contents (supposedly beyond what is said) arise because of the 
conventional meanings of terms used in utterances. So what we say when we utter ‘He is a 
philosopher, but he’s rich’ has the regular conjunctive truth-conditions; we implicate the contrast 
between being a philosopher and being rich. Bach denies that there’s any such thing as 
conventional implicatures; he includes the extra contents as part of what is said, in his sense.
150
 
He claims that a single sentence can express multiple propositions. Since these phenomena arise 
due to conventional meanings of terms in utterances, we might expect there to be a strong 
connection between locutionary and illocutionary contents, so that it would be hard in such cases 
to make a successful defense against having lied. But results are mixed, depending on the terms 
in question. Let’s consider a made-up scenario. 
My brother-in-law has just married a girl from Poland (whom he met at the Polish 
bar/bowling alley where he works). Every week, the family convenes at our house for Sunday 
dinner, and this week he’s bringing his new bride. Now that she’s a citizen (by dint of the 
marriage), I’m determined to influence her political beliefs so she votes the way I want—for 
Democrats. She doesn’t know anything about the American political parties, but any political 
convictions she may acquire will be informed by her strongly Catholic upbringing (the Pope was 
Polish when she was growing up; that was a big deal). In particular, her Catholicism will 
strongly dispose her to favor candidates and parties with “pro-life” stances. This, of course, 
presents a roadblock for my plan to make a Democrat out of her. So I decide to resort to 
deception. At the Sunday dinner table, I say the following: “Rebecca Kleefisch is a Republican, 
but she’s against abortion.” Now, it’s true that Kleefisch is a Republican, and it’s true that she’s 
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against abortion, so on a strict truth-functional reading of the sentence, it’s true.151 It’s deceptive 
in that the word ‘but’ conventionally conveys a contrast between the conjuncts, so that, in this 
case, there’s something surprising about the second conjunct in light of the first. Did I lie, or 
merely mislead? An accusation of lying here seems to me a bit strained; it’s hard to justify 
including the relevant false proposition—that Republicans are not, generally, “pro-life”—as part 
of what was said (strictly speaking). But suppose I go on the say the following: “Senator Bob 
Casey is a Democrat; he is, therefore, against abortion.” Again, true that Bob Casey’s a 
Democrat, and true that he’s “pro-life.” What’s false is that there’s a relationship between the 
two—that the former implies that latter. Did I say it did? Seems to me a stronger case can be 
made for the word ‘therefore’ than for ‘but’ that the supposed conventional implicature is part of 
what is said. 
 So I agree with Bach, and disagree with Grice: these phenomena should not be 
considered implicatures. Grice is just straightforwardly wrong about ‘therefore’, in my view, 
when he says: 
If I say (smugly), He is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave, I have certainly 
committed myself, by virtue of the meaning of my words, to its being the case that his 
being brave is a consequence of (follows from) his being an Englishman. But while I 
have said that he is an Englishman, and said that he is brave, I do not want to say that I 
have said (in the favored sense) that it follows from his being an Englishman that he is 
brave, though I have certainly indicated, and so implicated, that this is so. I do not want 
to say that my utterance of this sentence would be, strictly speaking, false should the 
consequence in question fail to hold.
152
 
 
The reason he doesn’t want to say that it’s strictly speaking false, I would contend, is that he fails 
to consider an actual scenario in which that kind of judgment is called for—one in which the 
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difference between lying and misleading is at stake. This is an example of how our approach can 
help shed light.  
Now, what should we say in general about putative conventional implicatures? They 
evidently can’t be treated uniformly, as the difference between ‘but’ and ‘therefore’ in our 
example illustrates. If we follow Bach, and take secondary propositions like ‘Republicans 
generally favor abortion rights’ and ‘Democrats are generally against abortion’ to be part of what 
is said, we need an explanation for why one seems so much closer to being part of illocutionary 
content—to being asserted—than the other. In these cases I think the explanation is relatively 
straightforward: we’re committed to the secondary propositions to different degrees in each case, 
and the degree to which we’re committed is a function of the meanings of the words involved. It 
is part of the semantic contribution of ‘therefore’ that it commits one more strongly than the 
word ‘but’. If we take assertion as the representative, generic illocutionary act, and following 
Robert Brandom 1983 and 1994, for example, take it essentially to involve commitment to 
contents; and if we take it for granted that one can be committed with varying degrees of 
strength, then we have a fine explanation for a phenomenon that was heretofore puzzling—viz., 
the fact that our intuitions about whether an act is a lie or (merely) misleading can vary, can 
come in degrees. 
If only it were always so simple. What marks conventional implicatures as distinct from 
their conversational cousins, in Grice’s scheme, is that the former are not cancellable. One 
cannot retract the implication, by saying, for example, “He is a philosopher; therefore he’s rich—
though I don’t mean to imply that there’s any connection between being a philosopher and being 
rich.” Such an utterance would be infelicitous at best, contradictory at worst. This persistence of 
the extra content helps explain why it’s so attractive just to include it as part of what is said—and 
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is part of the explanation of why this aspect of meaning resists abandonment in defenses against 
lying. Other contents that we’ve considered, though—like implicitures, explicatures, and GCIs—
for inclusion in what is said, are cancellable, and so when they too resist abandonment, we can’t 
appeal to the same sorts of explanations. In particular, the variability in our intuitions about 
different locutions can’t be explained in terms of their meanings. We noted, for example, that 
among scalar implicatures, the minimal content of particular affirmatives (some… and possibly 
all) was easier to appeal to in making the case for the literal truth of an utterance than the 
minimal content of the corresponding deontic modal (permitted… and possibly obligated). It’s 
hard to see how there’s something about the meanings of ‘some’ and ‘permitted’ that explains 
the stronger tendency of the latter to rule out its superaltern.
153
 
So what is the explanation? Why are some cancellable default interpretations so much 
more persistent than others? It’s a matter of context, we might say. We can always imagine a 
context in which even the most intransigent extra contents are cast aside, making the minimal 
understanding the most natural. (In Taylor 2001, we get an imaginary scenario in which ‘I’ve 
had breakfast’ would most naturally be understood to mean that the speaker’s life has not been 
entirely breakfast-less.) So too, one might say, can we imagine contexts in which the pull of the 
minimal interpretation varies from stronger to weaker. Maybe we can, but this does not explain 
the phenomenon we’ve identified. Our examples were all rigged to make the pragmatically 
enriched interpretations maximally salient; that’s how you deceive: by making the false 
interpretation as natural as possible. And still we observed variation in the degree to which 
minimal propositions could be appealed to. 
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We’ve identified a genuine puzzle, one that I’ve not seen recognized anywhere in the 
literature. The distinction between lying and misleading is hardly ever discussed, but even when 
it is, the complexity of the issues it raises is not acknowledged. For example, in Horn 2009, we 
get a defense of the minimal, neo-Gricean conception of ‘what is said’ on the basis of its utility 
in marking the distinction. The paper, a forty-year retrospective on the Gricean framework, is 
mostly a recapitulation of arguments found elsewhere and earlier; the material on lying and 
misleading is meant to provide a new line of defense. The abstract lays out the strategy, and is 
worth quoting in full: 
40-plus years ago Paul Grice initiated modern pragmatics by defining a relation of 
conversational implicature within a general theory of cooperation and rationality. While 
critics have disputed the formulation and derivation of Gricean principles, the overall 
framework, with appropriate emendations, remains the most natural and explanatory 
approach to predicting constraints on lexical incorporation, the behavior of scalar 
predicates, pragmatic strengthening, and other linguistic phenomena. Despite recent 
arguments for an enriched conception of propositional content, a range of real and 
fictional exchanges bearing on the distinction between lying and misleading supports the 
neo-Gricean view of an austere conception of what is said.
154
 
 
The “recent arguments for an enriched conception of propositional content” come from the usual 
suspects: Recanati, Relevance Theorists, etc. The kinds of cases Horn mentions early in the 
paper are familiar: “I haven’t had breakfast {today}. …John and Mary are married {to each 
other}. …Robin ate the shrimp and {as a result} got food poisoning.”155 He wants to defend the 
position that the bracketed material is not part of what is said. But if this is his goal, and the 
material in the final section on lying and misleading is meant to be the culmination of his efforts, 
then his choice of examples in that section is strange. He doesn’t consider any scenarios in which 
the familiar quoted examples are the disputed utterances—an odd choice, given how much 
weight his stated opponents put on them. And as we’ve seen, these are just the sorts of cases that, 
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when situated within contexts in which the lying/misleading distinction is at issue, make it most 
difficult to maintain a minimalism about ‘what is said’. Instead of focusing on the examples we 
might expect, Horn gives us a fanciful “travelogue,” with an eclectic mix of samples of deceptive 
communication, drawn from history and fiction. But the cases tend to miss the mark, either 
because the examples of mere misleading they present can be accommodated within a non-
Gricean framework, or because the chosen cases lack the features necessary to test the claims 
about our intuitions about lying and misleading.  
We’ll start with the examples that are simply of the wrong kind. He gives us a snippet of 
dialogue from a television show, featuring an utterance that will be familiar: 
 Kama: ‘Is he gonna die?’ 
Dr. Foreman: ‘No, no one’s gonna die.’ 
Kama: ‘In the whole world? Ever? That’s so great!’156 
Horn doesn’t explain what he thinks this bit of dialogue is supposed to show us, but it’s featured 
in a section meant to demonstrate that a minimal conception of ‘what is said’ can explain our 
intuitions about the difference between lying and misleading—and whatever this example gives 
us, it doesn’t support that claim. The most glaring problem is that the scenario doesn’t feature a 
deceptive act; as we’ve seen, if we want to gain insight into differences between species of 
deception, we need examples of deception. Further, the kinds of examples Horn needs are those 
in which the minimal proposition is intuitively what is said; we’ve looked at this kind of case 
before (the mother consoling the boy with a cut: “You’re not going to die.”), and it elicits the 
opposite intuition. At best, such an example demonstrates that we can be made aware of a more 
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minimal sense of ‘saying’, but in this case, at least, this minimal sense does not help us 
distinguish lying from misleading. It only explains why we take Kama’s remark to be a joke. 
Horn gives us another example from a televised medical drama, in which the Meredith 
character apparently is having an affair with the surgeon mentioned: 
Benjamin: ‘Did you have sex with that brain surgeon?’ 
Benjamin’s sister: ‘Benjamin!’ 
Meredith: ‘It’s OK. Nope, I haven’t. [PAUSE.] Not today, anyway.’157 
This example is somewhat better than the first, in that it involves deception—at least until 
Meredith adds the qualification after the pause. But it still doesn’t suit Horn’s purposes. This 
case is similar to one that we began with: the lousy-cook neighbor and his appalling gumbo. In 
that scenario, an utterance of ‘I’ve had lunch’ clearly communicates—and, I argued, says—that 
the speaker has had lunch that day. As Taylor 2001 points out, though, sex is different from 
lunch: most of us don’t have it every day.158 So in this scenario, the utterance of ‘Nope, I 
haven’t’ communicates that the speaker never has. And if we leave off the qualification after the 
pause, and suppose that Meredith is trying to conceal her affair, we have an act of deception. It’s 
a lie, though: everybody—neo-Gricean minimalists, Relevance Theorists, Truth-Conditional 
Pragmaticists—would agree that what was said was false. There is no separation between what is 
said and what is communicated, so the question of mere misleading doesn’t arise. We could alter 
the scenario somewhat, so that it would: suppose (contrary to (fictional) fact) that Meredith had 
never slept with the surgeon, and (again, contrary to (fictional) fact) she wanted the sick kid to 
believe, falsely, that she had. Now Meredith’s entire utterance, including the remark after the 
pause, would (arguably) be (merely) misleading: strictly speaking, it’s true that she hadn’t had 
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sex with the surgeon that day; what’s false is the implication that, though she hadn’t that day, she 
had at some other time. This isn’t the story we’re given, though, so all this shows is that Horn 
needs different kinds of examples. 
 And there are other examples. He talks about the old Jesuitical practice of “mental 
restriction.” This method of withholding the truth involves tacitly (mentally) qualifying one’s 
utterances in such a way that they’re true—with the qualification. So a person accused of killing 
can say, “I have not killed anyone,” while mentally adding “since I got out of prison,” and claim 
to be speaking truthfully, even if he did the killing in question, provided it occurred before his 
last prison term.
159
 Such examples at least promise potentially to be relevant: they clear the bar 
of actually featuring deceptive acts; moreover, the distinction between lying and misleading is in 
play, since the Jesuits think this practice allows them to deceive without committing the (worse) 
sin of lying. Still, though, these examples fail to show that the minimal, merely locutionary sense 
of ‘saying’ can explain our intuitions between lying and misleading, again because they are the 
wrong kinds of cases. We have enough experience by now to know what the right kinds of cases 
look like: what Horn needs are scenarios in which there is misleading rather than lying, because 
what is said, strictly speaking, is true—where what is said is his favored neo-Gricean, minimal 
proposition. The Jesuits don’t give us such cases. Here, the minimal proposition said is that the 
speaker has not (ever) killed anyone; the tacit qualification can’t affect what is said. But this is 
false; the Jesuit lies. Use our test: imagine the murderer trying to defend himself against having 
lied by pointing to the mental qualification; such a defense is laughable. 
 The examples we’ve looked at so far fail because they lack the features necessary to 
highlight the differences between lying and misleading. Horn’s other examples do have the 
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requisite features, but again they fail to meet his needs. Horn seems confident that the difference 
between lying and misleading is explicable in terms of “[t]he manipulation of these two 
dimensions of meaning—what is (austerely) said vs. what is effectively communicated.”160 His 
confidence that a minimal ‘what is said’ can in general underwrite the distinction in question is, 
as we’ve shown, misplaced. Even if we set aside instances in which the minimal content is not 
even a proposition (but a mere “propositional radical,” as Bach puts it), so that it’s obviously 
unsuitable as a redoubt for the deceiver (what is said can’t be true if it’s not truth-evaluable), 
there still remain cases, many of which are enumerated in earlier sections of this chapter, in 
which the minimal proposition fails to provide an intuitive basis for a claim of having merely 
misled rather than lied. There are, of course, scenarios in which such a notion can successfully be 
appealed to, and we surveyed some of those; but it’s a fallacy to conclude from a few cases in 
which minimalism comports with our intuitions about lying and misleading that it can provide a 
general account of the distinction. But the most serious problem with Horn’s actual strategy is 
that his examples fail to isolate his preferred minimalist account as the best option. He chooses 
examples in which (1) we would intuitively classify an utterance as merely misleading; (2) any 
false content communicated would be a mere implicature or implication, not part of what is said; 
and (3) the austere, neo-Gricean proposition is true. But this is not enough to show that we “need 
to invoke minimal meanings to account for ordinary language intuitions of lying and 
misleading.”161 This is because, in the scenarios Horn describes, advocates of a less austere 
conception of ‘what is said’ can also maintain that this content is true. But if both the minimalists 
and their opponents can agree that what is said is true, then such cases give us no reason to prefer 
the former view to the latter, contrary to Horn’s intentions.  
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Here’s an example: Horn describes the case of Saint Athanasius, pursued on the Nile by 
agents of the Roman emperor.
162
 His pursuers approached him, but didn’t recognize him, so they 
asked, “Is Athanasius close at hand?” Athanasius replied, “He is not far from here.” Here we 
have, I think, a clear case of misleading—deceiving without lying. It would certainly pass my 
test: if someone accused Athanasius of lying, he could successfully defend himself by arguing 
that what he said was, strictly speaking, true. Horn and other minimalists would concur. But 
wouldn’t just about anybody? I don’t see why Recanati or Relevance Theorists, for example, 
would be forced to claim that what Athanasius said was false. They advocate for a more robust 
conception of ‘what is said’, but they don’t deny that there are implicatures—aspects of what is 
communicated that go beyond even their beefed-up ‘what is said’. I think everyone would agree 
that the falsity in this case—that Athanasius is not right there at that very spot—is merely 
implicated. It doesn’t seem obviously to be a development of the logical form, as required by RT 
for explicatures; nor does it seem to be the output of Recanati’s primary pragmatic processes.  
Other examples from Horn share the same defect: they fail to distinguish minimalism 
from these other approaches as the preferred account of ‘what is said’. He tells us the story of 
Queen Iseult and her lover, Tristan. The Queen is (rightly) accused of adultery, but she concocts 
a cunning stratagem: she arranges for her lover to appear on the Day of Judgment disguised as a 
poor pilgrim, then contrives to fall down in the mud near him; he picks her up and places her on 
dry land, at which point the Trial commences and she swears, “[N]o man born of woman has 
ever held me in his arms other than my lord King Mark, and that poor pilgrim….”163 Again, 
clearly a misleading truth—but I don’t think the minimalist would be alone in making that 
judgment. And Horn’s final example is one we’ve seen, and to which we’ll return, from the 
                                                 
162
 The case is borrowed from MacIntyre 1994. 
163
 Horn 2009, p. 28 
   
 105 
Supreme Court: Bronston v. United States. The defendant in a case before a lower court, a 
certain Samuel Bronston, was questioned during the original trial thus: 
Q: Do you have any bank accounts in Swiss banks? 
A: No, sir. 
Q: Have you ever? 
A: The company had an account there for about six months, in Zurich. 
In fact, Bronston’s company did have the account described; but Bronston also had a personal 
account (since closed). Bronston was convicted of perjury, but the Supremes overturned the 
ruling, since (in their judgment) the utterance in his last answer wasn’t false, but only a 
misleading truth. Again, I think that minimalists, Relevance Theorists, and Truth-Conditional 
Pragmaticists could all agree with that assessment: that he didn’t ever have his own account 
seems like a classic particularized implicatum.  
 Now, there are some theorists—we’ll meet a few in the next chapter—who would 
maintain that in all these cases, what was said was, in fact, false. These people have a radically 
expansive conception of saying, which goes far beyond that of Recanati or RT—and Horn 
succeeds in distinguishing his position from theirs. But, again, he does not succeed in his stated 
aim of defending neo-Gricean minimalism from views closer to it on the spectrum. To do this, 
he’d have to consider the kinds of examples we’ve already surveyed at length—and when we 
consider those, minimalism doesn’t come out looking like a very good candidate to underwrite 
the distinction between lying and misleading.  
 And by avoiding these sorts of cases—featuring GCIs, implicitures, explicatures, and so 
on—Horn doesn’t confront the even more vexing phenomenon that our investigations have 
revealed: the fact of variability in the degree to which different locutions’ minimal 
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interpretations can constitute such a basis. For this we still require an explanation—and I’m 
afraid I don’t have one. What we require is an account of the relationship between the semantic 
content of utterances, on the one hand, and the pragmatically enriched content of the speech acts 
performed in making those utterances. But even to ask for such an account immediately raises 
vexed questions, principal among which is: How do we distinguish between Semantics and 
Pragmatics? It is to this and related questions that we now turn. 
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3.0  WHITHER SEMANTICS? 
As it’s traditionally conceived, Semantics is supposed to satisfy a number of conditions, perform 
a number of tasks: (1) specify the stable foundation of communication, namely word- and 
sentence-meanings, the latter being composed out of the former systematically—which is to say, 
in a manner determined, or at least constrained by the arrangement of the words, the syntax of 
the sentence; (2) yield contents—propositions, truth-conditions, or what-have-you—for 
declarative sentences that are truth-evaluable; (3) account for our intuitions about speech acts, 
both about the content of what we say when we utter sentences (consulting 1), and about the 
truth or falsity of those utterances (consulting 2); (4) serve as a starting point for the larger 
communicative task of interpreting what a speaker means, which often goes beyond what she 
merely says (including, e.g., implicatures), and is determined by Pragmatics, the inferential 
processes of which use the output of Semantics as their input. 
 There are problems with this basic picture, some easily solved, others less so. One need 
only modify the traditional conception of Semantics slightly, for example, to accommodate the 
problem posed by indexical expressions, which systematically change their reference in different 
contexts; Kaplan taught us how to do this. Other problems, however, such as those presented by 
the kinds of phenomena canvassed in the previous chapter, can put considerably more strain on 
the traditional picture and lead a semantic theorist to abandon entirely one or more of the four 
desiderata listed above. Some, impressed with the importance of the third condition, such as 
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Recanati and the Relevance Theorists, call into question the propriety of the fourth. Others, who 
maintain the primacy of the first condition (particularly the syntactic constraint), such as Bach, 
significantly alter the traditional picture, dramatically softening the third condition—so that it’s 
only the minimal, locutionary sense of ‘saying’ that is correlated systematically with semantic 
content—and abandoning the second requirement entirely, so that semantic content needn’t be 
fully propositional.  Still others cannot countenance non-propositional semantic content, and so 
make other adjustments. And so on. 
The purpose of this chapter is to look at various attempts to re-conceive Semantics in 
light of the vexing phenomena examined in the last chapter. This is a very large topic, so I will 
narrow the focus somewhat. I will examine in particular detail a proposal to preserve condition 2 
(that semantic contents must be propositional, or truth-evaluable
164
) by Herman Cappelen and 
Ernie Lepore, which they call Semantic Minimalism. For them, the cost of preserving condition 
2 is an almost complete abandonment of condition 3 (that Semantics explain our intuitions about 
speech acts). I want to examine this proposal vis-à-vis that of Bach and others, which jettisons 
condition 2 instead. This examination will comprise the first, much longer, section of the chapter. 
In the second section, I will briefly look at a few other proposals. 
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3.1 CAPPELEN AND LEPORE’S SEMANTIC MINIMALISM 
In the last chapter, we used the designation ‘Minimalism’ to characterize the views of Grice and 
his more contemporary intellectual heirs (Bach, Horn, et al.). The topic of that chapter was the 
debate about the concept ‘what is said’, and so minimalists, in that context, were minimalists 
about that notion—i.e., theorists who maintain that contextual factors play only a minimal role in 
determining what we say (namely, disambiguating and resolving indexicals). There is an 
alternative use of ‘Minimalism’ that we must be careful to distinguish from the one we used in 
Chapter 2. This is ‘Semantic Minimalism’. It is a minimalist view, not about ‘what is said’, but 
about Semantics: it is, roughly, the view that context plays only a minimal role in the 
determination of semantic content. Now, since it is often maintained that what is said by an 
utterance just is its semantic content, these two versions of Minimalism are often conflated. 
However, it’s important to see that they can be distinguished. It is possible, for example, to 
maintain that context plays only a minimal role in determining the semantic content of an 
utterance, while at the same time acknowledging that contextual (pragmatic) factors play a major 
role in determining what is said by the utterance. This is the position of the Semantic Minimalists 
we will now discuss.  
The neo-Griceans we’ve seen are happy to refer to themselves as semantic minimalists, 
too.
165
 But their minimalism is too austere for many, in that it accepts the possibility that the 
semantic content of an utterance may not amount to a full proposition.
166
 In their 2005, Cappelen 
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and Lepore (hereafter, C&L) implicitly
167
 reject this version of minimalism, and maintain that 
every grammatically complete, indexical-free sentence—even those, like ‘Rose isn’t tall 
enough’, that have been supposed by others not to be truth-evaluable—has for its semantic 
content a “full-blooded proposition with truth conditions and a truth value.”168 This semantic 
content is constant: it does not vary with context. Contextual variability, according to C&L, is an 
extremely limited phenomenon: only a select group of truly indexical expressions—members of 
what they refer to as the “Basic Set,” which includes personal pronouns, demonstratives, various 
adverbs like ‘here’ and ‘now’, and other like expressions—give rise to contextual variation of 
semantic content. In taking this stance, they contrast their view with those of so-called 
Contextualists, who see context-sensitivity as a much more pervasive phenomenon. According to 
C&L, a range of views falls under this heading, from various forms of Moderate Contextualism, 
which expand the class of context-sensitive expressions beyond the Basic Set (with different 
versions of Moderate Contextualism distinguishable according to which expressions they add to 
the Basic Set), to Radical Contextualism, adherents to which “all hold some version or other of 
the view that every single expression is context sensitive….”169 C&L’s argumentative strategy is 
show that (a) Radical Contextualism is an incoherent view; (b) Moderate Contextualism is an 
unstable position, the arguments for which lead inevitably to Radical Contextualism; and (c) the 
only viable alternative is their Semantic Minimalism. 
Before we look at any arguments, though, we should mention the way in which C&L deal 
with the data that make various forms of contextualism so tempting. They’re the kinds of cases 
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we’ve been examining all along, in which a sentence, when uttered in different contexts, 
intuitively has different truth values. This can happen for sentences that are (apparently) 
semantically incomplete or indeterminate: ‘Rose isn’t tall enough’ is true when it’s a question of 
whether she can play for the Lakers, false when the issue is whether she can ride the Tilt-A-
Whirl. Or it can happen for sentences whose determinacy is not in question: ‘Rose is tall’ is true 
when uttered in her second grade classroom, false in the Lakers’ locker room. The variability of 
truth conditions here suggests variability in the propositions expressed, which suggests a 
variability of semantic content—for what is the semantic content of a sentence other than the 
proposition it expresses? C&L’s response is to carefully distinguish between semantic content on 
the one hand, and speech act content on the other. The semantic content of sentences (except 
those with genuine indexicals from the Basic Set) does not change: a single proposition is 
semantically expressed by every utterance of the same sentence, regardless of context. What is 
said, claimed, asserted, etc. in an utterance of a sentence, though, can vary from context to 
context; this is not semantic content, but speech act content. They call their position on speech 
act content “Speech Act Pluralism” (SPAP for short): 
No one thing is said (or asserted, or claimed, or…) by an utterance: rather, indefinitely 
many propositions are said, asserted, claimed, stated. What is said (asserted, claimed, 
etc.) depends on a wide range of facts other than the proposition semantically expressed. 
It depends on a potentially indefinite number of features of the context of utterance and 
of the context of those who report on (or think about) what was said by the utterance.
170
 
 
This is how C&L’s minimalism differs from the minimalisms of the last chapter: they are 
minimalists about semantic content, but they are maximalists about ‘what is said’. 
In what follows, I will first examine the details of C&L’s positive proposals—Semantic 
Minimalism and Speech Act Pluralism—to see whether they are plausible on their own terms 
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and consistent with the insights gleaned from the last chapter’s meanderings. I will conclude that 
they are not. C&L’s minimal propositions—the contents semantically expressed by every 
utterance of the same sentence, regardless of context—are problematic, and so there is no reason 
to prefer their form of minimalism over those that allow semantic content to fall short of being 
fully propositional. Also, many of the conclusions that C&L draw from SPAP turn out to be 
absurd on their face and at odds with the linguistic practices canvassed in Chapter 2. A major 
source of these problems, we will see, is C&L’s failure carefully to distinguish locutionary and 
illocutionary acts; the importance of that distinction was one of the principal lessons of the last 
chapter. This failure, in turn, undermines the core of C&L’s overall argument: the claim that 
Moderate Contextualism is unstable, that it inevitably collapses into Radical Contextualism. 
 
3.1.1 Minimal propositions: metaphysical problems  
Perhaps the most striking claim that C&L make is that all indexical-free sentences have for their 
semantic content a fully truth-evaluable proposition. The claim is striking because it is so easy to 
elicit contrary intuitions about certain types of sentences—such as ‘Rose isn’t tall enough’ and 
‘Rose is tall’—the truth-values of which seem sensitive to variations in circumstance. C&L bite 
the bullet: the semantic content of ‘Rose isn’t tall enough’ is just the proposition that Rose isn’t 
tall enough, which is true just in case Rose isn’t tall enough—never mind for what; the semantic 
content of ‘Rose is tall’ is just the proposition that Rose is tall, which is true just in case Rose is 
tall—never mind varying standards for what counts as being tall. On the face of it, these claims 
are just nuts. What is it for Rose to be just plain tall enough (never mind for what)—or to be just 
plain tall? When are these (alleged) propositions true? They’re supposed to be “full-blooded 
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proposition[s] with truth conditions and a truth value.” OK, so what’s the truth-value of ‘Rose is 
tall’, independent of any more specific standards for what counts as being tall? I have no idea, 
and neither do you. 
 Cappelen and Lepore admit that they don’t have any idea, either. But that’s OK; it’s not 
their job to tell us, say, in which possible worlds Rose counts as just plain tall, or whether not she 
is tall in the actual world, because they’re semanticists, not metaphysicians. Qua semanticists, 
C&L observe that the semantic value of ‘Rose is tall’ is the proposition that Rose is tall, which is 
true just in case she’s tall. What plain old tallness amounts to, as a property, is a metaphysical 
question, and C&L are not metaphysicians. 
 Not that they don’t dip their toes a bit into the metaphysical waters. There are a number 
of different ways the metaphysician might approach the questions of what it is for Rose not to be 
tall enough (never mind for what), and what it is for her to be tall simpliciter. C&L survey a 
number of them. When they’re discussing (apparently) incomplete sentences, in fact, they seem 
to stake out a metaphysical position of their own. Considering sentences of the form ‘x is ready’, 
with instances like ‘A is ready to rob a bank’, ‘B is ready to eat dinner’, and ‘C is ready to take 
the exam’, they remark, “Thinking about A, B, and C… they all have a common relation they 
stand in to their respective projects. …What they have in common is that they are all ready.”171 
Similarly for ‘enough’: “Consider a bunch of people who have all had enough. For example, one 
person who has had enough wine, one has had enough turkey, and one has had enough cocaine. 
All these people have something in common: They have all had enough.”172 The metaphysical 
position that C&L seem to be taking is something like this: someone is ready just in case there 
exists something for which she is ready; someone has had enough just in case there exists 
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something she’s had enough of. In general, when we’re faced with an apparently incomplete 
sentence, a sentence which, out of context, prompts a follow-up question like ‘Ready for what?’ 
or ‘Enough of what?’, it is enough that there is some thing answering to the ‘what?’ for us to 
affirm that the person is ready, has had enough, etc., simpliciter. 
Here’s a problem for this sort of schematic metaphysical answer: it threatens to make the 
extensions of predicates like ‘x is ready’ too large—maybe universal. C&L give examples of 
people being ready to take on various projects, but it’s not just people who can be ready for 
things. My dog Olive is ready for a walk. My bedroom walls, having been primed, are ready for 
a coat of paint. My trashcan, now full, is ready to be emptied; my trashcan, not yet full, is ready 
to receive more trash. My pencil, now sharpened, is ready to be used to write things down; my 
pencil, now dull, is ready to be sharpened, or to be used to point at something, or to be 
brandished threateningly at an easily intimidated opponent, or to be tossed across the yard for 
Olive to fetch, or…. Pick any object: there’s something it’s ready for, in some sense of ‘ready’. 
This H2O molecule is ready to be attracted to another one via hydrogen bonding. Goldbach’s 
conjecture is ready to be proved (or refuted). I’m starting to think that everything is ready for 
something or other—in which case everything is ready, simpliciter.  
But perhaps I’m doing some violence to the concept of readiness, stretching it beyond its 
normal well-defined bounds into the realm of metaphor. A professional metaphysician, with help 
from a concept monger of some stripe (philosopher of language?), maybe, could set me straight, 
tell me at which point above I crossed the line. Let’s try a different predicate: ‘x is big enough’. 
On what appears to be C&L’s metaphysical view, what it takes to possess the property 
corresponding to this predicate is for there to exist at least one thing for which x is big enough. 
Rose possesses the property, since she’s big enough to ride the Tilt-A-Whirl; I possess it, since 
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I’m big enough to drive a car; Olive possesses it, since she’s big enough to reach my lap when 
she goes up on her hind legs; the Titanic possessed it because…, well, for lots of reasons; but so 
too does the gnat, who’s big enough to be seen with the naked eye, unlike, say, a paramecium—
but those are big enough to be seen with a microscope; and protons are big enough to be 
decomposed into smaller bits, quarks—which are big enough to be detected using sensitive 
enough equipment…. This is looking familiar. It seems that anything with any size at all 
possesses the property of being big enough. I’m not a professional metaphysician, but that 
doesn’t sound like a well-behaved property. 
What’s worse, though, is that everything seems also to lack the property, since one can 
always find something for which any given thing is not big enough: Rose isn’t big enough to 
drive a car; I’m not big enough to (successfully) sumo-wrestle; the Titanic wasn’t big enough to 
significantly distort the geometry of space-time; etc. But maybe I’m misreading C&L’s 
metaphysical view here. Perhaps it’s not enough, to lack the property, for there to exist one thing 
for which one isn’t big enough; perhaps, in order to lack the property, it must be that one isn’t 
big enough for anything at all. That’s fine, but things are still awkward. Rose possesses the 
property of being big enough (because of her Tilt-A-Whirl eligibility), but she also possesses the 
property of being too small, since there’s at least one thing for which she’s too small, e.g., 
driving. So, according to C&L, Rose is both big enough and too small. The proposition 
semantically expressed by ‘Rose is big enough and Rose is too small’ is true. That’s a tough 
bullet to have to bite. 
Relations can misbehave in similar ways. Consider ‘x is better than y’, and the sentence 
‘LeBron James is better than Knachel’, which, C&L would tell us, semantically expresses the 
proposition that LeBron James is better than Knachel, and is true just in case James is better, full 
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stop. It can be used to perform innumerable speech acts, like asserting that James is better than 
Knachel at basketball, but the semantic content expressed is just that he is better, simpliciter. 
Again, we wonder what it is for one thing to be just plain better than another, which is a 
metaphysical question, and C&L’s official position is that they’re not metaphysicians, and so it’s 
not their job to answer such questions, but we can extrapolate from their metaphysical musings 
about the predicates above to guess at their answer. They would insist that ordered pairs, about 
which we can say truthfully that the first is better than the second (at something, for something, 
etc.) must have something in common—and what else could that be than that there is something 
or other at which (for which, etc.) the first is better than the second. So, LeBron James is better 
than Knachel at basketball, and Roger Federer is better than Knachel at tennis, so the pairs 
<James, Knachel> and <Federer, Knachel> share in this just plain better than relation; the 
semantic contents of ‘LeBron James is better than Knachel’ and ‘Roger Federer is better than 
Knachel’ are true propositions. Fine. Those guys would surely kick my butt at the games which 
they are, respectively, among the greatest of all time to play. But I can make really good 
homemade falafel. Really good. Took me years to get my technique just right. I bet my falafel is 
way better than any falafel LeBron James or Roger Federer could make. If I’m right, then there 
exists at least one thing at which I’m better than both James and Federer—which, by parity of 
reasoning, means that the propositions semantically expressed by ‘Knachel is better than LeBron 
James’ and ‘Knachel is better than Roger Federer’ are both true. The result is: I’m just plain 
better than them AND they’re just plain better than me. This odd result seems to me to deprive 
the supposed relation being just plain better than of metaphysical respectability. 
But perhaps I’m getting carried away, either by misinterpreting sketchy remarks and 
thereby saddling C&L with metaphysical views at odds with those they actually hold, or, what’s 
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possibly worse, imputing to them metaphysical opinions in the first place. As noted, they 
expressly deny any obligation to articulate metaphysical theses, since they are mere semanticists, 
and are constantly at pains to resist any “attempt[s] to force metaphysics on [them].”173 And the 
hints at metaphysical speculation cited above with respect to ‘x has had enough’ and ‘x is ready’ 
are contradicted when, for example, in considering the predicate ‘x is red’ and its true 
saturations, they explicitly remark, “We’re most certainly not claiming that something is red just 
in case it is red in some way (or in some respect or under some conditions).”174 So perhaps it was 
a mistake to impute to them the view, e.g., that something is big enough just in case there is 
something for which it is big enough. C&L aren’t metaphysicians, so they can neither be 
criticized for giving incorrect answers to metaphysical questions, nor for failing to give any 
answers at all, since that’s not their job. But, as John MacFarlane points out, “Semantic 
Minimalism is problematic not because it does not provide an answer to questions about the 
intensions of its minimal properties and propositions, but because it requires that there be 
answers to such questions.”175 The reflections above, even if misdirected at C&L’s non-existent 
metaphysical positions, at least give a sense of the difficulty of solving the puzzles that their 
semantic position lays at the metaphysician’s doorstep. There are reasons to think that the 
sensible metaphysician would reply to C&L’s buck-passing by demurring—or even by declaring 
the problems insoluble. Perhaps there’s no such thing as being just plain red or tall or ready, of 
having had enough, simpliciter. 
C&L consider this kind of response and reject it out of hand. Their reasons are a bit 
puzzling, though. That there are such minimal properties as these is presented as the result of a 
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rather stark choice, whose only other alternative is Nihilism: “[T]hose who claim[, e.g.,] that 
there is no such thing as being red simpliciter, should, in order to be consistent, say that there’s a 
puzzle about the very idea of two or more things sharing properties…. To raise [such] 
objections… is to be committed, in effect to a form of Metaphysical Nihilism.”176 Well, nobody 
wants to be a Nihilist, so…. But why should we think that there’s no middle-ground between 
Nihilism on the one hand, and acceptance of C&L’s position on minimal properties on the other? 
“Think about what metaphysicians do. For at least two millennia, metaphysicians have been 
asking What-Do-They-Have-In-Common Questions (CQ, for short). Suppose you’re curious 
about what it is to be G. Then you ask…: (CQ) What do all G things have in common?”177 This 
kind of just sounds like the one-over-many argument. Either there is a thing (property) that they 
all have in common, or you’re a Nihilist. About redness, they say, “Some things are red on the 
inside, some are red on the outside, some are red when scrubbed, some are red in the dark, 
[etc.]…. What do they all have in common? What is this property of redness that they all 
share?”178 C&L’s view seems to be that there must be answers to “CQ” questions: given a 
variety of true sentences featuring the same predicate, there must be a property corresponding to 
that predicate which all the subjects of the sentence have in common. In other words, syntax is, 
in general, a reliable indicator of the features of reality. If we reject Nihilism, must we accept this 
alternative? No. The two positions are contraries, but not contradictories; they can’t both be true, 
but it’s possible to reject both. One can allow the reality of properties in the world, while at the 
same time denying that every predicate picks out a unique property. All the Moderate 
Contextualist, for example, is proposing is that sometimes predicates fail to correspond to any 
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property, or that instead they correspond to a relational property (tall relative to some 
comparison class). It may be harder for a Radical Contextualist, for whom the designation of 
every predicate is potentially up for grabs depending on the context, to stake out such a moderate 
position, but C&L face a serious burden to show that the moderate position collapses into the 
radical one.
179
 It’s certainly not obvious why someone couldn’t take the position that sometimes 
predicates relate neatly to properties, and sometimes they don’t, without inadvertently embracing 
Nihilism. 
Such a view is outlined in Mark Wilson’s 2006, Wandering Significance (and 
adumbrated in his 1982).  In light of the considerations put forth there, C&L have made an 
extremely poor choice of predicate (‘x is red’) to serve as the prime example of 
predicate/property alignment and foundation for general claims. The steps in their argument are: 
(a) to show that there’s no metaphysical problem for an easy case like redness, and (b) to show 
that if there’s a problem for apparently harder cases (readiness, tallness), it must also be a 
problem for redness. Wilson shows, though, that many predicates, ‘x is red’ prominent among 
them, are quite unruly in their behavior, and fail to exhibit the kinds of tidy word-world relations 
of the simple predicate/property alignment type that C&L demand a priori. Rather, attributions 
of redness are judged according to a variety of standards, which shift according to the various 
practical purposes speakers have in making such attributions, and it’s very difficult, if not 
impossible, to discover underneath all these shifting usages a single physical property to which 
all uses of ‘x is red’ correspond.  
Wilson’s conclusions are difficult to summarize succinctly, partly because one of the 
upshots of his investigations is that conceptual behavior is so variegated that a unifying account, 
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e.g., of predicate/property relations is impossible. Rather, one must proceed piecemeal, 
examining the individual personalities (his metaphor) of words and the processes according to 
which they’re shaped over the history of their deployment. The picture that emerges contradicts 
the classical account of word-world relations, in which our predications are neatly attached to 
their corresponding properties (through a process he dubs “classical gluing”) without remainder; 
instead, we get a dizzying variety of modes of attachment, depending on the predicate under 
examination. One can get a sense of the complications here just by looking at a list of metaphors 
Wilson deploys to characterize the different relationships: atlases, patchworks, façades, 
platforms, bridges, lifts, parking garages; compare these to the classical picture of the pasting 
together of congruent rectilinear sheets. The complications documented arise over the course of 
the history of a predicate’s use, and usually result from the necessity of accommodating that 
usage to novel and unforeseen circumstances presented by the ever-beguiling Mother Nature, in 
such a way as to maintain the usefulness of those words in accomplishing our goals. In the case 
of color predicates like ‘x is red’, depending on whether our projects involve design or 
manufacture, depending on whether our materials are cloth or metal, depending on whether our 
instruments are “reduction screens” or darkened tubes, and so on, we will end up evaluating 
claims of the form ‘such-and-such is red’ differently. Wilson summarizes the situation thus: 
 “[T]he predicate ‘is red’ spreads itself over a rather complicated atlas of naturally 
connected sheets and locally corresponds to quite different forms of evaluations, to the 
degree that its target objects are not even of the same type (behaviors under illumination 
lie below the color tag sheet; material objects under the color class patch). Considered as 
a whole—and since its usages continue into one another naturally, it should—being red 
can’t qualify as a true attribute at all, but more nearly corresponds to an informational 
package of quasi-attribute type.”180 
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The important point is that this behavior is a feature, not a bug: there is no problem with our 
concept of redness; it is not confused or ambiguous; we don’t need to undertake a program of 
conceptual sanitization to clearly distinguish separate usages or to discover some underlying, 
unifying conception of redness; things are in order as they stand; they’re just messy and 
complex, driven inevitably by the shifting practical needs of language users and the surprising 
revelations of Nature. To think otherwise is still to be in the grip of the classical picture, 
according to which understanding a predicate like ‘x is red’ involves grasping a simple, constant 
conceptual content, which determines in advance proper future usage.
181
 But this illicit 
“projection” of syntactic simplicity will only lead us to pursue impossible projects, like searching 
for stable properties in a world populated only with “ghost attributes.” Wilson catalogues such 
misguided adventures, with respect to color terminology, and even more strikingly, concerning 
the concept hardness.
182
 C&L, I’m sure, would demand that there be something that all hard 
things have in common, some single physical property. But despite heroic efforts through the 
years by scientists and engineers at unifying the varying uses of ‘hard’ under a single 
definition
183
, no such property is anywhere to be found. Yet the predicate marches on, doing 
useful work and characterizing objective features of the world. 
With these Wilsonian insights in hand, we can see how C&L’s slippery-slope 
argument—if there’s a problem with tricky predicates like ‘x is ready’, then there’s a problem 
with every predicate, even easy ones like ‘x is red’—fails. It is undermined in two ways. First, 
the supposed disaster at the bottom of the slope (we’re forced to admit that even good old ‘red’ is 
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problematic!) is no disaster at all. Second, it suggests that the slope is not at all slippery, or that 
it’s not even a slope, since different predicates display different personalities and it’s impossible 
to treat them all the same way. Some predicates behave very well: for instance, biological 
species-terms tend to line up well with natural attributes; Wilson’s favorite example is the neat 
alignment between ‘x is a dog’ and belonging to Canis familiaris. Others, as we have seen, are 
quite unruly. The kinds of complex relationships between predicate and property that Wilson 
describes are particularly common among the bits of language that aim to describe the physical 
world; it is here that Nature is constantly surprising us. Thus, C&L’s attempt to establish the 
simplicity of ‘red’ is all the more inappropriate in that it relies on an analogy between ‘x is red’ 
and ‘x is a dance’. There are different ways of dancing, just as there are different ways of being 
red, C&L argue; but there’s no problem saying that all the dances have something in common 
(being a dance), so there’s no problem saying that all the red things have something in common 
(being red). Whether or not something is a dance, though, is entirely a matter of human 
convention; negotiation with other language users is all that’s required to set the proper 
boundaries to that concept. In the case of ‘red’ and other physical-world predicates, however, 
there’s no negotiating with Mother Nature; we must accommodate our usage to her unwavering 
demands. It should come as no surprise, then, that ‘x is red’ might display irregularities not 
present in the case of ‘x is a dance’. 
The lesson here is that C&L’s minimal propositions lack the metaphysical inevitability 
that they try to establish for them. Their argument—“Sure, they look strange, but it’s either 
minimal propositions or Metaphysical Nihilism”—fails; the metaphysicians to whom they pass 
the buck of sorting out truth-conditions for these things have plenty of good reasons for refusing 
to take up a hopeless task. One happy consequence of this, as far as I’m concerned, is that it 
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shifts a great deal of labor back into the domain of Semantics, where it belongs. It’s up to the 
semanticist to keep track of the complex and shifting relationships that obtain between the words 
we use and the world that we use them to describe and get around in; if Wilson is right, this is an 
arduous task. Contrast this occupation with the sinecure that is Minimal Semantics: it seems that, 
for C&L, the semanticists’ only job is to pound the table and issue T-sentences (“‘It’s red’ is true 
just in case it’s red, dammit!”), while resisting the wheedling of Tom Sawyer metaphysicians 
trying to get them to do their whitewashing for them. 
 
3.1.2 Minimal propositions: psychological problems 
Besides being metaphysically dubious, minimal propositions are, prima facie, psychologically 
problematic: if we’re unable (without the help of metaphysicians) to determine their truth-values, 
in what sense can we be said to grasp them? How can they play any role in the understanding 
required to sustain our communicative practices? They seem dispensable—in favor of actually 
grasped and entertained speech act contents—in an account of communication, so why insist that 
they have any psychological reality at all?  
For instance, suppose two people are discussing falafels. One says to the other, “Knachel 
is better than LeBron James.” In context, it’s clear that she means to assert that I’m better than 
LeBron at making falafel; it is this content that both interlocutors entertain. Further, suppose it’s 
a well-known fact (ESPN just had a big exposé about it, or something) that LeBron’s falafels are 
among the worst in the world; he’s legendarily bad at making falafel. With this in the 
background, the original utterance might give rise to an implicature, to the effect that Knachel’s 
no great shakes, falafel-wise, himself (a case of “damning with faint praise”). To calculate the 
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implicature, the hearer only needs the assertive content ‘Knachel is better than James at making 
falafel’. So, in neither the process of original utterance understanding, nor in the process of 
implicature derivation, does the minimal semantic content ‘Knachel is just plain better than 
LeBron James’ play a role. So what is it good for? 
C&L’s answer is that minimal semantic content is indispensable, not in the sorts of 
communicative interactions described above, in which the interlocutors share a context and are 
apparently fully attentive and knowledgeable about one another’s intentions, beliefs, background 
assumptions, and so forth, but in cases where such ideal conditions are lacking. When we don’t 
know the speaker’s/hearer’s intentions or beliefs, when we’re ignorant of the relevant contextual 
features that help determine more robust contents, whether because of inattention, mistaken 
assumptions, or the simple fact that we’re not in the same context, minimal semantic content 
earns its keep:  
“The proposition semantically expressed is that content the speaker can expect an 
audience to grasp… even if they have incomplete or mistaken communication-relevant 
information. …[It] is the content the audience can expect the speaker to grasp… even if 
she has such mistaken or incomplete information. …[It] is that content which can be 
grasped and expressed by someone who isn’t even a participant in the context of 
utterance. …[It] is that content which speakers and audiences know can be transmitted 
through indirect quotation… to those who find themselves in contexts radically different 
from the original context of utterance.”184 
 
So, even if the hearer mistakenly believes that we’re talking about basketball, rather than falafel-
cookery, even if the speaker thinks that LeBron James is a famous Lebanese chef, both can grasp 
the content semantically expressed, that Knachel is better than James. Even someone who wasn’t 
present at the original conversation, and had no idea what the participants were talking about or 
what they believed, could be told, “She said that Knachel was better than LeBron James,” and 
thereby gain some measure of access to the content of the communication. Not full access, of 
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course, but a “starting point,” as C&L put it.185 The range of possible interpretations is narrowed 
(she wasn’t, for example, making a claim about Generalissimo Franco or Father Guido 
Sarducci); the process of decoding the utterance can begin from there. This is enough for 
minimal propositions to have a cognitive function, for them to be “psychologically real.” 
This is a fine response, so far as it goes; it just doesn’t go as far as C&L want it to. I have 
no quarrel with a level of content that, for example, anchors the practice of indirect quotation. 
This is an ideal role for ‘what is said’ to play, where saying is considered as a merely locutionary 
act.
186
 But while C&L have given us reasons for supposing that there must be some level of 
psychologically real and efficacious content to play these kinds of roles, and reasons for thinking 
that Semantics provides such content, they have failed to establish that this content must be 
propositional. The job of providing a starting point for decoding illocutionary content and more 
robust speaker-meaning can just as easily be performed by Bach’s propositional radicals, for 
example. Consider the following story about a speech act and an indirect report of it: Paulie 
reports to Shep that Alice said that Rose isn’t tall enough; Shep doesn’t know anything about the 
context of the utterance, or about Paulie’s or Alice’s beliefs in that context, but he knows who 
Rose and Alice are, and, as an English speaker, he knows the meanings of ‘is’, ‘not’, ‘tall’, and 
‘enough’ and has sufficient grammatical mastery to appreciate the upshot of their mode of 
combination in this case. This narrows considerably the range of possible speech acts Alice 
could have performed (it’s unlikely, for example, that she promised to donate a kidney to 
Vladimir Putin), and gives clues to how Shep should continue an investigation to narrow things 
further (e.g., inquire about what Rose isn’t tall enough for). So far, so trivial. But notice: Shep 
can do all of this without ever comprehending, understanding, or entertaining the supposedly 
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full-fledged, truth-valued proposition that Rose is just plain not tall enough. In fact, it’s hard to 
tell a plausible story in which that does happen. C&L try to, though. Their story is about the 
proposition that something is red, but it applies to our case, mutatis mutandis (and if their story 
about redness is implausible, then a similar story about our case is even less plausible, since 
according to C&L, redness is easier to handle than enough-ness): 
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that the proposition that A is red is trivially true (not 
something we have endorsed, simply something we speculated about [when discussing 
metaphysical objections to our view]). The audience knows that the speaker is talking 
about A and its redness, not, for example, about oysters, France, or Relevance Theory. 
There’s a lot of stuff to talk about in the universe. The proposition semantically expressed 
pares it down considerably. Knowledge that this proposition was semantically expressed 
provides the audience with the best possible access to the speaker’s mind, given the 
restricted knowledge they have of the speaker. It is trivial that A is red on some surface or 
other under some condition or other. The audience can assume that the speaker knew that 
this was trivial and was not interested in conveying such trivialities with his utterance and 
can, therefore, infer that there’s work to be done in order to figure out exactly what the 
speaker was trying to communicate. In general, audiences know what to look for in such 
situations; they know what kind of information would help narrow down more closely 
what the speaker wanted to communicate.
187
 
 
This story is going well, and mirroring my own above, until C&L attribute knowledge to the 
speaker and hearer that they cannot possibly possess. We start the passage by supposing, for the 
sake of argument, that one particular metaphysical proposal gives us the proper account of what 
it is to be just plain red. Even if we set aside our concerns about the plausibility of this, it is not 
plausible to suppose, as C&L go on to do, that the upshot of such an account would be known to 
speakers and hearers, so that they could, as the story goes, form communicative intentions based 
on, and draw conclusions from, the triviality of the proposition semantically expressed. C&L 
stipulate, in their discussion of the metaphysical objection to their views, that neither they, nor 
anybody else they know, can say what it is to be just plain red; that’s for some (future, very 
clever) metaphysician to decide. But despite the current state of general metaphysical nescience, 
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communication goes along just fine. And it must go along without the sorts of intentions and 
inferences based on non-existent metaphysical knowledge that C&L include in their story about 
‘A is red’.  
There’s a natural way charitably to alter their story, though, removing the imputation of 
implausible mental states to the conversational participants: C&L might insist that they entertain, 
comprehend, or grasp the fully propositional content, where such an achievement needn’t 
involve secret metaphysical knowledge, but merely knowledge of the truth-conditions of the 
proposition. These, as we’ve been repeatedly reminded, are just given by the relevant T-
sentences: ‘A is red’ is true iff A is red. Surely there’s no problem attributing this knowledge to 
speakers and hearers. I don’t object to this knowledge-attribution; I just wonder about the 
significance and efficacy of such knowledge. It seems to come too cheap: if someone tells Rose 
(who speaks no German) that General Scheisskopf said that der Schnee ist weiss, she doesn’t 
know much, but she does know that ‘Der Schnee ist weiss’ is true iff der Schnee ist weiss. 
Surely, though, this is not enough for her to qualify as grasping the proposition. Rose lacks 
something that I have.
188
 She can’t, for example, formulate a correct T-sentence in which her 
native language is the meta-language: ‘Der Schnee is weiss’ is true iff snow is white. So perhaps 
it’s this more robust kind of knowledge that communicators have, for C&L, when they 
comprehend the T-sentence truth-conditions of propositions. But what does such knowledge 
consist in? That’s a big question, and I don’t know the answer (it depends, to some degree, on 
what kinds of entities we take propositions to be—metaphysical issues that I, along with C&L, 
would prefer to avoid), but one natural and fairly neutral thing to say is that knowledge of truth-
conditions is knowledge of what the world would have to be like in order for the sentence to be 
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true. This kind of knowledge, though, in cases like ‘Rose isn’t tall enough’ and ‘A is red’, is 
knowledge that no one has, due to the metaphysical uncertainties already canvassed. So the kind 
of state we need is somewhere between the trivial ability to remove quotation marks from 
sentences and the more robust understanding of how things would have to be to make the 
proposition true. Borrowing some theoretical terminology, we could state the situation thus: let 
the meaning of a proposition (its “intension”) be a function from possible worlds to truth values; 
I, with respect to a proposition whose meaning I grasp, know which possible worlds map to the 
True, while Rose, with respect to, for example, ‘der Schnee ist weiss’, knows nothing of its 
intension; as far as she knows, all of the possible worlds are potential candidates for being 
mapped to the True.
189
  Cases like ‘Rose isn’t tall enough’ fall somewhere between these 
extremes: they don’t involve knowledge of which possible worlds a particular proposition’s 
intension maps to the True, but grasp of them does provide a significant paring-down of the 
range of possible worlds under consideration—various subsets of which will be the mapped-to-
True domain-members of the intensions of the different determinate propositions that one might 
have intended to express by uttering the sentence in question. Thus we can even more plausibly 
characterize the content entertained as incomplete—a propositional radical (a la Bach), or a 
propositional blueprint (a la Neale), or a semantically non-specific sentence-type (a la Jay 
Atlas), or a propositional skeleton (a la Scott Soames). Such incomplete contents (incomplete in 
the sense that some contribution from Pragmatics is required to generate a truth-evaluable 
proposition), as Soames and Atlas both put it, constrain rather than determine the contents of our 
assertions and other speech acts.
190
 It’s just this sort of constraining-rather-than-determining role 
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that C&L seem to have in mind for their minimal propositions; but it seems just the sort of role 
for something less determinate to play. There are multiple extant accounts involving such 
indeterminate semantic content, and so, absent some convincing argument that semantic content 
must be fully propositional—and as we’ve seen from our discussion of metaphysical issues, C&L 
are not convincing on this score—highlighting Semantics’ indispensability as a communicative 
starting-point gives us no reason to prefer C&L’s propositional minimalism over other, non-
propositional versions.  
 
3.1.3 Speech Act Pluralism 
One advantage that minimal propositions might be supposed to have over their non-propositional 
competitors (radicals, blueprints, skeletons, etc.) is that it’s at least possible for them to play a 
role in the communicative phenomenon under investigation in the present work—namely, the 
practice of distinguishing lies from mere acts of misleading. Minimal propositions, being fully 
propositional, are truth-evaluable—and as we’ve repeatedly noted, the non-liar needs truth-
evaluability, as his defense involves pointing to the truth of what he said (strictly speaking). 
Propositional radicals and the like cannot provide this fallback content, since they can’t be true 
or false; but maybe C&L’s minimal propositions could. 
Alas, they cannot. And not just for the obvious reason that in many cases their truth-
values are a metaphysical mystery. C&L expressly deny that they can play such a role—indeed, 
they deny that any sense at all can be made of the notion of ‘what is strictly speaking said’: one 
of the consequences of their Speech Act Pluralism is that no one of the indefinitely many things 
said/claimed/asserted by a speaker of an utterance has such a privileged status. I think it’s a 
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mistake to draw this conclusion, not only because it conflicts with the common practice of 
language users, who do use such a notion to distinguish lying and misleading, but because the 
conclusion ignores the distinction between locutionary and illocutionary senses of saying—the 
importance of minding which was one of the principal lessons of Chapter 2. C&L’s failure to 
acknowledge this distinction leads to all sorts of errors. 
As we’ve seen, while C&L are minimalists about Semantics, they are maximalists about 
the notion at the center of Chapter 2—‘what is said’. They describe themselves as deliberately 
naïve about speech-act content: their method for uncovering it is simply to listen to utterances, 
then consult their intuitions about what has been said/claimed/asserted.
191
 Using this procedure, 
they are evidently impressed by the massively permissive practices normal speakers use in 
reporting the contents of the speech-acts of others. They consider the infamous “Smoking Gun” 
utterance(s) by Richard Nixon from the tapes of his conversations in the Oval Office—the 
discussion with Robert Haldeman in which Nixon orchestrates the cover-up of the Watergate 
burglary—and note that one could legitimately characterize what is said by Nixon in any number 
of ways (“Nixon told Haldeman to tell the CIA to tell the FBI not to pursue their investigation 
into the Watergate burglary. …Nixon told Haldeman to tell Helms that Nixon wanted him to stop 
the Watergate investigation. …Nixon told Haldeman to break the law. …And so on and so 
on.”192) They go on to note that this kind of flexibility in reporting speech-acts is typical, and 
conclude that indefinitely many things are said/asserted/claimed by speakers with their 
utterances. Furthermore, they claim, no one of the indefinitely many contents one could 
legitimately report as what someone said can be singled out as the one thing that they said 
literally or strictly speaking. There’s not much argument for this claim; they simply ask us to 
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reconsider the Smoking Gun Tape and ask, “Did Nixon really say what we attributed to him? 
Did he, strictly speaking, say it? Did he literally say it? Let’s see: We know this particular 
utterance was the cornerstone of the impeachment case against Nixon. …Imagine the absurdity 
of a defense of Nixon that he didn’t, strictly speaking, ask the CIA to block the FBI 
investigation.”193 We can’t even single out the minimal proposition expressed by an utterance as 
having some special speech-act status; minimal propositions are but one among the many things 
said: “One of the many propositions asserted by an utterance is the semantic content of the 
utterance (the proposition semantically expressed).”194 
This is familiar ground for us by now. We took note of the permissibility of various 
reports of a single utterance at the very beginning of the Introduction (discussing the sign that 
read ’10 for $10’ and Camp’s example concerning Jim and his attendance at Democratic Party 
meetings at the Bluebird Diner). So I agree with C&L that our linguistic practices typically 
sanction, for any given utterance, a wide variety of reports of the form ‘S said that P’, and that 
these practices should be taken at face value; I disagree with their sweeping conclusion, 
however, to the effect that this, let us say “flexibility” (not “context-sensitivity”) in our use of 
‘saying’ implies that no sense at all can be made of the concept of what is (strictly speaking) 
said. After all, if we’re supposed to “take our nontheoretic beliefs and intuitions about what 
speakers say, assert, claim, etc. at face value,”195 then we should treat the common practice of 
distinguishing lies from mere deceptions with the same deliberate naivety, and hence take 
seriously the notion of strict saying on which the distinction is based. This doesn’t mean that we 
should demand or even expect a rigorous theory of such a notion—as Chapter 2 showed, there is 
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every reason to be pessimistic about the prospects for a comprehensive account—but neither can 
we dismiss it as unintelligible or uninteresting. True, ordinary language-users accept a variety of 
contents as appropriate characterizations of what a speaker has said; but it’s also true that, 
depending on the circumstance, ordinary language-users make distinctions among the variety of 
things that can be said to have been said, according to the appropriateness of attributing acts with 
the various contents to the speaker. One such act is that of lying, and an examination into the 
circumstances under which it’s appropriate to label an utterance as such can reveal the subtle 
contours of the notion of strict saying. C&L tacitly acknowledge that this would be the way to 
get at such a notion, when they consider a hypothetical defense of Nixon along the lines familiar 
to us from Chapter 2—that he didn’t, strictly speaking, say that Haldeman should break the law, 
for example. But they’re too hasty when they apparently conclude, from the clear fact that such a 
defense in that particular case would be considered absurd, that the concept of strict saying is 
entirely inscrutable. There are plenty of cases, as we’ve seen, in which a defense against an 
accusation of having lied does succeed, and these cases involve arguing that some false content 
is not part of what one has, strictly speaking, said. 
When part of what one says, or one of the things that one says, is false then one has, 
arguably, at least to some degree, lied. C&L’s failure to countenance distinctions among the 
various things we say with an utterance makes liars of us all. Oftentimes the content semantically 
expressed by our utterances (C&L’s minimal propositions) is false, even if the meaning we 
intend to convey with that utterance—one of the other things we say, by C&L’s lights, but one 
which is on a par with each of the other innumerable things we say, including the minimal 
proposition—is something completely and uncontrovertibly true. “Rose isn’t tall,” I might say as 
she’s getting dominated by Shaquille O’Neal in a game of one-on-one. According to C&L, one 
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of the things I’ve said is the minimal proposition that Rose isn’t tall, simpliciter. As we’ve seen, 
it’s hard to say what this means, what its truth-conditions are (that’s a job for the 
metaphysicians), but according to one proposal floated by C&L, it turns out false if Rose has any 
degree of height at all. So I’m a liar, at least in part. And we needn’t adduce metaphysically 
dubious minimal propositions to make this point. Less-weird minimal propositions can also be 
false when there’s no lying going on: consider again the mother telling her barely injured son 
that he’s not going to die; for C&L, one of the things she says is that he’s immortal, and so she’s 
a liar. But this is absurd. 
Now, we might avert this conclusion by appealing to one of the results of Chapter 2—
namely, that the sense of ‘saying’ at play when we’re talking about lies is illocutionary, rather 
than merely locutionary. Lies are what Searle 1969 would classify as assertive acts, those that 
commit the speaker to the truth of their content. There is no such commitment in the mere 
expression of content involved in a locutionary act. So if we construe the expression of minimal 
propositions as merely locutionary saying, we’re off the hook for having lied. This perfectly 
natural and obvious move, however, is not open to C&L. When they talk about the expression of 
semantic content, they codify their position as the second thesis of Speech Act Pluralism, under 
the heading “What’s said and what’s semantically expressed,” thus: “One of the many 
propositions asserted by an utterance is the semantic content of that utterance (the proposition 
semantically expressed).”196 We assert minimal propositions! We’re committed to their truth. 
And so we lie all the time. 
The occurrence of ‘asserted’ rather than ‘said’ in the second thesis of Speech Act 
Pluralism is not just a slip-up, an accident. C&L seem to recognize no distinction between saying 
                                                 
196
 Ibid., p. 200. Emphasis mine. 
   
 134 
and asserting: they consistently treat various speech-act verbs as interchangeable. Their 
formulation of the first thesis of SPAP is typical: “No one thing is said (or asserted, or claimed, 
or…) by any utterance: rather, indefinitely many propositions are said, asserted, claimed, stated, 
etc.”197 The point is not that all these different kinds of acts—saying on the one hand, claiming 
on the other—are performed with an utterance; they treat ‘say’, ‘claim’, ‘assert’ and so on as 
equivalent. One can open the book to a random page and have a fine chance of seeing this: on 
page 91, we have “According to [Radical Contextualism], the two utterances of (1) assert (say, 
claim) radically different propositions.” Often, ‘say’ is out front, with ‘claim’ and ‘assert’ in 
parentheses; here they switch it up, clearly indicating their insensitivity to any distinctions in this 
area. C&L’s Speech Act Pluralism is a massively permissive (to borrow a phrase from Camp) 
one, which seems to acknowledge no difference between various distinguishable speech acts. 
3.1.4 SPAP undermines other arguments 
But C&L should be careful to draw a distinction between mere locutionary saying and its more 
forceful illocutionary cousins; without it, some of their central arguments are undermined. Recall 
the overall argumentative strategy of Insensitive Semantics: they seek to repudiate contextualism 
in all its forms, from moderate to radical varieties, first by showing that moderate versions 
collapse into radicalism, and then by showing that Radical Contextualism (RC) is incoherent. 
Contextualists are theorists who posit semantic context-sensitivity where there really isn’t any 
(according to C&L). The only genuinely context-sensitive expressions are members of their 
Basic Set, which includes the usual paradigmatic indexicals: pronouns, ‘here’, ‘now’, etc. The 
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centerpiece of C&L’s attack on RC comes in Chapter 7, where they teach us how to distinguish 
between genuine and spurious context-sensitivity by formulating tests which members of the 
Basic Set pass, and which the contextualists’ putative context-sensitive expressions fail. The 
reason that C&L ought to carefully distinguish locutionary saying from, e.g., asserting, is that 
these tests give different results depending on which speech-act verb one uses. 
Recall that one of the primary reasons for embracing a locutionary sense of ‘saying’ is to 
explain metaphorical utterances: intuitively, these are instances of the speaker saying one thing 
(“My wife is a delicate flower”) and meaning quite another (she’s lovely, etc.); we need a non-
assertive, force-neutral sense of ‘saying’ to account for the lack of commitment on the speaker’s 
part to the literal content of the act. Camp 2007 argues that C&L’s tests, when applied to 
metaphorical utterances, only give the correct result—or, at any rate, the result that C&L (and 
most other theorists) want—when formulated with a locutionary sense of ‘saying’; if one uses 
illocutionary verbs, the tests end up showing that metaphor is semantically context-sensitive. 
Consider C&L’s first test for genuine context-sensitivity: they point out that expressions in the 
Basic Set tend to block “inter-contextual disquotational indirect reports,” while other allegedly 
context-sensitive expressions do not.
198
 These reports are of the form “So-and-so said X,” where 
X is the very same sentence that so-and-so used in the original utterance. When we shift to a 
relevantly different context, these reports fail when X contains an expression in the Basic Set: 
suppose I utter “It’s going to be rainy tomorrow” on October 24th; on October 25th, Rose cannot 
report my utterance by saying “Dad said it’s going to be rainy tomorrow,” since in the new 
context, the reference of ‘tomorrow’ has changed. ‘Tomorrow’ is thus context-sensitive.  
Expressions that aren’t in the Basic Set fail the test: change the contexts however you like and 
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disquotational indirect reports will still succeed. So, for instance, about ‘tall’, they point out that 
“[a]ny utterance of ‘A is tall’ can be reported by ‘She said that A is tall’ and any two such 
utterances can be reported by ‘They both said that A is tall.’”199 Thus, ‘tall’ is not context-
sensitive. But, as Camp notes, if you change the verb from ‘said’ to ‘claimed’, the results of the 
test change. She considers two utterances in which a woman, Jane, is said to be a “long-stemmed 
rose.” 200 In the context of the first, it’s clear that the metaphor is meant to convey the speaker’s 
opinion that Jane is ostentatious and prickly; in the context of the second, the speaker thinks 
she’s classy. If we insert ‘Jane is a long-stemmed rose’ into C&L formulation above about 
tallness (a move suggested by C&L’s actual practice of re-deploying that schema for ‘tall’, 
‘enough’, ‘know’, and all the other words whose context-sensitivity they regard as spurious), we 
get the perfectly unobjectionable observation that any utterance of ‘Jane is a long-stemmed rose’ 
can be reported by ‘She said that Jane is a long-stemmed rose’ and any two such utterances can 
be reported by ‘They both said Jane is a long-stemmed rose.’ This is true. But Camp reports that 
her intuition is that, if we report the utterances from a third, unrelated context using ‘claimed’, 
the following three reports are false: (1) “Alex claimed that Jane is a long-stemmed rose”; (2) 
“Charlie claimed that Jane is a long-stemmed rose”; (3) “Alex and Charlie both claimed the same 
thing: that Jane is a long-stemmed rose.”201 My intuitions about (1) and (2) are not as strong as 
Camp’s, though I think those examples should remind us to make another important point: 
metaphorical utterances highlight the absurdity of C&L’s formulation of the second thesis of 
Speech Act Pluralism: “One of the many propositions asserted by an utterance is the semantic 
content of that utterance (the proposition semantically expressed).” The semantic content of the 
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utterances about Jane is that she’s (literally) a certain kind of flower; according to C&L, Alex 
and Charlie assert this, and so are committed to it. Balderdash. But back to (1) – (3): since (1) 
and (2) aren’t obviously false, it appears open to C&L to say that in these examples of 
intercontextual disquotational indirect reports are not blocked, so there is no context-sensitivity, 
just as one would expect. But while (1) and (2) aren’t obviously false, I think there’s a strong 
case that (3) is. If (3) is true, then it follows that Alex and Charlie made the same claim. But they 
didn’t: one is a flattering assessment of Jane, the other is not. If they made different claims, then 
by modus tollens (3) is false. And the falsity of (3) undermines C&L’s test: for them, the reason 
that disquotational reports are not blocked for expressions outside the Basic Set is that Radical 
Contextualists are wrong to think that different utterances of the same sentence can “assert (say, 
claim) radically different propositions.”202 Rather, a single content is said/claimed/asserted, and 
so we can observe, e.g., that any two utterances of ‘Jane is a long-stemmed rose’ can be reported 
by ‘They both said that Jane is a long-stemmed rose.’ Since what underwrites this collective 
reporting is the sameness of the contents in both utterances, and since C&L are also committed 
to the interchangeability of ‘said’ and ‘claimed’, it’s equivalent to put it as Camp does in (3): 
They both claimed the same thing: that Jane is a long-stemmed rose. And that is wrong, since 
they expressed different opinions of Jane—claimed different things about her—with their 
utterances. These utterances behave exactly the same way as two utterances featuring members 
of the Basic Set would: if I utter, on October 24
th, “It’s going to be rainy tomorrow,” and Rose 
utters the same sentence on October 25
th
, we have made different claims; for C&L, this is the 
reason inter-contextual disquotational reports are blocked. But if that’s the case, then they would 
have to report the same intuitions as Camp about the falseness of the claim-reports (1) and (2) 
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above. It’s easy to see how one can extend this procedure to other metaphorical utterances, and 
the end result is that metaphor seems to block inter-contextual disquotational indirect reports in 
the same way as members of the Basic Set, making metaphor semantically context-sensitive. 
This is an unattractive result for most theorists, and is certainly not a result that C&L would be 
happy with. 
Camp is concerned strictly with metaphor, but her point generalizes. It’s a simple fact of 
linguistic life that we use identical utterances in different contexts to perform different 
illocutionary acts. When I say “Rose isn’t tall enough” in the Lakers’ locker room, I make one 
assertion; when I say the same thing in front of the Tilt-A-Whirl, I make a different one. If we 
concentrate, then, on illocutionary acts, we will find context-sensitivity everywhere. C&L want 
to avoid that outcome, and so they need to distinguish carefully between locutionary and 
illocutionary acts, and formulate their tests using only the former notion. They don’t; instead, 
they explicitly conflate the two, and so their Speech Act Pluralism leads to absurd results. 
 The solution—to embrace a merely locutionary sense of ‘saying’, alter the tests 
accordingly, and moderate SPAP—is not, however available to C&L, because it undermines 
their arguments against Moderate Contextualism (MC) from earlier in the book.
203
 Again, recall 
that a crucial step in their overall argumentative strategy is to show that adopting MC puts one 
on a slippery slope to RC. They try to establish the slipperiness of the slope by showing that the 
moderate contextualist’s methods for establishing the context-sensitivity of particular 
expressions can be used to demonstrate the context-sensitivity of any expression whatsoever. 
One method involves the deployment of so-called Context-Shifting Arguments (CSAs), in which 
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we imagine the same sentence uttered in two different contexts, note that the utterances have 
different truth-values in the different contexts, and conclude that the culprit is context-sensitivity 
of one of the expressions therein. To show that this pattern of argumentation can be used to make 
any expression appear context-sensitive (and thus that MC collapses into RC), they run through 
several examples of CSAs featuring expressions that, they imagine, only a radical would deem to 
be context-sensitive.
204
 So they borrow an example from well-known radical Travis: ‘Smith 
weighs 80 kg.’ They imagine this sentence being uttered in two contexts: in the first, Smith has 
been on a diet and exercise regimen, and the speaker truly characterizes Smith’s success with the 
utterance, even though, as a matter of fact, while Smith’s morning weigh-in came to exactly 80 
kg, at the time of utterance he is wearing lots of heavy clothing and has just eaten an enormous 
lunch; in the second, all the facts are the same, except that the utterance occurs at the doors of an 
elevator whose maximum capacity is exactly 80 kg short of being reached, making the utterance 
false. 
One can imagine resisting the conclusion that ‘weighs 80 kg’ is context-sensitive205 thus: 
while it’s true that the utterances are used to make different assertions with different truth-
values, what is said, strictly speaking, on each occasion is the same thing, and it’s false. The 
content of the locutionary act in both cases is the same, and is delivered by Semantics, and its 
truth-conditions are such that it’s false unless Jones weighs exactly 80 kg. Whether or not one 
agrees with the semantic diagnosis, this kind of response is an option. C&L consider the 
possibility of an objection appealing to what is strictly speaking said, but since they lack the 
notion of a locutionary act, they are unable to assess it fairly. Considering questions about what 
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someone strictly speaking said, they say, “As far as we can determine, the only way to take this 
question so that its answer is ‘no’ is as a question about direct quotation.”206 That is, the only 
way to specify what someone said, strictly speaking, is to quote their exact words. But we have 
an alternative sense of strict saying as a locutionary act, and I can correctly report the content of 
this act without resorting to direct quotation. For example, if Alice says “Smith weighs 80 kg,” I 
can report her utterance (supposing that Smith has a certain job) thus: “Alice said that the 
Regional Manager of Sales tips the scales at 176.37 lbs.” Co-referring expressions, synonyms, 
and so forth can be part of the specification of a locutionary act’s content. What we have then, is 
“a special class of indirect reports of the form ‘A literally (strictly) speaking said that p’ [that] 
creates a connection between indirect speech and semantic theory relevantly similar to the 
connection [that C&L have] been denying.”207 That is, at least to a first approximation, 
Semantics provides the content of locutionary acts, and this content can remain stable across 
contexts when none of the expressions in an utterance are relevantly semantically context-
sensitive. Cases in which the content of illocutionary acts performed using those utterances is 
unstable do not show that the moderate contextualist is committed to their semantic context-
sensitivity. 
We can even resist C&L’s conclusions without appealing to notion of a locutionary act. 
Note that the sense of ‘what is said, strictly speaking’ at work in the last paragraph—i.e., a 
purely locutionary sense—is not the sense in which we need to understand that notion as it is 
used to mark the distinction between lying and misleading. As we learned in Chapter 2, we need 
an illocutionary sense of ‘saying’ for that—and consideration of the nature of the relationship 
between the two types of saying was a source of significant vexation. But even according to the 
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more robust illocutionary sense of strict saying, some of C&L’s examples fail. For instance, they 
ask us to consider multiple utterances of ‘John went to the gym.’208 In one context, the topic of 
conversation is John’s nightly walk; in another, it’s his exercise regimen. C&L elicit the intuition 
that in the first case, the fact that John walked to the gym would vindicate the utterance, while in 
the second, it would not: if he only walked there, but didn’t go in to exercise, the utterance would 
be false. But one can imagine, in such a context, a defense against lying appealing to the 
illocutionary sense of strict saying: “What I said was, strictly speaking, true, since John did in 
fact go to the gym. It was, I admit, misleading, though, since he didn’t work out when he was 
there.” Whether or not one agrees that the defense goes through in this case, this is certainly a 
standard use of the notion of strict saying, one that any competent speaker would recognize. I 
don’t think C&L’s expressions of puzzlement about the notion look at all coherent in light of 
such examples, the ubiquity of which is now familiar to us from our explorations in Chapter 2. 
Moreover, if we help ourselves to a merely locutionary sense of strict saying, the example is 
utterly straightforward: it seems quite plausible to say that ‘John went to the gym’, minimally 
construed, is clearly true in both cases, with Semantics demanding only that John changed his 
location from one not gym-proximate to one in the gym’s general vicinity. 
C&L deploy the same sort of slippery-slope argument against so-called Incompleteness 
Arguments as they do against CSAs. Incompleteness Arguments, as C&L understand them, are 
another way for moderate contextualists to establish the semantic context-sensitivity of non-
Basic Set expressions, this time by pointing to the alleged fact that, without contributions from 
context, utterances containing them cannot express full truth-evaluable propositions. The 
examples are familiar: e.g., ‘Rose isn’t tall enough’ doesn’t express a proposition unless context 
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tells us what she isn’t tall enough for. C&L claim that this pattern of reasoning can be extended 
to any expression whatsoever, even those only a radical would consider context-sensitive—and 
so once again the adoption of the moderate contextualists’ strategy leads inevitably to Radical 
Contextualism. They argue, for example, that even an utterance of the seemingly complete ‘John 
went to the gym’ could be queried in the same way as ‘Rose isn’t tall enough’: “Went to the gym 
how? Walked to the vicinity? Did something in the gym? Did what in the gym? For how long? 
What if he went into the gym but was sleepwalking? Etc. We don’t know how to evaluate [the 
utterance] without settling these questions….”209 
Once again, this argument founders on the rocks of C&L’s too-permissive Speech Act 
Pluralism—their inability or unwillingness to acknowledge real differences between different 
kinds of speech acts. Even if we grant that we require answers to further questions to determine 
the illocutionary content of an utterance of ‘John went to the gym’ (suppose it’s a context in 
which his exercise regimen is under discussion, and so what’s asserted by the utterance is that he 
performed his scheduled workout; it could be argued (see above) that this is not part of what is 
said (in the illocutionary sense), but rather a mere implicatum, but we’ll set that aside for now), 
it’s open to the moderate contextualist to appeal to the notion of the utterance’s locutionary 
content, and say, quite plausibly, that Semantics delivers a perfectly truth-evaluable proposition, 
one that’s true just in case John went to the gym—no matter how he got there, what he did there, 
or whether or not he was sleep walking at the time. The difference between this kind of case and 
those in which there is genuine semantic incompleteness is that for the latter, what we’re given 
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even at the level of locutionary content
210
 requires that we answer further questions before we 
can evaluate its truth or falsity; it is not fully propositional.
211
 
Now, C&L might object that there’s no principled way to draw a distinction between 
sentences that are semantically incomplete and those that are not. ‘Rose isn’t tall enough’ is 
maybe a relatively easy case, but what about ‘It’s raining’? This seems to require a specification 
of location in order to be truth-evaluable. Does that make it semantically incomplete? Perhaps its 
semantic content is the proposition that it’s (currently) raining somewhere or other. Or, if a 
location is required, maybe it can be treated in the same way as sentences containing 
indexicals—as having an argument-place (in this case, covert) in its logical form demanding a 
specification of location. There are many difficult cases to consider (see Bach 2001, section 5 for 
a sample), but the lack of a clear criterion for deciding them all is not evidence that there’s no 
such thing as semantic incompleteness. This sort of situation is (painfully) familiar to us: after an 
exhaustive (and exhausting) search in Chapter 2, we failed to find a principled way to distinguish 
lies from acts of mere misleading. There turned out to be a variety of difficult, borderline cases; 
the distinction resists theoretical codification. But that does not mean there’s no such distinction! 
Similarly for semantic incompleteness: perhaps the best approach is to consider alleged examples 
on a case-by-case basis, consulting a wide range of data—from intuitions about what is said and 
                                                 
210
 I deliberately used the phrase ‘what we’re given at the level of locutionary content’ rather than something like 
‘semantic content’, because there are distinct views on this. For Bach, self-described radical semantic minimalist, 
there is no difference between the two phrases; locutionary content just is semantic content, and in the case of 
semantic incompleteness, that content is a propositional radical rather than a full-fledged proposition. Some 
moderate contextualists, though, would characterize as semantic the fleshed-out propositional content provided with 
input from context. C&L are blind to this distinction: to them, Bach is a moderate contextualist (a designation to 
which he objects in Bach 2006). 
211
 At least, arguably non-propositional. C&L will maintain, of course, that there’s a minimal proposition in such 
cases, but that claim, as we’ve seen, rests on some pretty dubious metaphysics. The thrust of the present objection, 
though, does not depend on metaphysical arguments against minimal propositions: the point is simply that there’s a 
natural way to distinguish between the two examples in terms of locutionary content (one requires further questions 
to determine it, the other does not); failure to acknowledge this can be traced to C&L’s SPAP, not their metaphysics. 
(Thanks to James Shaw for prompting this clarification.) 
   
 144 
truth-values, to linguistic and psychological data. The difficulty of the enterprise does not show 
that it’s hopeless. And if the only alternative is to accept C&L’s minimal propositions—and they 
tell us that this is, in fact, the only alternative—then given the problems we’ve already identified 
with those, I’ll take semantic incompleteness. 
3.1.5 Summing up: how to use intuitions  
C&L believe it’s a mistake to assume that a semantic theory must explain our intuitions about 
speech act content. They codify this belief and call it the “Mistaken Assumption”: “A theory of 
semantic content is adequate just in case it accounts for all or most of the intuitions speakers 
have about speech act content, i.e., intuitions about what speakers say, assert, claim, and state by 
uttering sentences.”212 This assumption may indeed be mistaken if we take it to demand of 
Semantics that it account for our intuitions about the contents of illocutionary acts—assertions, 
claims, and so on. Our linguistic practices allow such variability, such flexibility in the modes of 
expression we deploy in the performance of such acts that it seems too daunting a task for a 
formal semantic theory to account for it all. But it is not clearly mistaken if we demand of 
Semantics only the more modest task of accounting for our intuitions about locutionary acts—
intuitions, for example, about the cancellability of generalized implicatures, which may in some 
cases (see Chapter 2) be part of asserted, illocutionary content, but whose non-minimal, 
(arguably) extra-semantic status can be revealed with the appropriate cancelling clause. C&L 
affect an extreme wariness about relying on intuitions: “[I]f you want to exploit intuitions about 
speech act content to fix semantic content, then you have to be extremely careful in so doing. It 
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can be done, and we’ll show you how, but it’s a subtle and easily corrupted process.”213 Despite 
this and similar declarations, though, I think a lack of care in handling intuitions is their undoing. 
Recall our methodological discussion from §2.1.1 above. There are in the literature two 
alternative approaches for getting at speech act content, what is said; according to one, we should 
rely solely on intuitions about the appropriateness of indirect reports; according to the other, it’s 
better to focus on intuitions about the truth-values of utterances in various contexts. C&L 
emphatically declare their allegiance to the first school of thought; indeed, they find the second 
approach incomprehensible: “We don’t know what it is to have intuitions about the truth value of 
utterances as such. If we are asked to have intuitions not about what an utterance says, asserts, 
claims, etc. but just about its truth value, we are at a loss.”214 But intuitions about the truth-values 
of utterances are robust and unavoidable—as C&L themselves demonstrate when they formulate 
their tests for genuine context-sensitivity (Test 3: an expression “e is context sensitive only if 
there is a true utterance of an instance of the following schema for Inter-Contextual Disquotation 
(ICD, for short; where S contains e): (ICD) There are (or can be) false utterances of ⌜S⌝  even 
though S.”), and when they try to show that CSAs and Incompleteness arguments put us on a 
slippery slope to Radical Contextualism (we’re asked, for example, to note that an utterance of 
‘John went to the gym’ has different truth-values in different contexts). My own view is that the 
best approach is to combine the two sorts of intuitions—about propriety of indirect reports and 
truth-values of utterances—and that the best kinds of examples to consider involve the 
lying/misleading distinction. Moderated by a consideration of the truth-values of original 
utterances in context, intuitions about the appropriateness of various reports reveal a range of 
subtle, surprising, and vexing phenomena. Despite their implicit endorsement (through actual 
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practice) of the importance of truth-value intuitions, though, C&L steadfastly ignore them at 
crucial stages. This leaves them with an un-moderated set of intuitions about reporting practices, 
and from the liberality of those practices (the variety of reports of the form ‘S said that p’ that are 
often acceptable, the frequent inter-changeability of ‘say’, ‘assert’, ‘claim’, etc.) they derive 
conclusions that make them blind to distinctions among speech-act types, with disastrous results. 
The basic circumspection at the heart of Speech Act Pluralism is laudable: “We have been 
unable to figure out how to devise an algorithm that takes the proposition semantically expressed 
and delivers all the propositions said, asserted, etc. There might not be any systematic theory 
from which one can derive all of which [sic] is said by an utterance.”215 Replace ‘proposition 
semantically expressed’ with ‘locutionary content’, and this passage becomes something we 
might have said to sum up the results of Chapter 2’s meanderings. But C&L’s wanton conflation 
of locutionary and illocutionary saying leads to many absurdities: minimal propositions are 
asserted despite being metaphysically mysterious, as are any contents—whether or not they’re 
known or believed by speakers—that can feature in indirect reports of their speech; so, for 
example, if I say, “Alice is playing with Shep,” and it turns out that, unbeknownst to me, Alice is 
the second-cutest 3-year-old in North America
216
 and Shep, a doll we bought second-hand, used 
to belong to Chelsea Clinton, and was her favorite, then I have asserted that the second-cutest 3-
year-old in North America is playing with Chelsea Clinton’s favorite doll—I’m committed to the 
truth of that content. But of course I’m not. Their basic error is to mistake the truth of a variety of 
de re assertion-reports for evidence of a corresponding variety of assertions; but there is no such 
variety, as the falsity of de dicto versions of the same reports makes clear. And besides 
committing them to such absurdities about speech act content, C&L’s flawed intuition-
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mongering makes them blind to the sorts of distinctions that would allow Moderate 
Contextualists—and minimalists like Bach, et. al., who countenance sub-propositional semantic 
content—to resist a slide into Radical Contextualism. This has the disastrous effect of 
undermining the core of their argument. 
3.2 ALTERNATIVES TO CAPPELEN AND LEPORE 
C&L try to resist the onslaught of the marauding pragmatic hordes by drawing a tight perimeter 
around their semantic stronghold, ceding some territory in order to shore up their defenses. They 
abandon almost entirely the traditional connection between semantic content and speech act 
content (condition 3 above) and try to protect the rest of their semantic redoubt. The maneuver is 
unsuccessful, however; their fortifications are insufficient, and their encampment suffers from 
internal strife.  
I want to turn to an examination of some other ways of conceiving of the semantic 
project. The first, due to Emma Borg, represents a potential way to rescue the minimalist 
semantic project. The others, from Jason Stanley and Katarzyna Jaszczolt, respectively, are more 
expansive conceptions of Semantics (the latter more so than the former). I’ve chosen these three 
views to try to get a representative sample of the wide variety of positions within this logical 
space; there are many other views, and many variations of roughly similar approaches, but these 
three should give us a good idea of the choices that are possible, and the challenges that arise for 
each. The aim here is not a comprehensive evaluation of the alternatives; rather, I’ll give a brief 
sketch and note some potential problems, noting for each any special issues that arise in the 
connection with our distinctive focus on the lying/misleading distinction. 
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3.2.1 Borg’s semantic minimalism 
Borg stresses the importance of the first of our conditions on Semantics, particularly the 
requirement that it account systematically for the relationship between the syntactic arrangement 
and semantic contents of the words in a sentence, on the one hand, and the sentence’s semantic 
content on the other. She demands that Semantics be a formal theory: it abstracts from the 
features of the uses of expressions, considering only their formal properties (meanings of 
individual lexical items, mode of their combination, i.e., sentential syntax) and providing an 
account of how literal sentence-meaning (as opposed to use-based utterance-meaning) can be 
computed from these basic formal ingredients. The reason she demands such a conception of 
Semantics is that she’s committed to a computational, modular conception of the mind, in the 
style of Fodor 1975 and 1983, according to which, very roughly, reasoning is a process of formal 
computation—manipulation of mental representation according to their syntactic properties—
and the mind is divided into discrete modules carrying out distinct reasoning processes, one of 
which is a dedicated language faculty.
217
 In Borg’s words: “A module is then a probably innate, 
encapsulated body of information together with processes operating only over that information, 
which is responsible for realizing a given cognitive function.”218 A formal semantic theory 
dovetails with this picture of the mind. 
If semantic content is the output of such a processing module, there are serious 
constraints on its character. Consider the processes by which we come to an overall 
interpretation of the communicative content of a speaker’s utterances, including implicatures, 
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insinuations, indirect speech acts, and so on. We bring to bear on this interpretive task prodigious 
amounts of information, not only about lexical meanings and so forth, but also about the 
speaker’s likely intentions, the current state and context of the discourse, and background 
information about the world, culture, etc. Putting all this together, we make an inference to the 
best explanation for what the speaker meant to convey with her words. This kind of abductive, 
all-things-considered reasoning, however, is not suited to the formal, computational, modular 
model that Borg envisions for semantic processing. Inferences in that mode must be deductive 
and draw only on the specialized information contained in the linguistic module. This condition 
severely constrains what can count as semantic content. In order to determine, for example, 
what’s referred to by a demonstrative pronoun (‘this’ or ‘that’), we must consult speakers’ 
intentions.
219
 Even the contents of so-called (by Kaplan) “pure” indexicals like ‘here’ and ‘now’ 
are not simply determined by objective features of context, the location of the speaker and the 
time of utterance; speakers can intend different areas of space and periods of time with these 
locutions, and so consultation of intentions again becomes unavoidable. (Compare ‘Now I can 
surf the web on my phone’, where I mean something like ‘these days’, to ‘Now the steak is 
done’, where I mean ‘this very moment’.) So it turns out that even C&L are too liberal, on this 
conception, in granting the contextual determination of the referents of members of the Basic Set 
status as properly semantic. Borg says, “[T]he true test for minimalism is… how it deals with the 
existence of those expressions for which it seems uncontroversial that their content is bound up 
with current speaker intentions… [i.e.,] how it deals with overtly context-sensitive expressions 
like demonstratives and indexicals.”220 C&L fail the test. 
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To pass it, one must adopt an extremely austere conception of semantic content. 
According to Borg, the contents of demonstratives and other indexical expressions are singular 
(as opposed to general) concepts, grasped by the hearer at the time of utterance, the contents of 
which are the objects referred to—but, and this is the key point, the object referred to is not 
specified in anything but a descriptive manner. An example will help. When someone hears an 
utterance of ‘That is mine’, the semantic content entertained will be something like “α, whatever 
it is, belongs to S, whoever that may be.”221 Or the value of ‘This is red’ will be something like 
‘α is red’, or ‘the object ostended by the speaker of the utterance is red’. In these examples, α is 
the singular concept, and it could refer to any number of objects.
222
 Borg takes it that this sort of 
singular-concept account extends to singular terms in general, even proper names. 
Rather than posit C&L’s comparatively more robust, allegedly more concretely specified, 
minimal propositions, Borg opts for what she calls “liberal truth-conditions.” She deals with 
apparent semantic incompleteness, for example, not by pounding the table and insisting that 
‘Jane can’t continue’, for instance, expresses the (minimal) proposition that Jane can’t continue, 
and is true if and only if Jane can’t continue, but by offering the schematic, liberal truth-
condition: “If u is an utterance of ‘Jane can’t continue’ in a context c and ‘Jane’ in u refers to α 
then u is true iff α can’t continue something.”223 This doesn’t specify a single state of affairs, but 
rather a range of them that may satisfy the conditions. Specification of which precise state is the 
one indicated by the particular utterance is a task that falls outside the province of Semantics; it 
requires the consultation of information outside the ambit of the language faculty. 
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That Borg’s liberal truth-conditions are unlike what one normally thinks of as semantic 
content is apparent. She recognizes this, and discusses at length a series of objections that 
naturally arise in reaction to her view, all to the effect that liberal truth-conditions are not real 
truth-conditions—they’re too schematic, they don’t allow one to determine a truth-value in all 
possible situations, they fail to match intuitive truth-conditions in particular circumstances, and 
so on. Most of these objections, though, are just variations on the complaint that liberal truth-
conditions are not the intuitive truth-conditions of utterances. But they were never meant to be. 
Borg is self-consciously separating the domain of Semantics from the domain of speech-act 
interpretation; condition 3 on Semantics—that it explain our intuitions about speech acts—is 
denied utterly. At most, Semantics provides a starting point for utterance interpretation, but “by 
the time we reach any judgment of what is said by a given utterance in a given context the 
peculiarly semantic contribution will have been swamped beneath the influence of other (non-
semantic) factors.”224 Determination of speech-act content is an almost entirely pragmatic affair. 
“‘Saying’ or ‘asserting’ are pragmatic notions…. [I]t is no longer (if it ever was) thought to be 
the job of a semantic theory to explain different speech acts or what a speaker says by a given 
utterance. The task of semantics is to capture the literal meanings of words and sentences, 
nothing more.”225  
Borg’s is an even more resolute minimalism than C&L’s, and this is a mark in its favor, 
in my view. It allows Borg to avoid the absurd claim that one of the propositions we assert when 
we utter a sentence is the semantically minimal proposition associated with it—a claim that is in 
clear contradiction with the distinction that is our focus, between lying and misleading. If the 
semantic content of ‘Rose isn’t tall enough’ is something like ‘Rose, whoever that might be, is 
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not tall enough for something or other’, this content is easy to make true; she’s tall enough to 
look down at an ant, for example. But if we make this truth part of what we assert whenever we 
utter a sentence, we get a specious defense against lying (at least a partial defense) in 
circumstances in which an utterance of the sentence would clearly be false (standing in front of 
the Tilt-A-Whirl, e.g.). C&L are committed to this absurd result; Borg is not. 
All this is not to say that I want to embrace Borg’s account of Semantics entirely. The 
purpose of this chapter is not to reach such definitive conclusions, but rather to chip away at the 
issues a little bit. And I have some reservations about Borg’s view. First, it’s not clear to me that 
we have much reason to prefer her version of minimalism to that of Bach et al., where we 
abandon condition 2 and allow sub-propositional content to count as the meaning of certain 
sentences. Liberal truth-conditions, being satisfiable by a range of different circumstances, are 
hard, on the face of it, to distinguish from propositional radicals or blueprints, which are also 
sufficiently indeterminate to allow for multiple ways of fleshing out. Moreover, as Bach points 
out, while adding an argument place to the syntax of a sentence to be filled with an existential 
quantifier is intuitively plausible in some cases, it fails to be in others. Compare ‘Jack is glad’ to 
‘Jack is pleased’; in each case, we may specify something further that he’s glad or pleased about. 
But while ‘Jack is pleased about something or other’ seems fine, ‘Jack is glad about something 
or other’ seems fishy. It makes sense to say “Jack is pleased, but I have no idea about what,” but 
“Jack is glad, I have no idea about what,” is awkward. When we say someone is glad, we have to 
have something specific in mind, and so liberal truth-conditions are inappropriate here in a way 
that they’re not with ‘Jack is pleased’.226 And Borg’s objections to sub-propositional content 
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commit the very error I praised her above for avoiding; namely, she takes semantic content to be 
something a speaker expresses as part of a speech act. She says:  
If semantics gives us nothing but a gappy proposition we surely still want to ask which of 
these contextually provided fillings-in the speaker genuinely expresses or commits 
themselves to. Yet since we have given up the idea that what counts for literal content is 
what can be found at the lexico-syntactic level, it becomes quite unclear how we can 
isolate just one (or some) of all the possible expansions of a propositional radical as the 
one(s) that delivers literal meaning.
227
 
 
Her preferred account, according to which we assign liberal truth-conditions as semantic content, 
is only an advantage over gappy propositions if it provides what Borg thinks is needed: a 
specification of what the speaker is committed to; this must be what she means here by “literal 
content/meaning.” But this is the content of an illocutionary speech act (the invocation of 
commitment makes it so), and liberal truth-conditions are no better positioned to provide this 
than propositional radicals. If she wants to claim that her minimal semantic content can serve 
such a role, she’s committing the same blunder as C&L did when they said that minimal 
propositions are always asserted. 
My second reservation about Borg’s minimalism is its commitment to the computational, 
modular conception of mind. I’ve already noted that I’m reluctant to embrace that view (see the 
discussion of Relevance Theory above), though this is not the place to offer arguments against it. 
Instead, I just want to emphasize the degree to which Borg’s vision for Semantics is beholden to 
it. She freely admits that the semantic content generated by her linguistic processing unit has no 
essential role to play in the conscious process of utterance interpretation (her §2.3.4 is titled 
“There is limited conscious access to the intermediate representations of the language faculty”); 
rather, we often skip past these literal meanings, consulting pragmatic information to arrive at 
intuitive meanings for utterances. If this is so, then semantic content fails to satisfy Recanati’s 
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“Availability Principle,” according to which conscious availability is a necessary condition for 
psychological reality (see §2.5.3 above). Now, as we saw in the case of locutionary content, 
failure always to be present to consciousness need not imply that there is no such thing, as one 
can train oneself to become aware of such content (in the case of locutionary content, by 
considering the cancellability of extra material). But Borg’s singular concept-laden liberal truth-
conditions are alien to everyday linguistic practice in a way that simple locutionary contents are 
not, so it’s less clear that such a move is available to her. Consideration of cancellability and so 
forth seems more likely to lead to Bach’s more intuitive propositional radicals in the relevant 
cases. Only if, as a matter of empirical, psychological fact, there is a linguistic processing 
module operating exactly as Borg describes can we have any guarantee that her semantic 
contents are real. 
3.2.2 Indexicalism 
Indexicalism is a comparatively bold proposal, in that it aims to satisfy all four conditions that 
tradition supposes a semantic theory should: it is compositional and syntactically constrained; it 
yields truth-evaluable propositions as contents of declarative sentences; these comport with our 
intuitions about speech acts; and they provide an input to the usual Gricean pragmatic processes. 
Its most prominent exponent is Jason Stanley (along with collaborators like Jeff King and Zoltán 
Gendler-Szabó). Though Stanley himself doesn’t refer to his view as “Indexicalism,” it’s a 
natural enough designation, as his account is merely an expansion of the standard Kaplanian 
treatment of indexical expressions. That is, he deals with all the apparent context-sensitivity of 
the contents of speech acts by positing indexical-like elements in the logical form of the 
sentences used to perform those acts, thus rendering the acts’ contents properly semantic, insofar 
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as their determination is triggered by syntactic considerations. Stanley does not share Borg’s 
scruples about the need to consult speaker-intentions, since his theory is not so closely tied to a 
specific view about the nature of mental linguistic processing, and so he can allow a wide range 
of phenomena to fall under the semantic umbrella. 
Some examples easily illustrate the general features of the approach. In their 2000, 
Stanley and Szabó take on the phenomenon of quantifier domain restriction—the ability of 
speakers to use sentences with apparently unrestricted quantifiers, like ‘Every bottle is empty’, to 
make claims in which the quantifiers’ scope is limited, e.g., ‘Every bottle I just bought is empty.’ 
In a context in which Lisa utters the former having just returned from the store with some bottles, 
and her friend Max, who needs empty bottles to fill with his homemade beer, has just asked her 
whether the bottles need to be emptied before he can use them, she successfully conveys the 
proposition expressed by the latter.
228
 The challenge is to show that this intuitive content of 
Lisa’s speech act is determined by Semantics. Their key idea is that the logical form of the 
uttered sentence contains a hidden element—hidden in that there’s nothing phonetic in the 
sentence to which it corresponds—that triggers the consultation of context to specify the domain 
over which the quantifier is supposed to range. This element is a variable that takes different 
quantifier-domains as values and is associated grammatically with the noun.
229
 Context tells us 
which, of all the bottles in the universe, we are to consider: the ones she just purchased. This 
syntactically triggered appeal to context is exactly analogous to the manner in which indexical 
expressions trigger such an appeal, except that the relevant element of syntax is hidden—it is, to 
                                                 
228
 Stanley and Szabó 2000, p. 231 
229
 I’m deliberately setting aside various complications, such as the need to conceive of the variable element as a 
function, and the question of whether the variable co-habits a terminal node with the noun, or has one of its own 
(hence the intentionally vague ‘associated with’). Nothing I have to say depends on attending to these niceties, and 
so I won’t. 
   
 156 
use Neale’s terminology, aphonic. This general approach allows Stanley et al. to deal with a 
variety of instances of context sensitivity. For example, the theory can be deployed to explain a 
phenomenon that we’ve returned to again and again—relative adjectives’ apparent context-
sensitivity. Different utterances of ‘Rose is tall’ can express different propositions in different 
contexts, depending on the salient comparison class. If one postulates a hidden variable in logical 
form that demands the specification of a comparison class, the phenomenon becomes properly 
semantic.
230
 
There are various quibbles one could make with the formal details of Stanley’s theory, 
though I’m not interested in those and suspect they can be dealt with. I’m willing to stipulate that 
the details of the (rather impressive) logico-syntactic apparatus are entirely on the up-and-up. 
The deeper concern one might have with this approach is that it’s question-begging against the 
theorist who maintains that the relevant phenomena are pragmatic, not semantic. One might 
worry that hidden indexicals are a mere postulate, in the sense closer to that term’s Latin root, 
postulāre—to demand—than to the sense in which it’s synonymous with ‘axiom’. That is, it’s 
only a prior conviction that the observed context-sensitivity must have a semantic explanation 
that motivates the introduction of aphonic indexicals; but this is not evidence that the phenomena 
aren’t pragmatic, especially since the explanans are invisible. What is required to ameliorate this 
concern is an independent argument for the existence of hidden indexicals. Stanley recognizes 
this challenge: “[S]yntactic structure cannot simply be postulated on semantic grounds. Rather, 
evidence of a syntactic sort must be available for the existence of domain variables.”231 The 
syntactic evidence Stanley musters for the existence of hidden variables is that they seem to 
interact with—be bound by—quantifiers. For example, the domain variable in ‘Every bottle is 
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empty’ can be bound by the quantifier in ‘In some rooms, every bottle is empty’, which is 
naturally understood to convey something like ‘In some rooms, every bottle in that room is 
empty’. The italicized material makes explicit the value that the domain variable must take, now 
that it’s been bound; what was heretofore hidden is now manifest. 
The Binding Argument is supposed to generalize beyond quantifier sentences. So, in his 
2000, Stanley discusses 'It rains', and concludes 'rains' co-occurs with both temporal and 
locational variables.
232
 Also, comparative adjectives have variables for comparison-classes 
associated with them.
233
 Evidence for the existence of these variables in LF is provided by their 
bind-ability, based on the Binding Assumption: “If α and β are within the same clause, and 
α semantically binds β, then α either is, or introduces, a variable-binding operator which is co-
indexed with, and stands in certain specified structural relation to, a variable which is either 
identical to, or is a constituent of, β.”234 The upshot is, where there's binding, there's a variable, 
possibly hidden in LF. So, for example, it seems that the natural reading of ‘Everywhere I go, it 
rains’ is ‘for all locations x, if I go to x then it rains at x.’ 
There are reasons to be concerned about this argument from binding. First, as C&L 
argue, it over-generates; that is, it leads us to conclude that there are hidden variables present 
when, intuitively, there shouldn’t be. Consider ‘Everywhere I go, 2 + 2 = 4’.235 By parity of 
reasoning, this sentence provides evidence of a hidden variable for location in ‘2 + 2 = 4’. That’s 
surprising! Furthermore, we can keep adding quantifier phrases to generate evidence for 
indefinitely-many hidden variables in a sentence’s logical form: ‘Everywhere I go, no matter 
when I go there, 2 + 2 = 4’ indicates the presence of both location- and time-variables; 
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‘Everywhere I go, no matter when I go there, and no matter what I ate for breakfast, 2 + 2 = 4’ 
adds a variable for the speaker’s breakfast; we could keep going. There are moves that Stanley 
can make to avoid this conclusion. He can (and does, in his 2007), deny that 'for all locations x, 
if I go to x, 2+2=4 at x' is the proper reading (Jonathan Cohen and Sam Rickless make the same 
argument in their 2007). He can also argue that the objection misinterprets the Binding 
Argument, making it stronger than it was intended to be: C&L presume that it posits hidden 
variables as necessary to explain the grammaticality of the sentences in question; Stanley (again, 
see his 2007), can insist that bound variables are only arrived at via an inference to the best 
explanation for the binding phenomena he examines.
236
 This is not the place to get into the 
merits or demerits of these moves and counter-moves; my only intention in presenting these 
objections is to indicate that the Binding Argument is not universally accepted—that there may 
be problems with it, and the issues are complicated. 
Lenny Clapp registers a similar objection, this one focusing on relative adjectives. The 
following succession of sentences suggests an indefinite number of hidden variables: “(17) Most 
species have members that are small. (small for the species) (17’) Most species have some 
females who are small. (small for females of the species) (17’’) There is some region where for 
most species several females are small. (small for females of the species who live in the 
region)”237 It seems that binding arguments force us to conclude that any given sentence contains 
a plethora a hidden indexical variables—possibly infinitely many!238 This is a troubling 
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conclusion about the grammar of our language. How does one learn such a language, for 
example?
239
 
If any of the various objections to the Binding Argument stick, then, deprived of 
independent motivation for the postulation of hidden variables in logical form, Indexicalism 
must face the charge of begging the question. And the charge can be made vehemently. Neale is 
particularly scathing: “The only substantive difference between the way the [advocate of a 
pragmatic theory] sees the process of identifying the proposition expressed and the way someone 
postulating aphonic elements in syntax sees it is that the latter is just insisting that the search for 
the integration of contextual information in the interpretation process is triggered 
syntactically.”240 It gets worse in a footnote:  
In effect, then, [Stanley’s] proposal is nothing more than a pointlessly formal and 
absurdly syntactic way of saying that interpreting an utterance of, say, ‘Every philosopher 
explained several theories to every linguist’ involves identifying which class of 
philosophers, which class of theories, and which class of linguists are being talked about. 
But that is precisely what [the pragmatic theorist] has been saying all along, only without 
the syntactic palaver and dogma.
241
 
 
It’s useful to recall Borg’s reservations, and Stanley’s lack thereof, about countenancing as even 
potentially semantic the sorts of richly inferential processes involved in, say, determining the 
referent of a demonstrative pronoun. If we allow it, then we need strong arguments in favor of 
syntactic triggering to distinguish the view that such interpretation is a semantic matter from the 
view that it’s pragmatic. I’m not sure the Binding Argument is up to the task. 
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My final concern with Stanley’s program has to do with its ambition. His aim seems to be 
to maintain the traditional roles of Semantics in determining both the contents and truth-
conditions of our speech acts—of what we say or assert. Semantics, moreover, must save the 
phenomena, in that its output must correspond to our intuitions about content and truth-
conditions. “[A]ccounting for our ordinary judgments concerning the truth-conditions of various 
sentences is the central aim of semantics.”242 “What results from a successful application of [the 
semantic] stage of interpretation is a unique proposition, a fully truth-evaluable entity. 
Furthermore, if the process is successful, the proposition it yields is one the interpreter would 
recognize as the proposition expressed by [the speaker’s] assertion.”243 Now, even if we stipulate 
that Stanley has successfully accounted for some phenomena within a plausible semantic 
framework—quantifier domain restriction, relative adjectives, and a few others are explicitly 
tackled in his writings—there remains a host of others to consider. We were exposed to the 
overwhelming variety in the last chapter. Stanley is optimistic: “I… hope to provide convincing 
evidence of the promise of the project of reducing all apparent effects of context on semantic 
content to a small number of sources.”244 I don’t share Stanley’s optimism. It’s not just the sheer 
variety of phenomena to be accounted for that makes me pessimistic; it’s their evident 
unruliness. If there was one definitive result in Chapter 2, it was this: the sorts of linguistic 
constructions that exhibit apparent sensitivity to context are a motley bunch resistant to 
systematization; and even within subsets of the motley of phenomena that can be given a unified 
analysis (Q-type GCIs, for instance), our intuitions about content and truth-conditions exhibit no 
regularity. It’s these sorts of intuitions that Stanley aims to account for. But as we’ve seen, 
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there’s a prior question to be answered about how to tap into those intuitions. Should one focus 
on indirect reports of speech? This can lead to the excesses of C&L’s Speech Act Pluralism. Or 
should one only consider intuitions about truth or falsity of utterances? This approach runs the 
risk of making us blind to merely locutionary sayings, which may be intuitively more closely 
associated with literal linguistic meaning. Stanley’s use of ‘assertion’ above suggests that he’s 
more interested in illocutionary content. My hybrid approach, relying on intuitions about cases in 
which the lying/misleading distinction is salient, and which seeks to retain the virtues of both 
alternatives, also sought an illocutionary sense of ‘saying’ (only this, we saw, was suitable to 
underwrite the lying/misleading distinction), but revealed along the way that there was much of 
interest in a merely locutionary notion, and many vexing questions about the relationship 
between the two. For Stanley’s project to succeed, it must reckon with all these issues. Chapter 2 
showed that “our ordinary judgments concerning the truth-conditions of various sentences”—
accounting for which is the “central aim of semantics”—are an extraordinarily complex, subtle 
matter, with ambivalence often being the prevailing intuition. Stanley may have succeeded in 
providing a plausible syntactic/semantic account for a few phenomena—I can’t, for instance, 
imagine a scenario in which one would convey a falsehood by restricting a quantifier domain in 
one way, and then plausibly defend himself against lying by claiming to have made a claim 
involving a less-restricted domain—but the relative modesty of this achievement compared with 
his stated ambitions is thrown into sharp relief against the background of the data presented in 
Chapter 2. That’s why I’m pessimistic. 
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3.2.3 Default Semantics 
Having spent so much time considering various minimalist approaches to Semantics, it’s 
appropriate that we finish our discussion with look at a view that may as well be called Sematic 
Maximalism. Jaszczolt’s Default Semantics is such a position. She throws off the shackles of the 
first traditional condition on semantic theories—that they be constrained by syntactic 
considerations—and re-conceives Semantics as open to input from a variety of non-traditional 
sources.  
The ‘defaults’ in Default Semantics (DS, hereafter) are “salient meaning[s] intended by 
the speaker, or presumed by the addressee to have been intended, and recovered (a) without the 
help of inference from the speaker's intentions or (b) without conscious inferential process 
altogether.”245 They are the sorts of speaker-meanings that Generalized Conversational 
Implicatures are a prime example of—the sorts of implicatures that go through automatically, or 
by default. They are aspects of speaker-meaning that are assumed to be present unless the 
context is unusual in some way, such that the implicature is cancelled. For Jaszczolt, the proper 
subject matter of Semantics is not sentence-meaning, but rather (contextualized) utterance-
meaning, the primary meanings that speakers intend to convey with their utterances. The guiding 
idea is that defaults provide an important input to the determination of such meanings. 
Specifically, defaults from two sources—innate properties of the mind and background 
knowledge about the world—conspire with the outputs of other processes—computations over 
lexical meanings and syntactic structure, and certain pragmatic inferences—to deliver an 
interpretation of a speaker’s primary intended meaning. Defaults of the first kind, “cognitive 
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defaults”, include the preference for referential over attributive interpretations of definite 
descriptions, and the preference for de re over de dicto readings of propositional attitude 
ascriptions. Defaults of the second kind, “social, cultural, and world-knowledge defaults”, yield 
the following interpretations (of the a-utterance as expressing the b-proposition), for example: 
(3a) The temperature fell below -10 degrees Celsius and the lake froze.  
(3b) The temperature fell below -10 degrees Celsius and as a result the lake froze. 
and 
 (5a) A Botticelli was stolen from the Uffizi last week.  
(5b) A painting by Botticelli was stolen from the Uffizi Gallery in Florence last week.
246
 
The former default results from our knowledge of physical laws, the latter from our knowledge 
of Botticelli’s medium of choice and the nature and location of the Uffizi. The problem arising 
from the fact that not all interlocutors are likely to know where the Uffizi is, or for that matter 
who Botticelli is (or, sadly, the temperature at which water freezes) is taken care of by 
identifying the meanings under investigation as those intended and recoverable by the Model 
Speaker and Model Addressee, respectively—an idealization that allows for assumptions about 
background knowledge. Also, the fact that conscious, inferential processes are allowed to 
contribute to overall meaning on equal footing with unconscious default sources, gives the model 
flexibility to account for differences in background knowledge among different people. 
This point about the different sources of information contributing to the overall 
interpretation is important and novel, and should be emphasized. Background knowledge about 
the world, innate properties of our cognitive system, the current situation of the discourse, and 
knowledge of word meanings and syntax are all co-equal contributors to semantic content, none 
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more fundamental than the others. The sum of their contributions, the “merger representation” Σ, 
is the so-called “primary meaning” of an utterance, the main, intended meaning conveyed by the 
Model Speaker and recovered by the Model Addressee. The most novel, surprising and 
controversial claim here is that the process normally conceived of as the purely semantic one—
that which processes utterances based on knowledge of words’ meanings and syntactic 
combination—is conceived as only one process among many, and no more fundamental than the 
others. The principle of syntactic constraint on semantic content is abandoned. This, along with 
the allowance for pragmatic inference (from world knowledge, the discourse situation, etc.) as a 
contributing factor in semantic interpretation, gives us even more novel results. Jaszczolt’s 
analysis of Bach’s famous example of the mother saying, “You’re not going to die” to her son 
who’s cut himself, identifies not the usual completion ‘You’re not going to die from this cut’ as 
the content; freed from syntactic constraint, she says the primary meaning is closer to something 
like ‘There’s nothing to worry about.’247 Indeed, freed from the bonds of syntax and armed with 
the tools of pragmatic inference, Jaszczolt even allows particularized implicatures to serve as 
primary meanings: in Grice’s famous dialogue 
A: Smith doesn’t seem to have a girlfriend these days. 
B: He’s been paying a lot of visits to New York lately. 
she claims that B’s primary meaning is that Smith may have a girlfriend.248 
Now, there are a number of questions one might have about Jaszczolt’s picture, a number 
of objections that spring immediately to mind. If the gates are thus opened to pragmatic 
contributions, doesn’t everything count as semantic content? Jaszczolt’s answer is to distinguish 
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primary meaning from secondary meaning, the latter of which is extra-semantic, additional 
content conveyed over and above (or along with) primary meanings. “What about 
compositionality?” one might cry, worried that the demotion from pre-eminence of syntactical 
processing might make an account of the systematic construction of meaning impossible. 
Jaszczolt’s claims that “compositionality need not be as strict as the traditional truth-conditional 
semantics requires” and insists that if one “places the methodological requirement of 
compositionality on the representation of utterance meaning rather than sentence meaning” the 
way is open to predicate compositionality of “of merger representations – the Σs of primary 
meanings of utterances, as intended by Model Speakers and recovered by Model Addressees” 
while admitting that, given the processes that inform such constructions, “semantic composition 
is necessarily largely ‘pragmaticky’….”249 One might also worry about cancellability: what 
distinguishes pragmatic content from semantic, according to the original Gricean picture, is that 
the former can be felicitously cancelled; even opponents of the basic Gricean approach admit as 
much, must account for the phenomenon. But if we allow cancellable content to be a part of 
semantic content, what are we to make of the phenomenon? Jaszczolt argues at length in her 
2009, marshalling various examples, that in fact the data more clearly indicate that the 
cancellability criterion corresponds to the primary/secondary meaning distinction than to the old 
Gricean distinction between what is said and what is implicated; primary meanings, even if 
they’re implicatures in the classic sense, resist cancellation more strongly than what is allegedly 
explicitly said. 
I don’t want to get into the details of all these objections and replies and assess their 
merits (or demerits). I’ll just note that DS is a novel, surprising, and controversial view, at 
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significant odds with many well-developed extant accounts in the literature, and that Jaszczolt 
has a difficult task in defending it. But maybe she can. My personal concern, from the point of 
view of the present work, is the effect of Jaszczolt’s re-conceiving of Semantics on the 
distinction between lying and misleading. For her results are deeply at odds with many of the 
intuitions we relied on in Chapter 2. Let’s consider a paradigmatic example of merely misleading 
(as opposed to lying): I and my wife are driving home from an all-too-rare night on the town, 
during the course of which we got rather carried away, booze-wise, so that we’re both drunk; my 
wife, let’s suppose, is a prominent politician, for whom a DUI conviction would be disastrous; I, 
on the other hand, am a low-level philosophy teacher, for whom a DUI, while inconvenient, 
would not be seriously disruptive, career-wise; it is therefore decided that I should do the 
driving. We get pulled over, and the patrolman comes to the car window and asks me whether 
I’ve been drinking tonight. I make a nod in my wife’s direction and say, “She’s been drinking 
tonight; that’s why I’m driving.” The way I understand it, DS would say that my primary 
meaning in this context would be something like, ‘I have not been drinking’ (remember, we’re 
not considering actual speakers’ intentions, but idealized Model Speakers’; in this example, I’m 
not a model of anything). This is a particularized implicature, according to the traditional 
analysis; according to DS, it’s the semantic content of my utterance. Here’s the problem. My 
intuition is that what I said to the patrolman is, strictly speaking, true; I didn’t lie, but I did 
mislead. But Jaszczolt makes the falsehood I conveyed the semantic content of my utterance—its 
very meaning. This is a serious tension: the meaning of my utterance is a falsehood, but I have a 
strong intuition that what I said was true, that I didn’t lie. This, for me, is the most serious 
drawback of re-conceiving Semantics as broadly as DS does. It renders the common practice of 
distinguishing between lying and merely misleading incomprehensible. Implicit in all of our 
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explorations so far has been a conception of Semantics according to which it provides the 
fallback position of the mere misleader—or at least, the point toward which a stricter 
interpretation of his utterance tends. If we adopt DS, we must abandon this conception; there is 
no semantic redoubt to which the misleader can retreat. This would involve conceiving of lying 
much more broadly, so that the example above and the other examples of mere misleading in 
Chapter 2, feature lying instead. All deceptive speech acts become lies. This is perhaps a way of 
putting a finer point on the concern raised above: if we re-conceive Semantics so broadly, it’s not 
really Semantics anymore; to borrow Jaszczolt’s word, it becomes too “pragmaticky.” If such a 
move does such violence to so commonplace a distinction as that between lying and misleading, 
then perhaps we should not make it. 
It is not an impossible move to make, though. We just need to redefine ‘lying’—or, I 
should say, since we haven’t explicitly defined lying, relying instead on rather hazy intuitions 
about the concept, we need to adopt an expansive definition of lying, of which there are many in 
the literature. It is to an exploration of this literature on how to define lying, and how different 
definitions are compatible with different positions in the philosophical literature(s) we’ve been 
exploring, that we now turn. 
 
 
   
 168 
4.0  LYING, ASSERTING, MORALITY, AND THE LAW 
So far, we’ve been preoccupied with theoretical issues in the philosophy of language and 
linguistics. But our focus on the lying/misleading distinction naturally leads us to consider a 
variety of other philosophical questions, as well. For example, we have not yet, as just noted, 
given any sort of definition of lying, relying instead on our pre-theoretical intuitions about the 
concept. There is, however, a vast literature on the question of how best to define ‘lie’, and it 
would be well for us to examine it. We will start with the most common dictionary definition, 
and look at various minor and major revisions to it, evaluating each in turn. Consideration of 
these will highlight a lacuna in the literature: while it’s often said that lying is a kind of 
(insincere) asserting, rarely are such pronouncements accompanied by any sort of rigorous 
account of that speech act. There are, though, many to choose from in the rich literature on 
assertion. In the second section of the chapter, I will start to fill this gap in the literature on lying, 
by examining various accounts of assertion and asking how well they account for our focal 
phenomena. I identify one account in particular (due to Robert Brandom) that seems best suited 
to the job. After this, in the third section, we will consider another issue that arises quite naturally 
when one begins to think about the lying/misleading distinction: what is its moral significance? 
This is too large a topic to deal with adequately in the space we have, but it’s a topic we’d be 
remiss in ignoring. We’ll deal with it briefly, in light of a proposed expansion of the definition of 
lying to include what we’ve been referring to as merely misleading acts. This definition has some 
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support in the literature, but is obviously at odds with the usage we’ve adopted. We’ll see that, 
absent compelling linguistic arguments for making this change, the rationale must include the 
claim that there is no moral difference between lying and misleading. The alternative case—that 
the lying/misleading distinction is morally significant—turns out to be surprisingly difficult to 
make. Finally, as a purely practical matter, the lying/misleading distinction does have legal 
significance. The legal definition of perjury, for example, sets a very high standard, one that only 
lies—in a narrow, not-merely-misleading sense—meet. The Supreme Court has ruled explicitly, 
in Bronston, that a false implicature cannot subject a defendant to conviction on perjury charges. 
Some legal scholars have argued that the Bronston case was wrongly decided; others support the 
ruling. In the last section of this chapter, we will bring to bear any insights we’ve acquired so far 
on this debate. We’ll examine the Bronston decision, as well as a prominent, more recent, case 
involving a deceptive political advertisement by a member of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. 
 
4.1 THE DEFINITION OF LYING 
In his 2008(b), Mahon identifies what he calls “the most common definition of lying”: 
To lie =df to make a believed-false statement to another person with the intention that that 
other person believe that statement to be true.
250
 
 
This definition is meant to be an improvement over the dictionary (OED) definition of lying, 
according to which a lie is “a false statement made with the intent to deceive.” This OED 
definition needs improving because it is subject to a number of counterexamples. First, there are 
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cases in which the conditions are not met, but which are intuitively instances of lying. Siegler 
1966 considers the situation faced by the character Pablo in Sartre’s story The Wall, who was 
captured by the authorities and questioned about the whereabouts of his comrade Gris. Pablo 
tells them Gris is hiding in the cemetery, trying to throw them off his trail, as he believes Gris to 
be somewhere else. It turns out Gris actually was in the cemetery (and tragic consequences 
ensue), but the intuition is that Pablo’s statement was still a lie, despite its truth; what’s crucial is 
that he believed that it was false. In addition, there are cases which meet the conditions of the 
dictionary definition, but intuitively are not lies: suppose my neighbor, the lousy cook, has 
invited me over for lunch the following day; to get out of it, I tell him that I have an important 
meeting that day, a claim that I believe to be true, but which is intended to mislead my neighbor, 
since the meeting is very early in the morning and would be over in plenty of time for me to 
come over for lunch. Now, suppose further that I was mistaken about the meeting: had I checked 
my e-mail, I’d have known that it had been rescheduled for the following week. Hence, the 
statement I made to my neighbor is, in fact, false—and since my intention in making it was to 
deceive, I have lied according to the dictionary definition. But there is a strong intuition (among 
many) that since I believe that what I was saying was true, it can’t count as a lie.251 A second 
counterexample of this type involves eavesdroppers: suppose I’m a criminal, and I know the 
cops have tapped my phone; I may try to throw them off by calling up a co-conspirator (he’s in 
on the deception) and saying, “I’ll meet you at the hideout at noon.” Neither of us has any 
intention of being anywhere near the hideout at noon (in fact, we’re planning to lam it); I said 
what I did to get the police to have false beliefs. But since they weren’t the (ostensible) audience 
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of my utterance, many have the intuition that I didn’t lie to them; and since I certainly didn’t lie 
to my co-conspirator, there’s no lie in this case.252 
One can challenge this “most common” definition of lying in a number of ways, some 
more radical than others. One quite radical objection, which we may as well start with, if only 
because it’s the hoariest, comes from philosophers whose moral convictions dictate that lying be 
wrong by definition—that it be an analytic truth that it’s always, indefeasibly morally wrong to 
lie. Accounts of this kind are often motivated by an adherence to background religious traditions 
which feature exceptionless proscriptions on lying, and so among the philosophical elaborations 
of such positions are some of quite antique vintage: Augustine, Aquinas, Grotius, and Kant are 
prominent historical figures in this tradition. The principal challenge to the advocate of an 
exceptionless prohibition of lying is the commonplace intuition that in some cases, it is morally 
permissible to lie—to spare someone’s feelings or to prevent some evil act. Kant (in)famously 
bites the bullet on this point, maintaining that it is impermissible to lie even to a murderer at 
one’s door, inquiring as to the whereabouts of one’s friend, whom he intends to murder.253 To 
avoid these sorts of unintuitive consequences of their view, theorists of this sort must carefully 
define lying so that the apparent counterexamples to the universal proscription turn out not to be 
lies at all. Thus, Grotius’ definition (as glossed by Mahon): 
To lie =df to make a believed-false statement to another person, with the intention that 
that other person believe that statement to be true, violating that person's right of liberty 
of judgment, with the intention to harm that other person.
254
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This definition builds in the wrongness of lying, with the violation of the victim’s rights and the 
intention to harm her, while leaving an out: certain listeners are not entitled to the truth, so that 
deceiving them with falsehoods does not violate their “right of liberty of judgment,” and hence is 
not lying. The murderer’s right of liberty of judgment is over-ridden by “the opposition of 
another right which, in the common judgement of all men, is much more cogent.”255 
I’m not in favor of defining lying in this way. The first, to me most persuasive, reason not 
to is that it conflicts with standard, everyday usage of the term. Every child is familiar with the 
idea of a “white lie”—a kind of deception-via-falsehood that is morally permissible for whatever 
reason (it spares someone’s feelings, it’s harmless, etc.), but is nevertheless a lie. The difference 
between me and the advocate of an exceptionless proscription of lying is merely terminological, 
in this sense: we both agree that giving the murderer at the door false information is morally 
permissible (with the possible exception of Kant, but see Mahon 2009); we just disagree about 
whether to call this act a ‘lie’. And since my terminological choice is in keeping with standard 
usage, it is to be preferred. A second reason to avoid the hard-line on lying is that the standard 
move to avoid counterexamples—in those cases, the listener isn’t entitled to the truth anyway, so 
it’s not a lie—is not always available. Consider a typical white lie: suppose I’ve severely injured 
myself by carelessly operating a piece household maintenance equipment; when I get home from 
the hospital, my neighbor has thoughtfully prepared food for me and my family. The dish in 
question, though, is gumbo, and, unbeknownst to my neighbor, we’re all allergic to shellfish; so I 
give the entire pot to my brother-in-law. When my neighbor asks me if we enjoyed the gumbo, I 
lie and tell her that we did, that it was delicious. She obviously went to a lot of trouble; what’s 
the point of telling her the truth? My lie seems morally permissible. Disanalogy: my neighbor is 
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not a murderer at the door. She doesn’t have evil intentions that deprive her of her “right of 
liberty of judgment”; she’s just as entitled to the truth as anyone else. So, unless we want to bite 
the bullet and claim that I did wrong on this occasion, we would need an alternative explanation, 
possibly involving a different definition, for why this is not a genuine lie. Perhaps we could 
provide such, but why bother? This conception of lying is already inconsistent with conventional 
usage; adding further complications can only make things worse. 
 Less radical criticisms of the “most common” definition of lying come from the 
consideration of a variety of supposed counterexamples, with various authors reporting 
conflicting intuitions and adding or subtracting necessary conditions from the definition 
accordingly. So, for example, I’m not sure I share Siegler’s intuition about the case of Pablo 
from The Wall. Part of me wants to say he thought he was lying, but he was mistaken; he was 
actually telling the truth. (Or: he tried to lie to his captors, but, tragically and ironically, failed.) 
I’m inclined to embrace Thomas Carson’s view: “Showing that a statement is true is always 
sufficient to counter the accusation that one has told a lie.”256 Imagining defenses against lying-
accusations is of course in line with my own methodology, and it helps crystallize my intuition in 
the Pedro case: it would be odd indeed for the authorities to return from killing Gris in the 
cemetery and accuse Pedro of lying. Given these intuitions, I would add a necessary condition to 
the most common definition to the effect that the statement must be false (retaining the condition 
that it must also be believed-false, to handle the case of misfired misleading discussed above; I 
find it hard to argue with the Costanza Doctrine: it’s not a lie if you believe it257). 
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I don’t think very much of importance hangs on my preference for a falsity condition, 
though. I don’t begrudge others their conflicting intuitions, and I suspect such disagreements are 
unlikely to be settled by argument. Lots of the moves and counter-moves in the debate over the 
definition of lying strike me as concerning similarly minor issues, concerning non-standard 
scenarios about which intuitions might be expected to vary from person to person. So, for 
example, Roderick Chisholm and Thomas Feehan take it to be a virtue of their account that it 
accommodates the intuition (shared by Augustine, from whom they borrow the example) that the 
following scenario does not involve lying: Harry is about to take a trip down a road on which, 
Sally believes, there are bandits; Sally is concerned about Harry’s safety, but since the two have 
just had a quarrel, Sally knows that Harry will distrust anything she says; so Sally tells Harry that 
there are no bandits on the road. This is not a lie, according to Chisholm and Feehan, because, 
while Sally disbelieves her statement, and is in some sense being deceptive (outwardly 
misrepresenting her actual beliefs), she has not (according to their definition of ‘assertion’) 
asserted that there are no bandits, since a necessary condition on genuine assertions is that the 
speaker state a proposition under conditions which she believes justify the hearer in believing 
that she accepts the proposition. The conditions of Sally’s statement are not like this: she knows 
that Harry distrusts her, so she does not think that Harry will believe that she accepts the 
proposition that there are no bandits; in fact, she’s counting on uptake to the contrary. Since 
asserting is necessary for lying, and there is no assertion in this case, Chisholm and Feehan 
conclude that there is no lie.
258
 
If all that seemed confusing, that’s because it is. Chisholm and Feehan themselves have 
trouble keeping track of the relevant features of the situation. At one point they say: “[Sally] has 
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acted with the intention of deceiving [Harry]; for, while believing that there are bandits on the 
road, [s]he has acted with the intention of causing [Harry] to believe that [s]he, [Sally], believes 
that there are no bandits on the road.”259 But that’s not right: Sally knows that Harry doesn’t trust 
her, so she can’t intend to cause him to believe that she thinks there are no bandits by saying that 
very thing. Sally is being deceptive here, but not in the way Chisholm and Feehan describe. 
Probably, they describe it that way—in terms of Sally’s intentions with respect to affecting 
Harry’s beliefs—because that description fits neatly with their rather convoluted definition of 
assertion. One counts as genuinely asserting what one states just in case the conditions are such 
that he believes that they justify the hearer believing that (i) the speaker accepts the proposition 
he states, and (ii) the speaker intends to “contribute causally” to the hearer’s coming to believe 
that he (the speaker) accepts the proposition.
260
 So Sally is deceptive, on the incorrect description 
of the scenario, because she believes one thing and acts with intention of causing Harry to 
believe that she believes its negation (though, again, she hasn’t lied because she hasn’t asserted: 
she doesn’t believe the conditions are such as to justify appropriate beliefs by Harry). 
I dwell on this example not to belabor Chisholm and Feehan, but because it highlights 
some key features of the literature on the definition of lying. First, many of the scenarios 
considered are so atypical that I’m not sure what my intuitions are. Did Sally lie to Harry above? 
I don’t know what to say. She said something she didn’t believe, and she was being deceptive, 
but then again…. Is it possible, in general, for someone who lacks the trust of one’s audience to 
lie to them? Those who insist on countenancing so-called bald-faced lies—where both speaker 
and hearer know that the claim is false—would say yes. But this situation differs from those, in 
that the falsity is not out in the open. In fact, there is no falsity in the actual utterance: the 
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intention of the speaker is to cause the listener to believe the very claim made. Can there be a lie 
in such a case? I suspect opinions are likely to vary on these questions, and on the status of many 
of the other sorts of examples and counterexamples discussed in this literature. All of which 
makes one wonder what the point is of focusing on such non-standard scenarios in the first place, 
and doubt whether it’s possible to articulate a set of necessary and sufficient conditions capable 
of capturing the concept of lying. Might we not be better off considering more prototypical cases 
and asking what they have in common?  
This is the view of Linda Coleman and Paul Kay, who argue that ‘lie’ should be given a 
“prototype semantics” according to which the “applicability of a word to a thing is in general 
NOT a matter of 'yes or no', but rather of 'more or less'.”261 Rather than having as its meaning a 
set of necessary and sufficient conditions, “[t]he meaning of the word lie ('prevaricate') consists 
in a cognitive prototype to which various real or imagined events may correspond in varying 
degrees.”262 There are certain features that prototypical cases of lying share—according to 
Coleman and Kay, a prototypical lie is an assertion of a proposition (i) that is false and (ii) 
believed to be false, with (iii) the intention to deceive the listener—and to the extent that various 
scenarios lack one or more of these, they will be less of a lie. Coleman and Kay present the 
results of an experiment to back up their claims: they presented subjects with eight fictional 
scenarios, from the prototypical lie in which all three conditions are present, to the prototypical 
instance of truth-telling, in which none of them are present—and then every possibility in 
between, in which some of the conditions are present and others are not; subjects were asked to 
rate the scenarios on a lie/non-lie scale, and the results were consistent with Coleman and Kay’s 
expectations—for example, that scenarios in which one doesn’t expect to deceive with one’s 
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falsehood, or those in which one seeks to deceive with a truth, score somewhere on the scale 
between the prototypical lie and truthfulness. 
The very idea of prototype semantics, of course, raises a whole host of difficult questions 
in philosophy of language and mind (So Semantics must be use-based? What sorts of cognitive 
structures correspond to prototypes? What about compositionality? Etc.), and is controversial, to 
say the least. This is not the place to debate the merits and demerits of the overall approach to 
word-meaning. But if we set these larger issues to one side, we can perhaps draw some lessons 
from Coleman and Kay’s results—and suggest ways in which they might be expanded and 
improved upon.  
The first thing to note is that the results are consistent with some of the reservations about 
particular cases that we have registered already. They present a story with the same features as 
the Pablo example from The Wall, in which the speaker intends to deceive by asserting a 
proposition she believes to be false, but which turns out to be true. Subjects have mixed feelings 
about the example, scoring it a 5.17 on a 7-point scale (where 7 is an outright lie), consistent 
with my own reservations, and suggesting perhaps that the case for abandoning the falsity 
condition is not as clear as some authors have suggested. They do not, however, present a story 
with the same features as the Harry and Sally example, in which the speaker utters a falsehood 
that she disbelieves, and intends to deceive (so that all three of Coleman and Kay’s conditions 
are apparently met), but intends to deceive in a non-standard way—i.e., not about the content of 
the proposition uttered, but about her beliefs. Perhaps Coleman and Kay would agree with 
Chisholm and Feehan that this is not even a genuine case of assertion, so that it doesn’t even 
merit consideration as a potential lie (Coleman and Kay are explicit that lies are a type of 
assertion), but since they don’t give us an account of assertion, it’s hard to tell. We’ll return to 
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this issue (the importance of an account of assertion) below. Anyway, I’d be curious to see where 
subjects would put that case on the 7-point scale.  
Another thing to note about the results is that the case closest to the concerns of the 
present work—in which the speaker tells the truth with the intention to deceive—is also one 
about which subjects report mixed feelings. It rates 3.48 on the non-lie/lie scale—slightly closer 
to telling the truth than lying. It’s a classic case of false (particularized) implicature: 
John and Mary have recently started going together. Valentino is Mary's ex-boyfriend. 
One evening John asks Mary, 'Have you seen Valentino this week?' Mary answers, 
'Valentino's been sick with mononucleosis for the past two weeks.' Valentino has in fact 
been sick with mononucleosis for the past two weeks, but it is also the case that Mary had 
a date with Valentino the night before. Did Mary lie?
263
 
 
I think the subjects’ overall ambivalence about this example is telling—both about our concept 
of lying and about Coleman and Kay’s methodology. After each story in the survey, subjects 
were presented with the following choices: “It was {a lie / not a lie / I can't say}. I am {very sure 
/ fairly sure / not too sure} most others would agree with the choice I just circled.”264 If the 
subject circles “I can’t say”, then the story gets scored a 4 regardless of how sure she is that 
others would agree; if “not a lie” is circled as the first choice, then the story gets a 1, 2, or 3, 
depending on certainty (1 for most certain, 3 for least); and if “a lie” is circled, the scores are 5, 
6, or 7 depending on certainty (with 7 corresponding to the highest degree of certainty). Again, 
this false-implicature story got an overall score of 3.48—on the non-lie side, but close to 
maximum ambivalence. But there are a number of ways a story could get such an overall score:; 
lots of people could respond with “I can’t say”, along with a few rather tepid endorsements of 
non-lie, providing evidence of widespread ambivalence; or, the subjects could be almost evenly 
split between those who think it’s a lie and are confident others will agree, and those who think it 
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isn’t and are also confident in their judgment. Alas, Coleman and Kay don’t provide a complete 
breakdown on the results, but they do tell us that, among the 67 total subjects, 7 responded “I 
can’t say”, with 42 calling it a non-lie and only 18 calling it a lie. So there’s pretty overwhelming 
support for calling this a non-lie; though from the fact that the score ends up so close to 4 we can 
infer that there’s not a whole lot of confidence in that judgment. I’d be curious to see if this is a 
case in which people’s intuitions could be “sensitized”, as Bach once put it.265 That is, I wonder 
what the results would be if subjects were given three choices: lie, truthful claim, and misleading 
claim—after being exposed to examples of the last. Since it is such an everyday notion, my guess 
is that after it was made salient, most people would agree that Mary misled rather than lied.  
This suggests a way that Coleman and Kay’s results might be made more robust—by 
discarding the overly simple bipolar distinction between lie and non-lie, or by making a 
particular kind of non-lie (misleading with the truth) salient. With this kind of foundation, the 
natural way to extend this kind of study is to focus on the sorts of cases encountered in Chapter 
2, in which we encountered what appeared to be a range of intuitions about the particular kind of 
case—misleading with the truth—represented in Coleman and Kay’s John and Mary story. It 
might be revealing to probe subjects’ intuitions about various scenarios involving false GCIs, 
implicitures, explicatures, etc. This gets to what I consider a more fundamental issue raised by 
consideration of the differences between lies and non-lies: what portion of a speaker’s intended 
communication counts as genuinely asserted, as opposed to merely implicated or implied? 
Coleman and Kay, and most other participants in the debate over how to define lying, bracket 
this question (if they consider it at all), focusing instead, for example, on whether the intent to 
deceive is a necessary condition for lying, or whether one’s statement must be false. My focus is 
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more radical: what’s the content that we’re evaluating for truth or falsity? How is it separated 
from other contents conveyed in a speech act? It’s no surprise that subjects exhibit ambivalence 
about a false implicature, since these sorts of difficult questions are in the background and 
unaddressed. I suggest bringing them to the fore. 
 
4.2 ASSERTION 
 
Such a move means addressing head on an issue that has only lately been given much attention 
in the literature on defining ‘lie’: what kind of a speech act is it? It is often averred that lying is a 
kind of assertion.
266
 Rarely, however, are these averments accompanied by any kind of detailed 
account of this speech act.
267
 Often, definitions of lying seem to ignore distinctions among 
various speech acts.
268
  Lately there has been a shift toward taking more seriously the question of 
just what constitutes an assertion. This is, in my view, a salutary development, since, as I’ve 
noted, I think the deepest issue one confronts when trying to circumscribe the concept of lying is 
the problem of specifying precisely what (false, believed-false, etc.) content the liar is being held 
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responsible for; that is, if lying is to be a kind of assertion, we must say what it takes for a 
proposition to count as being asserted. And this is a difficult task, as the results of Chapter 2 
demonstrate: speakers communicate much with their speech acts, and it’s hard to say which part 
of this they are fully responsible for the truthfulness of.  
The shift in the literature toward taking assertion more seriously has been occasioned by 
the consideration of a particular kind of purported counterexample to the most common 
definition of lying—so-called “bald-faced” lies.269 One tells a bald-faced lie when one states a 
falsehood, the falsity of which is common knowledge to both speaker and hearer. One of 
Carson’s examples (modified slightly to add color) is illustrative: consider a (reluctant) eye-
witness at the murder trial of a notorious mafioso; he witnessed this gangster killing someone, 
but he knows that if he testifies to that effect, there will be swift and terrible retribution from the 
Family. So he gets on the stand and tells the jury that he didn’t see anything; he wasn’t even at 
the scene of the crime—he was in, uh, Buffalo at the time. Yeah, Buffalo. Suppose further that 
the jury had just viewed video evidence (surveillance footage from the parking garage in which 
the assassination occurred) clearly showing the witness at the scene. So everybody knows that 
what the witness is saying is false—he could even be brought up on perjury charges (bad, but 
better that than “sleeping with the fishes”)—and the witness knows that everybody knows his 
claim is false; he doesn’t think he’s fooling anyone. The intuition is that it’s nevertheless 
appropriate to say that he’s lying. Thus, contrary to the most common definition, the liar needn’t 
intend to deceive his audience. Various alterations to the definition are proposed in the literature. 
Carson, for example, proposes that one lies when one (insincerely) warrants the truth of a 
falsehood. Roy Sorenson objects that this definition fails to account for bald-faced lies, because 
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those take place only in contexts in which it’s impossible to warrant the truth of the false 
statement: “One can warrant p only if p might be the case. When the falsehood of p is common 
knowledge, no party to the common knowledge can warrant p because p is epistemically 
impossible.”270 Sorenson counters with a pleasingly spare definition of lying, according to which 
it amounts simply to asserting what one believes to be false, but, as Carson points out, “the 
plausibility of this definition depends on his account of asserting a proposition.”271 And Sorenson 
doesn’t provide much of an account. He says only that an assertion must have “narrow 
plausibility,” so that “someone who only had access to the assertion might believe it,” as 
opposed to “wide plausibility,” i.e., “credibility relative to one’s total evidence.”272 Noting that 
this isn’t a whole lot to go on, Carson takes up the challenge to more fully explicate his notion of 
warranting the truth of a statement, saying that it involves “promising or guaranteeing that it is 
true” and “invit[ing] others to trust it or rely on it.”273 Don Fallis adopts Sorenson’s definition 
(lying = asserting what is believed-false), and provides a gloss of assertion in Gricean terms: 
“[Y]ou assert something when you say something and you believe that Paul Grice’s first maxim 
of quality (viz., “Do not say what you believe to be false”) is in effect as a norm of 
conversation.”274 
These are all moves in the right direction, toward taking more seriously the task of 
specifying just what kind of speech act lying is. It’s usually said to be a kind of assertion, and 
some attempts are being made to spell out what that means. These attempts, though, tend not to 
make contact with the large and mature literature on the very question of what constitutes an 
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assertion. As a result, they fail to deal adequately with the very difficult questions raised by our 
investigations in Chapter 2: Under what conditions are the things we say genuinely asserted? 
What sense of ‘saying’ is operative here? That term can be used more or less minimally. It is a 
commonplace that we communicate more that we say; is any of this additional content part of 
what we assert, and if so, what criteria do we use to determine that it is? And so on.  
The need to attend to such issues is nicely illustrated by a critique of Fallis’ definition by 
Andreas Stokke. In the course of his criticism, Stokke makes many of the same points about 
saying that were established in Chapter 2. Fallis freely admits that, on the face of it, ironic 
utterances appear to be counterexamples to his definition of lying—cases in which all three 
conditions (saying something, believing it false, and believing Grice’s first maxim of quality is in 
effect) are met, but in which there is no lie. He considers a sarcastic line delivered by the 
character Han Solo in the movie Star Wars: after he and some others, on another character’s 
suggestion, have escaped danger by sliding down a garbage chute, Solo remarks, “The garbage 
chute was a really wonderful idea. What an incredible smell you’ve discovered!” Solo thinks it’s 
false that the garbage chute was a wonderful idea—indeed, that is what he intends to convey 
with his utterance—and there’s no apparent reason to think Grice’s maxims aren’t in effect. And 
yet he’s obviously not lying. Fallis notes that this case can be analyzed as a conversational 
implicature, in which the speaker succeeds in conveying something other than what he has 
literally said by openly flouting one of the maxims. Fallis says that in this case Solo is not lying 
because the relevant Gricean maxim, having been flouted, is not in effect: “I contend that, by 
flouting this norm of conversation, Solo turns it off.”275 As Stokke points out, this analysis 
reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the way in which implicatures are supposed to arise. 
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Flouting maxims doesn’t “turn them off.” On the contrary, that the maxims are in effect is one of 
the premises a hearer must rely on to make the appropriate inferences in cases of implicature; she 
infers from the presumption that the speaker is being cooperative—from the presumption that the 
maxims are in effect—to the conclusion that he intends to convey something other than what he 
says. Stokke does a nice job of explicating the inference in the case of Solo’s utterance (note that 
“FMQ” abbreviates ‘First Maxim of Quality’): 
(a) Solo said that the garbage chute was a wonderful idea. 
(b) Solo believes that the garbage chute was a bad idea. 
(c) Solo is observing FMQ. 
(d) Unless Solo intended to convey that the garbage chute was a bad idea, he would 
not be observing FMQ. 
(e) Therefore, Solo intended to convey that the garbage chute was a bad idea.
276
  
 
So Fallis cannot say that, in cases of irony, FMQ is not in effect; according to his definition, 
then, such remarks count as lies. The only other option available to rescue the definition is to 
deny that ironic utterances count as genuine sayings. There is Gricean precedent for this: as we 
noted in Chapter 2, for Grice, what we mean is factorable, without remainder, into what we say 
and what we implicate; saying something thus entails meaning it. We don’t mean the literal 
contents of ironic utterances, so we don’t say them; rather, we “make as if to say” them. Putting 
the point in terms we’re familiar with: the sense of ‘saying’ according to which the literal content 
of ironic utterance counts as having been said is a more minimal, merely locutionary sense; 
Grice’s conception of saying is a more robust, illocutionary one. As Stokke points out, the 
adoption of this Gricean sense of ‘saying’, while it allows Fallis to deny that Solo’s utterance is a 
lie, is still not an option, since it opens the door to another counterexample in the form of bald-
                                                 
276
 Stokke 2013(a), p. 4 [My references are based on pagination of a copy of the paper available on Stokke’s 
website: http://andreasstokke.net/] 
   
 185 
faced lies, which Fallis also wants his definition to capture.
277
 On Grice’s view, we mean what 
we say, and meaning is analyzed in terms of reflexive intentions: a speaker means something iff 
he intends the audience to believe it, by way of recognizing that very intention. The intention to 
cause belief is the key: bald-faced liars have no such intention, and so in a Gricean framework 
they can’t count as meaning, and hence saying, the falsity they utter. If Fallis adopts this more 
expansive conception of saying, bald-faced liars don’t count as having lied. This is Stokke’s 
observation; I would add another: the proposal being considered is that Fallis adopt the strong, 
illocutionary Gricean sense of ‘saying’ as part of his definition of assertion. But to do so, great 
care must be taken to avoid circularity. Self-consciously following the Gricean tradition, Bach 
and Harnish 1979 define assertion in terms of reflexive intentions much the same as Grice 
defines his sense of saying; indeed, they list ‘say’ as a synonym for ‘assert’.278 So if Fallis were 
to adopt this notion of ‘saying’, as Stokke suggests is a possibility, then it looks as though he’d 
just be defining assertion in terms of itself. To avoid that, he’d need a way of distinguishing 
illocutionary saying from asserting; not an impossible task, perhaps (it’s a slightly weaker act in 
some sense?), but not one Fallis seems equipped to take on. 
Stokke extracts, I think, the proper lesson from the failure of Fallis’ ad hoc definition of 
assertion: if we need to define asserting before we can define lying, then why not look to one of 
the well-developed accounts of assertion to be found in the vast literature on that speech act? 
Stokke opts for an account inspired by that of Robert Stalnaker: to assert something is to (i) say 
it, and (ii) propose to add it to the conversational common ground.
279
 This common ground is a 
body of information available to conversational participants, a background against which the 
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conversation develops—where development involves updating this body of information, 
typically with the contents of assertions, but also, for example, with contents which much be 
presupposed for an utterance to be felicitous (if I assert that the aliens who designed the 
pyramids had almond-shaped eyes, the common ground may have to be updated to include the 
presuppositions that there were such aliens, and that they designed the pyramids). 
Stokke notes that we must be careful about how we define the common ground, lest the 
definition of lying it’s meant to underwrite succumb to counterexamples. It seems natural to say 
that the common ground is a shared set of beliefs, and so an assertion is a proposal to add to this 
set of beliefs. But bald-faced liars do not propose to add a belief to the common ground; they and 
their audience disbelieve the content of the lie, and everybody knows this. So, following 
Stalnaker (who had distinct reasons for making this move), Stokke defines the common ground 
in terms of a non-factive attitude weaker than belief: acceptance. Interlocutors can accept 
propositions that they’re unsure of, or that they know or believe to be false (as is sometimes 
required to facilitate conversational smoothness). The common ground, then, is a body of 
mutually accepted information, available to all conversational participants. 
Stokke’s definition of lying in terms of the common ground conception of assertion is 
this:  
S lies to X if and only if 
(L1) S says that p to X, and 
(L2) S proposes that p become common ground, and 
(L3) S believes that p is false.
280
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He argues that this definition is able to handle all the standard cases in the literature. An ironic 
utterance, for example, will be one for which the first and third conditions are met—one says 
something one believes to be false—but for which the second condition is not: we do not propose 
to update the common ground with the believed-false content (Solo does not propose that he, 
Luke, Leia, and Chewbacca all accept that the garbage chute was a good idea). The definition 
correctly rules out cases of false implicature (acts of misleading, in our terms), Stokke claims, 
since in such cases the falsity does not count as having been said—it is merely implicated. And 
the definition is able correctly to handle bald-faced lies, as they meet all of the conditions, thanks 
to the characterization of the common ground in terms of acceptance rather than belief. 
 So Stokke’s definition appears to do what it needs to. There are, however, complications, 
which Stokke notes and addresses, with varying degrees of success. First, Stokke discovers the 
same difficulty that occupied us for most of Chapter 2: it’s hard to pin down precisely the notion 
of ‘saying’ we need to capture intuitions about lying. It must not be so robust that we end up 
counting genuine cases of mere misleading as lies (that is, it must not include certain clear cases 
of false implicature); and yet it cannot be so minimal as to only count truth-conditional content 
as having been said, for in that case we miss capturing some intuitive lies. Here Stokke is 
dipping his toes into murky waters, the imponderable depths of which we explored in Chapter 2. 
Stokke’s first example of non-truth-conditional content that should be counted as part of what is 
said involves conventional implicature: we imagine an utterance of ‘Ames, who stole from the 
FBI, is now behind bars’, which conventionally implicates that Ames stole from the FBI; if we 
suppose that Ames is in fact behind bars, but that he did not steal from the FBI, Stokke reports 
that his intuition is that we should nevertheless count this utterance as a lie.
281
 I agree with the 
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intuition, but disagree with the conclusion he draws from the case: “I take this to be in favor of a 
line… according to which conventional implicatures are part of what is said…. Since 
conventional implicatures are clearly proposed for common ground inclusion, the Common 
Ground Definition would therefore count cases [in which they are false] as lies, in accordance 
with this intuition.”282 It’s a hasty generalization to conclude, on the basis of this one example, 
that conventional implicatures are part of what is said—and that if they’re false, utterances 
giving rise to them ought to count as lies. We briefly discussed conventional implicatures above 
(§2.5.3), asking whether they ought to be part of what is said. The results were mixed, because 
conventional implicatures are a motley bunch: there seemed to be a stronger case for including 
the implicata arising from ‘therefore’ as part of what is said; the case for those arising from ‘but’ 
was much weaker. I’m sure that a detailed examination of a wider variety of conventional 
implicatures would reveal the same sort of variability of intuitions that by now we’ve become 
inured to; cases like Stokke’s will seem clearly to be part of what is said, others clearly not, with 
many more falling in the grey area in between. And of course, consideration of conventional 
implicatures as candidates for inclusion in ‘what is said’ is only the beginning. As we saw, GCIs, 
implicitures, explicatures, and the like provide countless examples of subtle phenomena, the 
correct classification of which with respect to ‘saying’ resists tidy solutions. This is a concern 
about Stokke’s overall approach: while he’s given a more precise, theoretically robust 
specification of assertion (in terms of the common ground), there still remains significant 
uncertainty about what contents count as asserted in particular cases, for the fuzziness of the 
concept of saying so thoroughly documented in Chapter 2 remains. Now perhaps there’s not 
much one can do about this; there are all sorts of unavoidably vague distinctions, and that 
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between what is said and what is otherwise communicated may be one of them. But it would be 
an extremely attractive feature of a definition of assertion (and a definition of lying in terms of 
it), if it could at least provide some guidance for making judgments in difficult borderline 
cases—or if not guidance, exactly, at least more basic definitional concepts about which we’re 
likely to have robust intuitions, intuitions that dovetail with those about judgments we make 
further downstream, such as whether or not a certain speech act counts as a lie. If Chapter 2 
proved nothing else, it’s that our intuitions about saying are a bit of a mess in this respect. And 
the other more basic concept in Stokke’s definition—the common ground—doesn’t seem likely 
to be much help either: it’s a set of mutually accepted (not believed) propositions; our speech 
acts are proposals to update it. The notion of acceptance is not one about which anybody is likely 
to have robust pre-theoretical intuitions; indeed, it’s odd on the face of it to say that someone 
accepts a proposition that is false, and yet we need this possibility to be part of the theory. 
‘Updating the common ground’ has some intuitive appeal: I make a claim, and we add it to the 
stock of things we accept. But questions remain. Adding a proposition to the set via assertion is a 
straightforward enough idea; presupposition accommodation also makes good sense. Is 
subtracting a proposition also straightforward?
283
 And what about implicatures? Stokke thinks 
that it’s clear that conventional implicatures are to be added to the common ground. Are 
conversational implicatures also clearly to be so added? If implicatures are all proposed additions 
to the common ground, then the entire weight of drawing the distinction between lies and false 
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implicatures falls on the first condition of Stokke’s definition of lying—on the concept of saying. 
If implicatures are not proposed updates to the common ground, why not? If they are, is there 
any difference between how GCIs and PCIs are added? It’s easy to see why presuppositions need 
to be accommodated: those propositions are very closely connected to the ones that presuppose 
them. Arguably, conventional implicatures—since they arise from the meanings of terms—are 
also so closely related that they must also, obviously, be included in updates to the common 
ground. But conversational implicata—the computation of which is mediated by the maxims—
are relatively more distant from the propositions that give rise to them; and arguably PCIs more 
so than GCIs (given the latter’s default status). So are all of these proposed for inclusion in the 
common ground? I’m not suggesting that this question has no answer within the 
Stokke/Stalnaker framework, only that the fact that the answer isn’t obvious is evidence that the 
idea of updating the common ground is not as intuitive as it first appeared. I’ll return to this 
concern in a moment, after first considering another potential complication for his definition that 
Stokke addresses.   
 This complication involves, once again, the case of bald-faced lies. As noted, the notion 
of common ground must be spelled out in terms of mere acceptance, rather than belief, so that a 
proposal to add to doesn’t involve proposing one’s audience believe what one says; that’s not 
what the bald-faced liar does. This complication has been pre-emptively avoided. The further 
complication is this: if it’s known to all—speaker and audience—that what the bald-faced liar is 
saying is false, shouldn’t we say that this common knowledge is part of the common ground? 
And if so, isn’t there something extremely odd about proposing to update the common ground 
with a proposition when its negation is already accepted? Does this amount to proposing that 
everyone accept a contradiction? Stokke says two things in response. First, it doesn’t follow from 
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something’s being common knowledge to its being part of the common ground; in fact, its 
negation might be common ground. We’re asked to consider Keith Donnellan’s old chestnut, 
‘The man drinking a martini is a philosopher’. It may be that both speaker and hearer of this 
utterance know that it’s not a martini, yet, for the purposes of the conversation, they have both 
agreed to accept that he is drinking a martini.
284
 So we can have a proposition be part of the 
common ground even though its negation is common knowledge; this is what happens with bald-
faced lies. Furthermore, Stokke says, even if we insist that common knowledge must be part of 
the common ground, this does not present a problem in the case of bald-faced lies. Suppose it’s 
common knowledge, and hence common ground, that the witness was at the scene of the crime. 
When he testifies to the contrary, the witness is proposing to update the common ground with the 
proposition that he was not there. This needn’t involve a proposal that everyone accept both p 
and ~p; rather, the witness is suggesting that the update involve removing one proposition and 
replacing it with its negation.  
  I don’t have any serious objection to any of this; I think Stokke handles the potential 
problems with aplomb. Rather, I want to express (again) a vague sense of unease. My unease 
stems from the feeling that a lot of this is quite unintuitive. I think the very fact that the objection 
sounded so plausible as initially stated (Isn’t common knowledge common ground? How can 
you update a set of propositions with one of their negations?) is evidence that the ideas here—
common ground, updating, acceptance (as opposed to belief)—are not ones that come naturally. 
Again, this is not a real objection; sometimes we need to resort to unintuitive, novel concepts in 
order to develop a comprehensive account even of an ordinary notion like assertion. But the 
notion, for example, that I can accept something while knowing it to be false is just odd. What 
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we accept appears to be shaped by practical (as opposed to theoretical) considerations, and to 
depend on contextual demands.
285
 It’s easy to see how acceptance can be the appropriate attitude 
in a case like the following: 
The three of us need jointly to decide whether to build a house together. We agree to base 
our deliberations on the assumption that the total cost of the project will include the top 
of the estimated range offered by each of the sub-contractors. We facilitate our group 
deliberations and decisions by agreeing on a common framework of assumptions. We 
each accept these assumptions in this context, the context of our group's deliberations, 
even though it may well be that none of us believes these assumptions or accepts them in 
other, more individualistic contexts.
286
 
 
That situation involves mere uncertainty about what is accepted; we don’t know that the 
contractors won’t all come in at the top end of their estimates, but it’s useful to operate on that 
assumption. Appeal to such practical considerations is perhaps also plausible in the case of the 
non-martini-drinker: what he’s actually drinking is some strange concoction we don’t know the 
name of, so to facilitate a smoother conversation, we agree to accept that he’s a martini-drinker, 
even though we know that’s false. But the case of bald-faced liar in court seems different; sure, 
the witness goes on the record with his claim to have been in Buffalo, but in what sense does 
anyone accept that claim? What practical end is served by the alleged acceptance? Perhaps 
there’s something Stokke could say about this example to put my mind at ease; I’ll even stipulate 
that he can. My concern is how easily this kind of worry can arise in the first place. I’m just 
highlighting the unintuitive nature of some of Stokke’s fundamental concepts. I’d prefer an 
account of assertion with a more intuitive foundation. 
 There are alternatives to the Stalnakerian Common Ground approach in the literature. 
MacFarlane 2011 provides a useful taxonomy of the views on offer. He divides them into four 
categories, and frames them as answers to the question “What is assertion?” 
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1. To assert is to express an attitude. 
2. To assert is to make a move defined by its constitutive rules. 
3. To assert is to propose to add information to the conversational common ground. 
4. To assert is to undertake a commitment.
287
 
 
It remains for us to see whether any of these alternatives provides a satisfying, intuitive account 
of assertion—one that is, in particular, suitable for characterizing lies and differentiating them 
from acts of mere misleading. 
 The first type of account—assertion as an expression of an attitude—does not fare 
particularly well. Typically, the attitude in question is taken to be belief, so that to assert 
something is, roughly, to express one’s belief in it. This is obviously too simple; for one thing, 
we can assert things we don’t believe (lying!). A sophisticated definition of assertion along these 
lines appears in Bach and Harnish 1979: 
In uttering e, S asserts that P if S expresses: 
 i. the belief that P, and 
 ii. the intention that H believe that P.
288
 
 
As MacFarlane has also noted
289
, this definition seems to count implicata as part of what 
someone asserts.
290
 For example, if my wife asks me whether I remembered to do the dishes, and 
I respond, “My fingers look like prunes,” I implicate that yes, I remembered to do the dishes, and 
have the dish-pan hands to prove it. But in fact I’m trying to get away with something: true, my 
fingers are pruney, but only because I’ve spent the last few hours luxuriating in the hot tub, 
ignoring my chores—the dishes among them. This is a clear case of misleading with false 
implicature, which we want to distinguish from an outright lie. But in producing my utterance, I 
satisfy both of Bach and Harnish’s conditions, even if we let P = ‘I did the dishes’. The key to 
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seeing this is to understand what they mean by ‘express’. It is not necessary for S to have the 
belief that P in order to express that belief; if it were, it would be impossible to assert things we 
don’t believe. Rather, to express an attitude is “for S to R-intend the hearer to take S’s utterance 
as a reason to think S has that attitude.”291 An “R-intention” is a reflexive intention—an intention 
to produce an effect in the hearer, the fulfillment of which “consists in [its] recognition.”292 That 
is, an assertive act succeeds just in case the hearer recognizes that the speaker intends that she 
take his utterance to be a reason for thinking that he has the relevant belief. Clearly, then, both of 
the conditions are met for the proposition ‘I did the dishes’: (i) I’ve expressed the belief that P, in 
the sense that I’ve R-intended my wife to take my utterance as a reason for thinking I believe that 
P (I’m trying to get away with something, so naturally I want her to believe that I believe that I 
did the dishes); and (ii) I’ve also expressed an intention that she believe that P. Now, if we assert 
not only what our utterances literally mean, but also whatever they implicate—and if we define 
lying as a form of assertion, so that asserting something believed-false is a sufficient condition 
for having lied—then we lose the distinction between lies and false implicatures. This account of 
assertion won’t do for our purposes. 
 The second alternative—according to which assertion is an act governed by constitutive 
rules—comes in many varieties.293 What they have in common is the claim that what is essential 
to an assertion is just that it is subject to evaluation by a particular rule or norm; the accounts 
differ with respect to which norm they identify as the constitutive rule. The most frequently 
defended norm is the so-called knowledge norm of assertion, according to which it’s constitutive 
of assertive practice that we follow a norm something like “one ought to assert only what one 
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knows.” Other possible norms replace the knowledge-condition with, e.g., truth, belief, 
reasonableness, etc.; some are skeptical of the whole enterprise of providing such norms.
294
  
 While talk of norms dovetails nicely with my own preoccupation with lying and 
misleading, I’m among those skeptical of this general approach. I lack fully developed 
arguments to support my skepticism, and even if I had them, it would probably take us too far off 
track to spell them out. I’ll limit myself to (i) the expression of a vague suspicion, and (ii) 
pointing to a feature that these accounts lack, and that my preferred account does not. First, the 
suspicion. Arguments for these constitutive-norm accounts of assertions rely on intuitions about 
particular cases—about the correctness or incorrectness of assertions in different circumstances. 
Exponents of these views are careful to distinguish the constitutive norm governing the practice 
of assertion from other norms we might use to judge individual assertions. Constitutive norms 
are supposed to be like rules of a game—rules that serve to define a kind of practice.295 If one 
violates such a rule, one is subject to criticism on grounds that are internal to the practice. So, if 
one lies, one is sanctioned not only from the perspective of moral norms, which lie outside the 
practice of asserting, but from within: it’s a defective assertion, against the rules of the game, as 
it were. Here’s my problem: I know what it’s like to have an intuition about the moral 
permissibility of a particular assertion, or about its politeness, aptness, etc.; I don’t know what 
it’s like to have an intuition about the correctness of a particular assertion qua assertion, 
independent of any of the other usual evaluative standards. Peter Pagin apparently shares my 
concern, and puts it more clearly: 
Even more rare, I think, are evaluations in such cases when it is also made clear that the 
assertion is not judged from a moral point of view, or from the point of view of general 
                                                 
294
 DeRose, Hawthorne, Williamson and Unger are in the knowledge camp; Lackey goes for a “reasonable to 
believe” norm; Weiner favors truth; Koethe is skeptical. 
295
 Williamson puts it this way, using the analogy to games: op. cit., p. 234 
   
 196 
prudence or etiquette, but strictly from a point of view that only deals with semantics, 
speech act principles and epistemic conditions. In fact, it is not so clear that it happens at 
all outside philosophical contexts. Finally, when the question comes up, it seems to be up 
for debate what is to be considered as right or wrong, and this indicates that there is no 
firm empirical basis for such assessments. It is then not easy to see what the empirical 
basis could be for the claim that assertion is truly characterized by one norm rather than 
another.
296
 
 
Indeed, when authors defending various norms over others cite their intuitions, they find it hard 
not to express them in moral terms. Analyzing a particular assertion in context, Matthew Weiner 
says about it, “This sounds more acceptable than the assertion of (1) in the original set-up. It may 
be banal, unkind, and pointless to assert (11), but it is not likely to mislead.”297 The assertion in 
question is vindicated—despite various unattractive features—on the grounds that it’s not 
misleading; that doesn’t sound like a purely semantic assessment, as Pagin puts it. Again, I don’t 
take this to be a knock-down argument; only an expression of unease with this particular 
approach, one reason I feel more comfortable with an alternative. Another such reason is simply 
that the constitutive-norm accounts of assertion lack a certain directness; summing up 
Stalnaker’s approach, MacFarlane puts it like this:  
Stalnaker’s account of assertion differs from the two accounts we have examined so far in 
focusing neither on what is expressed by an assertion nor on the norms for when an 
assertion may be made, but on what he calls the “essential effect” of an assertion. As an 
answer to the question “what is it to make an assertion,” this is attractively direct. It has 
the form: “to assert is to Ф.”298 
 
My preferred account of assertion (and MacFarlane’s) shares this directness. 
 It also shares the main attraction of the rules-based approach: it defines assertion in 
explicitly normative terms, dovetailing with the present focus on assertions (lies) we judge to be 
wrong. I prefer a definition of assertion according to which to assert is to undertake a certain 
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kind of commitment. In this, I’m following the general approach outlined by Brandom 
(especially in his 1983 and 1994). The basic idea is to characterize assertions in terms of their 
normative consequences: in making an assertion, one undertakes a commitment, imposes upon 
oneself certain obligations. Specifically, in asserting one “commits oneself to justifying the 
original claim.”299 This produces an obligation “to justify the claim if challenged.”300 So lying, 
within this framework, is, roughly, committing oneself to justify something one believes to be 
false (and hence, unjustifiable). Given the explicitly normative terms in which this account is 
framed, it’s easy to see why lying is often wrong: one shirks one’s responsibilities and hangs 
one’s interlocutors out to dry, for the effect of asserting on them is to entitle them to assert the 
same thing (and other things that follow from it), deferring the justificatory responsibility to the 
original speaker; when one can’t meet that obligation, one has (often) wronged one’s audience, 
having put them into a position of vouching for unjustifiable claims. 
 One of the main problems we had with the other accounts of assertion was the difficulty 
of drawing the distinction between lying and misleading within their frameworks. For the Bach 
and Harnish view, false implicatures ended up counting as asserted contents, making it 
impossible to draw the distinction. For the Stalnaker/Stokke view, the difficulty was that the 
terms in which assertion was defined were insufficiently intuitive, so that they provided little 
guidance in deciding difficult cases. The notion of the common ground was not one about which 
we had any pre-theoretical intuitions, so the burden of distinguishing lies from non-lies fell on 
the notion of ‘saying’, about which there are too many unanswered questions. If what is said is to 
be specified according to some prior semantic, pragmatic, or mixed account, then, as we saw in 
Chapter 2, the difficulties may be insuperable. But here we find another potentially attractive 
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feature of the Brandomian framework: his approach reverses the explanatory order, specifying 
content not in terms of some prior semantic account, but in terms of the practices of participants 
in the Sprachspiele of assertion: 
Whether or not one claim justifies another, for example, is not determined by some 
objective semantic content or relations the sentences have and which the community must 
try to live up to or reflect in their social practices of recognizing some claims as justifying 
others. Rather, a justification is whatever the community treats as one—whatever its 
members will let assertors get away with. It is from the communal responsive 
dispositions to recognize some claims as justifying others that the sentences involved first 
acquire their semantic contents, paradigmatically their behavior as antecedents of 
conditionals. The meanings do not determine the appropriate inferences, but what 
inferences are socially appropriate determines the meanings of the sentences involved in 
those inferences.
301
 
 
I quote Brandom at great length here in order to include both what I like about his overall 
approach and what I’d rather not embrace. The latter category includes his “inferentialist” 
Semantics, according to which semantic content is determined by inferential role; this is the view 
gestured at in the last two sentences of the quoted passage (and developed fully in his 1994). I’m 
not prepared to embrace that kind of account of meaning. But I think it’s separable from the 
basic idea that a focus on practices can be helpful in determining speech act content—especially 
the content that is my narrow focus: what counts as said or asserted for the purposes of 
distinguishing between lies and merely misleading acts? Given the results of the investigations of 
Chapter 2, I’m skeptical about the prospects for a definitive answer to this question coming from 
some prior semantic or pragmatic theory. I think we can maintain that those sorts of 
considerations play some role in determining the contents of our assertions, but that the ultimate 
tribunal is community practices—“whatever its members will let assertors get away with.” What 
counts as part of what is (strictly speaking) said depends on the kinds of practices that Brandom 
focuses on: if a challenge is issued to an assertor to vindicate some allegedly asserted content by 
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justifying it, and the challenge is considered appropriate, then the speaker has an obligation to 
defend that content, and it counts as part of what he said. If he can’t vindicate it, he may be 
judged a liar. On the other hand, if the speaker is able to sidestep such a challenge (legitimately, 
according to the community’s reckoning), on the grounds that he does not have an obligation to 
justify certain content (such as, say, a false implicature), then that content is not part of what he 
said. In such cases, he may be judged to have merely misled (if, again, something like false 
implicature is involved). Clearly, Brandom’s overall approach to assertion is most compatible 
with the methodology we employed in Chapter 2: we appealed to intuitions about whether an 
accusation of lying would be judged appropriate, based on whether or not the alleged liar could 
succeed in avoiding the accusation by legitimately claiming that he is not responsible for 
vindicating the falsehood in question; these are just the sorts of scenarios that are at the 
foundation of Brandom’s theory. We discovered that our intuitions about certain difficult cases 
were not firm. This is just what we should expect if community practices are the ultimate 
standard of evaluation; people will disagree about borderline cases. This is as it should be. 
Community practices can be the subject of debate and disagreement, and can (and should) 
change over time. An account of assertion, and hence of lying, in terms of such standards is 
attractive for just this reason: it makes room for reflection on and revision of our concept of 
lying, which we may want to adjust in light of various considerations, be they linguistic or moral. 
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4.3 MORAL QUESTIONS 
 
One way we might adjust our concept of lying, for either linguistic or moral reasons (or both), is 
by defining it in such a way that any deceptive speech act counts as a lie, whether or not one 
believes that its content is false; it may be true (and believed-true). Thus, Sissela Bok writes, “I 
shall define as a lie any intentionally deceptive message which is stated.”302 According to this 
definition, then, the acts that I’ve been characterizing as merely misleading would count as lies, 
since they’re deceptive statements. So we lie not only when what we say is false (or believed 
false, or what have you), but also when the implications of what we say are false—even if what 
we say is true. At least, this is how we would put it if we assumed a standard Gricean framework. 
But as we noted, this conception of lying dovetails nicely with a broader conception of semantic 
content, such as that provided by Jaszczolt’s Default Semantics. For her, implicatures can be 
included within a speaker’s primary meaning—the semantic content of her utterance—if they are 
part of what ideal interlocutors would intend to communicate (as speaker) and interpret (as 
hearer). It seems quite natural to say that if the meaning of a speaker’s utterance is false, then she 
has lied. This gives the advocate of the expanded definition of lying at least some cover from 
criticism to the effect that it competes with our intuitions about lying (and misleading). However, 
one needn’t adopt a radically contextualist position like Default Semantics to go along with a 
more expansive definition of lying. In his 2005, Jörg Meibauer, a mainstream linguist, “analyses 
falsely implicating from the point of view of Gricean theory of implicature, …[and] argue[s] that 
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the case of falsely implicating should be included within a general definition of lying.”303 
Meibauer offers an extended, disjunctive definition of lying: someone lies if and only if he 
asserts something he believes is false or conversationally implicates something he believes to be 
false.
304
 
I am disinclined to accept such a broad definition of lying because it makes no distinction 
between true and false deceptive claims—that is, between what we’ve been calling acts of 
misleading and lies proper. Now, I can’t just register this complaint and leave it at that, lest I beg 
the question against Bok, Meibauer, and others. But I do not think that my position and theirs are 
on equal footing; rather, the burden of proof is on the advocate of the expanded definition of 
lying. She must provide compelling reasons for abandoning the distinction between lying and 
misleading. This is her burden since that distinction is so well-entrenched: it is a commonplace 
everyday usage; there is a theoretical, linguistic framework within which we can at least roughly 
draw it; and there is a long history of philosophical reflection on its moral importance. The 
distinction between lying and misleading is easy to explain, even to a child. Simple examples are 
enough to make it clear; the misleading grocery store sign under cans of soup, with which we 
began this essay, always works for me. Normal users of language make the distinction all the 
time. Indeed, even the Supreme Court of the United States, in Bronston, distinguishes between 
(perjurious) lying and non-felonious misleading. Grice gives us the tools to distinguish between 
what we say and what we implicate, which is helpful (though, as we saw in Chapter 2, hardly 
decisive) in making the distinction somewhat more precise. Finally, the distinction between lying 
and misleading has long been thought to be morally relevant. Saint Augustine, for example, 
defends Abraham who, in Genesis 20 tells king Abimelech that Sarah is his sister, which is true, 
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but meant to mislead the king into thinking that Sarah is not his wife; Abraham is praiseworthy, 
according to Augustine, for having avoided a lie in this case.
305
 Aquinas concurs with 
Augustine’s defense of Abraham, and offers further that “it is lawful to hide the truth prudently, 
by keeping it back….”306 Kant relates a personal anecdote in which he avoids lying to Friedrich 
Wilhelm II, but nevertheless deceives him.
307
 The debate about the moral relevance of the 
lying/misleading distinction continues in contemporary philosophical discussions: Jonathan 
Adler (1997) sides with tradition in maintaining that it does make a moral difference; Bernard 
Williams (2002) and Jennifer Saul (2012 and 2013) express doubts. 
In light of all this, I think we should demand some very compelling reasons for 
abandoning the lying/misleading distinction and embracing an expanded definition of lying. Bok 
doesn’t offer such reasons. She is concerned exclusively with questions in moral philosophy—
when and why it might be justifiable to lie—so she doesn’t offer a discussion about the linguistic 
considerations that underwrite our distinction. This appears to be intentional: “[My] purposes are 
best served by concentrating on choices between truth-telling and clear-cut lying, rather than on 
other forms of deception such as evasion or the suppression of relevant information.”308 
Apparently the difficult, borderline cases that have been our focus are not useful in bringing out 
the moral points she’s interested in making. That’s well and good, but it’s not enough reason to 
abandon our focal distinction. Meibauer, on the other hand, at least attempts to provide an 
argument for preferring a more expansive definition of lying. Alas, it’s pretty weak tea. First, 
Meibauer notes that lies differ from deceptions in that the latter need not be verbal (think of 
Kant’s example of the man silently packing as if going on a trip) and, if verbal, need not involve 
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assertion (one can ask a question, e.g., with a false presupposition). He then presents an 
argument for the expanded definition of lying, which I quote in full to avoid any appearance of 
being uncharitable: 
In my view, however, it follows from the two differences between deception and lie 
listed above that false implicatures should not be treated as deceptions. To be sure, false 
implicatures are deceptive, but lies are deceptive, too. An advantage of the extended 
definition of lie… is that it makes no use of the very broad and general notion 
‘deception’. The use of the notions ‘assertion’, ‘lie’, and ‘conversational implicature’ is 
sufficient. Thus, in the case where the assertion p is false and the implicature q is false, 
we do not have to say that there is a lie, and, in addition, a deception. It is a lie, because it 
is false on the basis of the assertion and the implicature. A further advantage of our 
extended definition of lie… is that it comprises the intimate connection between the 
assertion and its implicature. The crucial point is that a false implicature only comes 
about through a verbal act of assertion to which it is bound. In contrast, a characterisation 
of false implicature as deception misses this connection and remains purely 
terminological.
309
 
 
I don’t really understand this argument, let alone find it convincing. Meibauer seems to think that 
it’s best not to think of lies as sub-types of deception—despite the fact that, as he says in his 
second sentence above, they’re deceptive! Is this because the concept of deception is too “broad” 
and “general”? That claim is hinted at, but I don’t know. What’s wrong with having broad, 
general notions, anyway? He claims that the expanded definition of lying allows us more simply 
to handle cases in which one asserts a falsehood, and in so doing also implicates a falsehood. We 
can just say the person lied, rather than saying that he both lied and misled. But don’t we still 
have to note the falsity of both the assertion and the implicatum? The only advantage of 
Meibauer’s definition is that we can call them both lies; is that really so much better than saying 
there’s a lie and another deception? It seems worse, in that it obscures the differences between 
the two falsehoods. Granted, there are lots of different ways of deceiving others (Chisholm and 
Feehan (1977) distinguish eight), even if we restrict ourselves to verbal means of deception, and 
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lying and falsely implicating are the only ones that necessarily involve assertions, but this alone 
is not enough reason to lump them into the same category. We can still distinguish the two 
without “miss[ing the] connection” between an implicatum and the assertion to which it is 
bound. And again, the distinction between lying and misleading is so well-entrenched in 
everyday usage that Meibauer himself has trouble avoiding it. He repeatedly characterizes 
misleading with false implicatures as “lying while saying the truth.” At one point he says, 
“[T]here is a striking parallel between genuine lies... and lying while falsely implicating.”310 In 
light of all this, I’m inclined to agree with an anonymous reviewer of Meibauer’s article, who 
characterized it as “merely a terminological contribution to the theory of lying.”311 
Meibauer tries to make the case for abandoning the distinction between lying and 
misleading with false implicatures on purely linguistic grounds, and, in my view, he fails. It’s 
worth reflecting, though, on how one might make a compelling case for his conclusion. I think 
one would have to muster more than linguistic considerations and focus on moral ones as well. 
One could, perhaps, take Meibauer’s point about the close connection between assertion and 
implicature, combine it with observations about the difficulty in many cases of deciding how to 
even draw the line between what’s asserted and what’s merely implicated (pointing to my 
Chapter 2 for multiple examples), and add an argument that, from a moral point of view, there is 
no real difference between lying and merely misleading. The distinction is impossible to draw on 
principled linguistic grounds, and it’s ethically pernicious—giving cover to deceivers whose 
deeds are just as blameworthy as liars—so it should be abandoned. 
There has been some discussion of the moral half of this argument in the literature. What 
we might call the traditional view, since it goes back at least to Augustine, is that the distinction 
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between lying and misleading is morally relevant, such that the latter is always to be preferred to 
the former. This often goes along with the view that lying is always wrong, without 
exception
312—and complements it, by giving us a deceptive practice that’s allowable in the kinds 
of circumstances where our intuitions tell us that deceiving is the right thing to do (the old 
murderer-at-the-door scenario, e.g.). There is a straightforward way to challenge the traditional 
view; Bernard Williams puts the question pointedly: “If someone deliberately brings it about by 
what he says that you have a false belief, getting you to rely on something which he knows is 
untrue, what moral difference, if any, does it make whether he does this by lying of by relying on 
an implicature?”313 It is, prima facie, strange to say that two actions with identical 
consequences—the hearer comes to have false beliefs—and undertaken with the same deceptive 
intention—to cause those false beliefs—are not equally blameworthy. The means of achieving 
the end shouldn’t matter. According to a simple act-consequentialism, we should say there’s no 
moral distinction between a lie and merely misleading speech act. Things are murkier if we shift 
to a rule-based approach: since the broader consequences of a general moral preference for 
misleading over lying might “encourage deviousness and a legalistic attempt to get away with 
what one can…,”314 it seems doubtful that a general rule preferring misleading to lying could be 
justified on consequentialist grounds. There may be some special circumstances, involving, for 
example, tact, in which such a rule might arguably be defensible (we’ll look at such a case soon), 
but I suspect such circumstances are rare; they certainly can’t justify a general principle 
according to which misleading is better than lying. From the point of view of a kind of simple-
minded virtue ethics, one might be tempted to attribute moral significance to the distinction: 
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choosing to mislead rather than lie evinces a kind of respect for the truth or laudable desire to 
avoid wrongdoing; it’s tempting to talk this way, say, about Abraham’s misdirection and other 
traditional anecdotes about the saints.
315
 But on further reflection, this looks dubious: it’s 
certainly not the case that all non-lying misleaders act as they do out of saintly scruples; much 
more common are those who choose their means of deception strategically, to maintain 
“plausible deniability” in the face of accusations of lying. This is hardly evidence of virtue. In a 
more sophisticated development of a virtue-based approach to these questions, Williams defines 
Sincerity as “the virtue of trustworthiness in speech,” and since misleaders are no more worthy 
of our trust than liars, then possessing the relevant virtue must involve more than merely 
avoiding outright lies.
316
 Finally, a rather crude deontological approach might point to the Ten 
Commandments or the Five Precepts of Buddhism, and point out (or argue), that only outright 
lying is proscribed; this is unlikely to be universally convincing. A more sophisticated 
deontologist might offer more argument. Kant (the sophisticated deontologist) puts things in 
typically Kantian terms: 
The human being as a moral being (homo noumenon) cannot use himself as a natural 
being (homo phenomenon) as a mere means (a speaking machine), as if his natural being 
were not bound to the inner end (of communicating thoughts). 
 
Someone who does not believe what he says to another… has even less worth than if he 
were a mere thing. …But communication of one’s thoughts to someone through words 
that yet (intentionally) contain the contrary of what the speaker thinks on the subject is an 
end that is directly opposed to the natural purposiveness of the speaker’s capacity to 
communicate his thoughts, and is thus a renunciation of his personality, and such a 
speaker is a mere deceptive appearance of a human being, not a human being himself.
317
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 This is a familiar Kantian formulation. But notice that it does not provide an argument that lying 
is worse than misleading. His formulation does restrict itself to lying (the speaker doesn’t believe 
what he says). Why is it worse than misleading? Kant believed that the distinction was morally 
significant: as we noted above, he once carefully misled the King of Prussia without lying to 
him; apparently, shortly before Friedrich Wilhelm II’s death, the King enjoined Kant to refrain 
from denigrating Christianity by expressing heterodox views; since Kant’s views were quite 
heterodox, this injunction required Kant to remain silent on religious matters, so Kant promised, 
“as your Majesty’s faithful subject, that I shall in future completely desist from all public lectures 
or papers concerning religion, be it natural or revealed.”318 Kant resumed lecturing and writing 
on religion after the King’s death, explaining that he was no longer his “Majesty’s faithful 
subject” at that point, since there was a new king. Alasdair MacIntyre attributes to Kant the view 
that one is only responsible for the content of what he asserts; anything conveyed over and above 
that content (implicatures, etc.) is out of his hands. “Kant therefore places himself among those 
who hold that my duty is to assert only what is true and that the mistaken inferences that others 
may draw from what I say or what I do are, in some cases at least, not my responsibility, but 
theirs.”319 The thought seems to be that the audience is (at least to some degree) responsible for 
making inferences, and this shifted (or shared) responsibility mitigates any badness in the 
deception. Jonathan Adler points out that Kant’s choice of example to distinguish lying from 
misleading, where the onlooker infers that the man packing is going on a trip, supports this 
interpretation.
320
 But there are several problems with this kind of reasoning. As Adler notes, 
there’s a difference between communicative and non-communicative misleading. In the case of 
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the latter, when implicatures are involved, the speaker invites the hearer to make an inference in 
a way not present in the former case: implicatures, after all, are required to make sense of 
assertions as being as consistent with conversational maxims.
321
 And any competent speaker 
knows this about his assertions, making him culpable at least to some degree for the hearer’s 
inferences. In that case, responsibility for inferences from assertions must be shared between 
speaker and hearer. In order to maintain that the distinction between lying and misleading is 
morally significant, then, we must argue that in cases of shared responsibility, badness of actions 
is mitigated. But this does not hold in general, as Saul points out. She asks us to consider two 
mugging victims, one who was walking in a safe part of town in broad daylight, and another who 
was, as is her wont, walking in a dangerous neighborhood in the middle of the night. The second 
victim, it seems, is partially responsible for her fate, since she was so reckless. But this shared 
responsibility does not mitigate the badness of the muggers’ actions.322 Hence, shared 
responsibility does not in general have morally relevant implications, and we need—and lack—
and argument that it should make a difference in the case of mere misleading. 
So it seems, at least on a cursory look at the various normative-ethical approaches one 
might take, that it’s difficult to make the case that the difference between lying and misleading 
ought to carry any moral weight. But again, we’ve only briefly considered some relatively 
unsophisticated and/or old arguments. A more sophisticated and recent attempt to defend the 
moral relevance of the distinction appears in Adler 1997. His aims in that paper are relatively 
modest, to show “that there is a moral asymmetry favoring falsely implicating or deceiving to 
lying, while holding neither that this is true in each case nor that a general deceptive strategy to 
                                                 
321
 Ibid., p. 445 
322
 Saul 2012, p. 5 
   
 209 
avoid lying is moral progress.”323 He gives an example of a situation in which lying is morally 
inferior to misleading, involving tact: a man at a party asks after the whereabouts of his friend’s 
absent wife. The friend replies that she’s out of town on business, which is true, but leaves it at 
that, concealing (by inviting a contrary inference) the fact that they’re having marital problems 
(and she wouldn’t have come to the party with him anyway). Adler says this “answer is 
appropriately tactful, and even admirable if an effortful attempt to avoid an outright lie. So the 
opportunity to deceive smooths over social frictions without the naked transgression of a lie.”324 
He argues that in cases in which we’re inclined to think that misleading is morally preferable, 
we’re sensitive to a feature of the circumstances under which implicatures arise, viz. a 
diminished demand (as opposed to expectation) of truthfulness.
325
 We’re less likely to demand a 
rationale for an implicatum than the content of an assertion, since the utterance that gives rise to 
the implicature often states the reasons. (“Ted: ‘Whose turn is it to walk the dog?’ Marcia: ‘I did 
it yesterday.’”326)  Adler concludes that this “difference in demands of truthfulness for assertions 
compared to implicatures provides a salient rationale for a corresponding ethical norm.”327 This 
norm falls short of providing permission to deceive, though, since the expectation of truthfulness 
is still present even if the demand is diminished.  
Adler’s argument is very subtle, and his conclusion is admirably modest, but I’m not 
convinced on a number of points. Adler doesn’t make it clear exactly how we move from a 
conversational regularity to an ethical norm. The regularity in question (utterances giving rise to 
implicatures often state reasons for the implicatum) isn’t all that regular (lots of utterances don’t 
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give the reasons for the implicata they generate), so it seems hard to extend this rationale for 
distinguishing lying and misleading to other examples that don’t involve the regularity. Also, the 
intuition that he aims to explain—that in cases where we have some legitimate reason to deceive 
(such as tact), lying is worse than misleading—is not one that I necessarily share. It’s at least 
possible to explain the prevalence of such intuitions as a vestige of the sorts of hard-line views 
about lying canvassed above, according to which lying is always wrong; after all, many of us 
grew up heavily influenced by such manichean doctrines.
328
 It’s even possible to reject the 
notion that misleading is better than lying, but still to have an intuition that the person who chose 
to mislead rather than lie did something praiseworthy: he’s mistaken about the moral 
significance of his choice, but that mistake is widespread, and he tried to do what he (and many 
others, possibly including his interlocutor) believe to be the better thing; this is perhaps revealing 
of the quality of his character, and should be lauded. Adler sometimes argues as though his 
suggested moral norm—derived from the supposed linguistic regularity involving a reduced 
demand for truthfulness on implicatures—is needed not only to explain our intuitions in cases 
involving a laudable choice to mislead rather than lie, but more generally from the frequency of 
social situations in which there is pressure on us to deceive: borrowing a phrase from John 
Rawls, he says, “[A] norm corresponding to the lessened demands of truthfulness for 
implicatures would be desirable for all… [g]iven the previously mentioned ‘strains of 
commitment’ generated by the numerous situations pressuring us to deceive.”329 But if this is the 
motivation, we don’t need a norm that rests on the dubious linguistic principle of a lessened 
demand of truthfulness for implicatures; as Saul points out, a plausible moral principle might 
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simply involve “a lessened demand for truthfulness when one has legitimate reason to 
deceive.”330 Saul puts the rationale so nicely, I’ll just quote her: 
If the reason for allowing some kinds of deception is that sometimes we have legitimate 
reason to deceive, this norm makes much better sense than one that focuses on method of 
deception. Compare the case of violence. In general, we think that violence is bad; but 
sometimes, e.g. in self-defence, we think it is legitimate. We accommodate this fact not 
by allowing that, say, shootings with one brand of gun are better than shootings with 
another, but by allowing that violence for the sake of self-defence is better than other 
violence.
331
 
 
This alternative derivation of the relevant moral maxim is appealingly direct: rather than attempt 
to justify intuitively innocent deceptive practices from tenuously related and narrowly applicable 
conversational principles, we can point directly to the moral features of the circumstance at hand. 
This does not, of course, allow for any moral difference between lying and misleading, and it 
does not explain intuitions we may have in certain cases that the latter is preferable to the former. 
I suggested an explanation above; Saul offers a similar one: 
A decision to mislead may reveal an admirable desire to mitigate the wrong of one’s 
deception: Since many people hold the false belief that misleading is better than lying, 
many people think they do something better by misleading than by lying. A person 
concerned with being moral, and troubled by deceit, will often make the effort to craft a 
merely misleading utterance in the hope of doing something less bad. That what they do 
is in fact equally bad does not undermine the fact that a person like this, who tries to act 
morally, is more admirable than one who simply does not try because they do not care.
332
 
 
I thus tentatively conclude, with Saul and Williams, that the lying/misleading distinction 
has little if any moral significance. I do so tentatively, though, since this is a large topic 
deserving much more sustained examination—and I have barely begun that task.333 It may be 
that a compelling case can be made, but my preliminary investigation suggests to me that the 
task would be quite difficult. I only considered the question, though, as part of an imagined 
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argument for the abandonment of the distinction: because it is theoretically unfounded (see 
Chapter 2) and morally otiose, it should be abandoned. Even if the second premise of this 
argument looks like it may be true, I’ve already considered and rejected the idea of abandoning 
the distinction between lying and misleading on the grounds that it can’t be made in a 
theoretically robust, principled way (cf. §3.1.4 above): that a distinction resists theoretical 
codification, that it may be vague—allowing for indeterminate borderline cases—does not mean 
that there is no such distinction. And the fact that the lying misleading distinction continues to 
play a role in our lives is reason to hold on to it. Saul and Williams both point to similar 
examples: there is a reduced expectation of truthfulness (to put it in Adler’s terms) in certain 
specialized contexts, so that the difference between an outright lie and a false implicature takes 
on legal, if not moral, force—namely, in courtrooms (Saul’s example) and in the British 
Parliament (Williams’). In courtrooms, as we’ve seen, the norm against deception is provided by 
perjury law, which requires outright falsehood for conviction; mere misleading, as we’ve called 
it, is perfectly legal on the witness stand. This lack of expectation of truthfulness, especially in 
the questioning of defendants, is a natural adjunct to the principle—codified in the Fifth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution—that citizens have a right against self-incrimination. While 
it may be difficult to find moral justification for such a principle (there is a large literature on this 
topic, featuring widespread skepticism about moral arguments), it is nevertheless a deeply held, 
widespread legal norm. Similar norms (with even more dubious prospects of moral justification, 
it seems to me) apply to members of the British Parliament. As Williams notes, “[M]inisters may 
not lie when answering questions or making statements, but they can certainly omit, select, give 
answers that reveal less than the whole relevant truth, and generally give a misleading 
impression. (There is indeed an offence of ‘misleading the House’ which falls short of straight 
   
 213 
lying, but the general idea is on the lines of the traditional distinction.)”334 So, despite its shaky 
moral status, I’m still disinclined to give up our focal distinction; its pervasiveness in both 
everyday life and in legal settings makes it worth holding on to. And its formal legal status 
makes it, as a purely practical matter, a distinction worthy of serious consideration, lest it be 
abused to the detriment of justice. 
4.4 LEGAL MATTERS 
Many legal scholars and jurists have subjected the lying/misleading distinction to scrutiny, with 
just that concern in mind. The most obvious statutory application of the distinction is to perjury, 
and there has been debate over the correct way to interpret the law proscribing that particular 
form of deception. The relevant U.S. statute defines perjury as occurring when a witness “states 
or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be true.”335 The most prominent 
case in which interpretation of this language was at issue is Bronston v. United States, which we 
have seen a couple of times already. A reminder of the relevant facts: in Bronston’s original trial, 
the following exchange occurred: “Q. Do you have any bank accounts in Swiss Banks, Mr. 
Bronston? A. No, sir. Q. Have you ever? A. The company had an account there for about six 
months, in Zurich.”336 Bronston’s final answer was true; what he didn’t say was that he had also 
had a personal account in Zurich. Bronston was convicted of perjury after the original trial, but 
the Supreme Court overturned that ruling, maintaining that the literal truth of Bronston’s answer 
precludes a perjury conviction. That answer is a classic instance of false particularized 
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implicature, and so clearly the Supreme Court’s view is that the lying/misleading distinction does 
and ought to have legal significance. Some scholars share that view; others disagree, arguing not 
only that Bronston was decided incorrectly, but that the decision sets a dangerous precedent not 
only in perjury law, but in general. 
 Stuart Green is among those who agree with the Court. In his 2000 and especially in his 
2001, he argues first that the lying/misleading distinction has moral significance, and that this 
maps neatly onto its legal significance. Those who merely mislead—paradigmatically, by 
uttering truths that give rise to false implicatures—“should be regarded as less fully culpable 
than if [they] had lied.”337 A principle of caveat auditor applies. And just as there is a moral 
difference between the two kinds of deceptive acts, there is a corresponding legal difference: 
perjury involves lying, while other offenses—like the various kinds of criminal fraud—can 
involve merely misleading. The Court, therefore, gets it right in Bronston. The principle of 
caveat auditor is even more clearly applicable in a courtroom: one of the main differences 
between acts of lying and misleading “is that the latter afford the listener the opportunity for 
more precise questioning, which… lies generally do not. This distinction applies a fortiori in the 
courtroom. A lawyer who fails to clarify evasive or nonresponsive statements from a witness 
bears even more responsibility for improper inferences than does a listener in everyday 
conversation.”338 The Court itself avers that “it is the lawyer’s responsibility… to flush out the 
whole truth with the tools of adversarial examination.”339 
 We can criticize Green’s work, I think, from a number of angles. First, he seems to rely 
on a rather naïve view about meaning to draw his distinction between lying and misleading. The 
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difference between the two is just “the difference between (1) asserting what one believes is 
literally false, and (2) leading the listener to believe something false by saying something that is 
either true or has no truth value.”340 To determine whether an assertion is literally false, one 
checks its literal meaning, which “is derived, roughly speaking, by determining the meaning of 
the individual words... and applying the grammatical rules of the language to those words.”341 
And the literal meaning of an utterance is to be distinguished from what a speaker intends to 
convey by uttering it. If only things were so simple. It is painfully clear to us by now that this 
rough sketch elides any number of vexing complications; I won’t even bother listing them at this 
point. Second, I think Green does too little to establish his claim that “ceteris paribus, lying is 
more wrongful than merely misleading.”342 He spends only a few pages on the topic, citing, e.g., 
the dubious proposition (considered above) that in cases of misleading the listener shares some 
responsibility for drawing the inference (this seems to be the thrust of his appeal to a caveat 
auditor principle). He points to the Judeo-Christian tradition of making the distinction, and the 
Jesuits’ practice of “mental restriction”; again, we’ve considered these already, and found them 
wanting as justifications for a real moral distinction. It’s quite difficult to make the case that the 
lying/misleading distinction has moral significance, and Green has not done nearly enough to 
establish that claim. However, we should say, again, as already noted above, that a lack of moral 
significance need not imply that the distinction lacks legal significance, especially in the context 
of perjury, where the speech acts under consideration take place in a special, formalized 
context—a courtroom, in which, arguably, there is a reduced expectation of truthfulness and a 
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principle of caveat auditor is appropriately applied, e.g., to attorneys with the power and 
responsibility to ask probing follow-up questions. 
 The more serious objection, though, is the first: with a too-simplistic conception of literal 
meaning, one runs the risk of defining perjury so narrowly as to allow clearly specious defenses 
against lying to win the day in court. Some scholars maintain that the Bronston decision opens 
the door to this kind of pernicious “Literalism,” as William Simon calls it, exemplified in recent 
history by Bill Clinton’s legal maneuverings during the Monica Lewinsky affair, the Paula Jones 
trial, etc. Clinton, famously, quibbled over the proper understandings of the word ‘is’ and the 
phrase ‘sexual relations’, the latter of which, he claimed, he understood to preclude fellatio. Peter 
Tiersma, in his 1990, argues at length that the Court’s “literal falsity” requirement for perjury is 
an untenable standard, and “that the central issue in determining whether a false statement has 
been made ought to be what the witness meant by his statement, rather than what the words of 
the witness literally mean.”343 That is, he argues that speaker meaning, rather than merely what is 
said—to put it in Gricean terms—should be evaluated for truth or falsity in perjury cases. 
Tiersma explicitly appeals to the Gricean framework to make his case: he argues that speakers in 
a courtroom ought to be expected to adhere to the various conversational maxims, and that 
exploitation of them to communicate falsehoods ought to be considered perjurious. His overall 
strategy is familiar to us: he considers a variety of scenarios—some real, some invented—in 
which it’s difficult to say what counts as falling on either side of the Gricean divide between 
saying and implicating; he also considers scenarios in which there’s a strong intuition to include 
implicata as part of what is said. In other words, he does much the same thing that we did in 
Chapter 2. So, for example, he considers the question “Do you drive a Chevy?” and imagines the 
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response “I drive a Ford.”344 Supposing the person in question drives both a Ford and a Chevy, 
but wants to conceal (for some reason) the latter, has she lied/perjured herself in this case? What 
she said is arguably literally true. He looks at the case of United States v. Earp, in which the 
defendant is an incompetent racist, who, on a number of occasions had attempted to burn crosses 
in the lawns of inter-racial couples, but had failed to get them to light. When asked whether he 
had ever burned any crosses, he answered that he hadn’t; his conviction on perjury charges was 
overturned, appealing to the Bronston standard.
345
 But in Harrison v. State, an Indiana case, a 
certain trustee reported that he had received $500 from a bankruptcy settlement, when in fact he 
had received $1500; the court was not impressed with his defense that it was literally true that he 
had received $500.
346
  
 From these and many more examples, Tiersma concludes that the notion of literal truth 
cannot be satisfactorily defined, and so it should be abandoned as a legal standard. This is a 
tempting conclusion to draw; it mirrors our own reasoning in Chapter 2, in which we concluded 
that there is no precise way to draw the distinction between what is said (strictly speaking) and 
what is otherwise conveyed. The sorts of examples Tiersma cites, and the variety of intuitions 
they trigger, are just the sorts of examples we considered. But while the conclusion that there is 
no clear line to be drawn between lying and misleading is justified, I think it is hasty to conclude 
from this, as Tiersma does, “that whether a witness makes a false statement should depend on 
what the witness intended to communicate-what the witness meant by the statement.”347 This 
would amount to throwing out the distinction between lying and misleading entirely, and 
counting false implicatures as perjurious. I’ve considered this possibility before (cf. §3.1.4 and 
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§4.3 above) and rejected it: the fact remains that the lying/misleading distinction, even if it can’t 
be underwritten by a satisfactory semantic or pragmatic theory, even if it is vague, is one that 
normal speakers naturally make. Among those normal speakers are legislators, and they have 
made it clear that they intend the distinction to have legal force: as Lawrence Solan points out, 
“legislators know how to write a statute that includes both false statements and misleading 
statements [as is the case in statutes covering fraud]…, but did not write the perjury statute that 
way.”348 
 It is a separate, and much more difficult, question whether the perjury statute ought to be 
written that way. Many of Tiersma’s arguments seem to be directed at this issue. Thus he notes, I 
think compellingly, that witnesses in court take an oath not only to tell the truth, but the “whole 
truth.”349 This is, on its face, a very strong promise; arguably, it’s a promise to be a maximally 
cooperative conversational participant, one who holds nothing back, answers questions 
straightforwardly, and follows all of the Gricean conversational maxims. This seems to be the 
standard that Tiersma envisions for witness behavior: “[Jurors] will interpret what is said by a 
witness roughly as they would utterances heard outside the courtroom. Therefore, in evaluating 
the statements of a witness for purposes of the law of perjury, there is no reason to apply distinct 
rules of interpretation.”350 That is, jurors should assume that Gricean maxims apply in the 
courtroom, and that witnesses are adhering to them. This would arguably have a salutary effect. 
Simon argues that overly literalistic standards for testimony threaten the rule of law, in the sense 
that “requires that enforcers have material information available to them. Literalism threatens 
                                                 
348
 Solan 2002, p. 190 
349
 Tiersma, op. cit., p. 395 
350
 Ibid., p. 403 
   
 219 
this pre-requisite by permitting the withholding of material information.”351 The probability that 
justice will be served varies directly with the amount and quality of factual information judges 
and jurors have access to; a regime under which witnesses were held to a higher standard of 
truthfulness-expectation would thus promote fair outcomes. There are, however, countervailing 
norms that militate toward granting some latitude to witnesses, especially defendants. As Simon 
himself admits, “there is an asymmetry of stakes peculiar to criminal prosecution. We deem 
erroneous conviction far more costly than erroneous acquittal.”352 This may explain and partially 
justify a higher tolerance for misleading in criminal, as opposed to civil, contexts. Simon also 
allows that it is plausible to say that “implicit deception is less blameworthy than explicit 
deception because the deceiver is less active and because the victim's sense of betrayal will be 
weaker. The claim rests on the omission/commission distinction that, though sometimes hard to 
justify in principle, has strong support in intuition and convention.”353 Thus the felt difference 
between outright lying and (many instances of) mere misleading. Simon speculates: “If we ask 
why implicit deception seems less bad, the answer is likely to be that it is closer to the situation 
where the subject is entirely silent.”354 This seems right, and is closely related to traditional 
norms according to which it is permissible, or at least less-blameworthy than it otherwise would 
be, for accused persons to avoid incriminating themselves. This principle is codified in the Fifth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which explicitly permits silence. And there is a related 
norm, traditionally accepted but lately repudiated (by the Supreme Court in 1998, in Brogan v. 
United States), that even allows for false denials: the so-called “exculpatory no” doctrine. 
According to this principle, one could lie to investigators, provided the falsehood consisted of a 
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simple denial of wrongdoing, and not be subject to prosecution for making false statements. As 
Green points out, prior to 1998, there was wide agreement among lower courts about the 
legitimacy of this norm.
355
 
 Thus it is a difficult question whether perjury law ought to be written the way it is. We 
cannot decide the issue here. But given that it is in fact written explicitly to proscribe only 
falsehoods, I think it’s hard to fault the Supreme Court for its decision in Bronston. There are 
cases of clear-cut lies and cases that are clearly acts of mere misleading; and so there are cases of 
clear-cut perjury, and cases in which, though misleading, the defendant clearly did not “state 
[anything] which he does not believe to be true.” There are also, of course, many borderline 
cases in between. But the law clearly puts the onus on the courts to decide difficult cases. People 
can have various opinions, I think, about Bronston’s utterance, but given the statute, and given 
the criminal standard of proof (beyond a reasonable doubt), it seems like the Court made the 
proper call. And concerns that their talk of “literal truth” will lead to widespread unjust 
exonerations are, I think, overblown. The Court, in its decision, is explicitly sensitive to the fact 
that “literal truth” defenses have limits. They consider an example proffered by the District 
Court: “[I]f it is material to ascertain how many times a person has entered a store on a given day 
and that person responds to such a question by saying five times when in fact he knows that he 
entered the store 50 times that day, that person may be guilty of perjury even though it is 
technically true that he entered the store five times.”356 The Court rejects the lower court’s 
reasoning: “[I]t is doubtful that an answer which, in response to a specific quantitative inquiry, 
baldly understates a numerical fact can be described as even ‘technically true’.”357 This recalls 
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our discussion of GCIs—specifically, Q-Implicatures of the scalar variety, one of which involves 
number-terms, where the literal sense is supposed to be ‘at least’ and the implicatum ‘at most’. 
We argued that in cases of deception, a defense against lying that appealed to the alleged literal 
meaning being ‘at least’ would fail. The Court agrees. Again, this is entirely proper: there are a 
variety of phenomena to consider on the boundary between lies and other kinds of deceptions, 
and judgments will have to be made on a case-by-case basis. Given the statutory definition of 
perjury, courts will have to make such judgments. The Supreme Court seems to recognize the 
need for flexibility. 
 A recent case from my current home state of Wisconsin provides another nice case-study 
highlighting the need to be sensitive to Chapter 2 considerations about the viability of defenses 
against accusations of lying in various circumstances. This is not a perjury case, but rather a 
judicial ethics investigation. The defendant, then a candidate for but now a member of the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court, Michael Gableman, was accused of committing an ethics violation by 
running a deceptive television ad against his opponent for the seat, then-Justice Louis Butler. 
Here’s the text of the advertisement: 
Unbelievable. Shadowy special interests supporting Louis Butler are attacking Judge 
Michael Gableman. It’s not true! Judge, District Attorney, Michael Gableman has 
committed his life to locking up criminals to keep families safe—putting child molesters 
behind bars for over 100 years. Louis Butler worked to put criminals on the street. Like 
Reuben Lee Mitchell, who raped an 11-year-old girl with learning disabilities. Butler 
found a loophole. Mitchell went on to molest another child. Can Wisconsin families feel 
safe with Louis Butler on the Supreme Court?
358
 
 
Butler had been the defense attorney for the rapist in question, from 1985 – 1988. He had indeed 
successfully appealed his client’s conviction. That ruling, however, was overturned by the 
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Supreme Court, and Butler’s client was sent to prison. He was released in 1992, when Butler was 
no longer his attorney. He was convicted of sexual assault in 1995.  
 Gableman agreed to the finding of fact that “[n]othing that Justice Butler did in the 
course of his representation of Mitchell caused, facilitated, or enabled Mitchell’s release from 
prison in 1992,” and further that “[n]othing that Justice Butler did in the course of his 
representation of Mitchell had any connection to Mitchell’s commission of a second sexual 
assault of a child.”359 Obviously, the advertisement suggests otherwise. 
 The ethics rule that Gableman was alleged to have violated says this: 
Misrepresentations. A candidate for a judicial office shall not knowingly or with reckless 
disregard for the statement’s truth or falsity misrepresent the identity, qualifications, 
present position, or other fact concerning the candidate or an opponent. A candidate for 
judicial office should not knowingly make representations that, although true, are 
misleading, or knowingly make statements that are likely to confuse the public with 
respect to the proper role of judges and lawyers in the American adversary system.
360
 
 
It’s important to note that the difference between the words “shall” and “should” is significant in 
this context: proscriptions of conduct beginning with “shall not” are mandatory; those beginning 
with “should not” are merely “aspirational.” Hence, although it’s arguable that Gableman 
violated the second condition (he argued before the Panel that he had), since it is aspirational, he 
was not subject to sanction for that violation. Only the first condition is in play. The question is 
how to interpret that condition. Citing the need to interpret statutes in such a way as to avoid 
superfluity, the Panel concluded that the first condition cannot be interpreted to proscribe true 
but misleading claims, since the second condition explicitly addresses those. They conclude that 
“it stands to reason that the first sentence must apply to statements that, standing alone, are 
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false.”361 This interpretation of the rule makes this case directly comparable to those involving 
perjury: there is a false-statement requirement. Two of the three judges on the Panel argued that, 
since the individual sentences in the advertisement were all true, there was no false statement, 
and so Gableman had not violated the mandatory portion of the rule. Enough members of the 
Supreme Court agreed with this reasoning, and Gableman was exonerated.
362
 
 I would argue that the Panel and (half of) the Court got this one wrong. Considerations 
from Chapter 2 can guide us here. The offending portion of the advertisement is this: “Butler 
found a loophole. Mitchell went on to molest another child.” The Panel (along with three 
Justices) notes that both sentences are true, and so Gableman cannot be said to have made a false 
statement. The linguistic phenomenon on display in this case is parataxis—the concatenation of 
clauses without conjunctions. Levinson argues that this gives rise to I-implicatures: 
“John turned the switch. The motor started.” 
I++> ‘John turned the switch and hen as an intended result the motor started.’363 
 
He points out that many have argued that parataxis should be interpreted as “elided conjunction,” 
but that the range of implicata is even wider for parataxis, as this example demonstrates: “John 
fell and broke his leg. He lost his grip on the cliff.” If ‘and’ were inserted between the two 
sentences, the natural reverse-temporal reading would be unavailable. Levinson also notes that 
many languages get along without conjunctions, relying instead on parataxis.
364
 We considered 
conjunctions above (§2.2.2), and noted the phenomenon of “buttressing,” whereby it’s natural to 
read them as carrying temporal, causal, and other types of information. Further, we concluded 
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that in many cases, the evidence was compelling that these sorts of I-implicatures ought to be 
included as part of what is said. I think these arguments apply to the Gableman ad: it seems quite 
natural to say that it said or claimed that there was a close temporal and causal connection 
between Butler’s finding a loophole and Mitchell going on to molest another child. I am 
therefore with the one member of the Panel, Ralph Fine, who dissented from the others’ 
conclusions on this question, writing, “The ‘fact’ asserted in the advertisement, by its language 
and the juxtaposition of that language, is that Justice Butler did something when he was a lawyer 
representing Mitchell that permitted Mitchell to commit another sex crime. There is in my view 
no other way to read the advertisement’s two key sentences….”365 An interpretation of sentences 
according to which the falsity is merely implied “is a crabbed reading, lashed to the mast of a 
sentence-by-sentence literalism, and ignores the way we use language….”366 I agree, and wish I 
had turned that phrase myself. 
 The situation in the Gableman case is exactly analogous to that faced in Bronston and any 
other perjury trial. A determination must be made as to whether or not the defendant has lied; 
this requires that what he said, strictly speaking, was false. Judgments about such matters can be 
difficult to make, as there are a wide variety of linguistic phenomena which the would-be 
deceiver can take advantage of. Chapter 2, while not exhaustive, surveyed a broad range of these, 
and its conclusions can be helpful in guiding our judgments. It is satisfying to conclude our 
sometimes abstruse theoretical investigations with a clear example of their potential for practical 
applicability. 
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